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Abstract 
 
In the recent debate around ‘globalisation’, and in relation to the development of 
capitalism on a world scale in general, Karl Marx has attracted enormous attention. It 
is true that he was particularly interested in the global character of capitalism. But he 
left a number of comments on it in many different occasions without organising them 
systematically and, therefore, commentators have interpreted Marx’s attitude towards 
it in a variety of ways according to their points of reference.  
Against this background, this thesis has two distinct purposes. The first part of this 
thesis traces Marx’s intellectual development and his changing thought on the 
globality of capitalism. To be shown is that as his main interest moved from 
philosophy and politics to political economy, and as his approach to political 
economy became more sophisticated over time, the meaning of globality and its place 
in his overall thought changed. Especially after what we call the ‘methodological 
sophistication’ around the time he wrote the Grundrisse in 1857-58, it is apparent 
that, grasping the globality of capitalism in the concept of the world market, he was 
planning to deal with it as a crucial moment in the reproduction of the capitalist world 
economy.  
The latter part of the thesis is devoted to presenting a possible realisation of Marx’s 
unfinished plan. Of course, this is to extend Marx’s value theory in his Capital by 
introducing the world market as a new theoretical category. This is necessarily 
concerned with a critique of the existing theories, mainstream or Marxist, of the 
international economic relations under capitalism. Our conclusion suggests that, 
unlike the significance the younger Marx attached to the globality of capitalism, the 
global development of capitalism present in his more mature thought tends to expose 
the fetishism of capitalism even further.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1.	MOTIVATIONS	AND	MAIN	QUESTIONS	
Put most briefly, this thesis is about Karl Marx’s thought on the meaning of the 
‘world’. Then, why the ‘world market’? This is simply because he captured the 
globality of capitalism with this concept. So, how that happened, and what he did, or 
wanted to do with it are the main questions to be answered. 
Indeed, the globality of capitalism is a subject that has seen the most active and 
abundant development within Marxist political economy after Marx’s death. The first 
step was taken by the generation of European Marxists who were instrumental in the 
Second International, and they eventually produced what later came to be called the 
‘classical’ theories of imperialism. After WWII, new approaches were developed 
reflecting the new aspects of IERs such as dependency theory, world-systems theory, 
theories of US economic and political hegemony, and other theories concerning 
transnational corporations as the new agents of international economic relations. 
Around the mid-1980s when the crisis of the ‘really existing socialism’ became 
obvious, the critical and explanatory power of Marxist theories of IERs began to 
decline. Indeed, the economic rise of the non-European NICs — first Japan, and then 
the Four Dragons of East Asia — appeared the evidence disproving the relevance of 
Marxist theories. But Marxist approaches revived in the ‘globalisation’ debate around 
the mid-1990s, and Marx is now praised as one of the first thinkers who took the 
globality of capitalism seriously. 
Then, ironically enough, Marx has always been regarded as important intellectual 
resources in clarifying capitalist international economic relations in spite of changing 
contours of the world economy from the late-19th century onwards. This means that 
Marx’s thought on the globality of capitalism can be interpreted in a variety of ways. 
To a degree, it is Marx himself who occasioned such ambiguity, for although he made 
a number of commentaries on the issue in his personal correspondence, public 
addresses and newspaper columns, he had never delivered any ultimate, or systematic 
argument on the globality of capitalism. 
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This emptiness is the main motivation of this thesis. Instead of trying to find out 
decisive commentaries on our subject, if any, from the heaps of his previously 
unavailable manuscripts, it seeks to elucidate Marx’s thought on the globality of 
capitalism by locating it in three contexts: his lfie-long intellectual development, the 
intellectual history of modern Europe, and real history. First of all, it needs to be 
considered in the dimension of his lfie-long intellectual development. Marx lived a 
life as a public intellectual for over 40 years from his mid-20s when he had started 
writing for the Rheinische Zeitung to the ‘mature’ years when he produced Capital. It 
is natural to suppose that there was one or more ‘epistemological breaks’ in his way 
of regarding society as the object of study; his thought about globality would have 
changed accordingly. Moreover, the significance of Marx’s varying thought would be 
further clarified, and enriched, when placed against the background of the relevant 
West European intellectual history of the globality of the modern world. Lastly, real 
historical development also needs to be considered. But we, in this thesis, deal with it 
as far as it makes up the ultimate landscape in which the intellectual development 
both of Marx and more broadly takes place. 
The consideration of the broader intellectual backgrounds is of critical importance in 
our discussion. For this will illuminate how Marx followed his predecessors, where he 
departed from them, and what significance it bore. More than anything else, the 
uniqueness of Marx’s thought on the globality of modern society lies in the fact that 
he, regarding the globality as a constituent category of the capitalist economy, tried to 
incorporate it in his system of value theory, though successful. The latter part of this 
thesis is devoted to presenting a possible realisation of Marx’s theory of international 
economic relations. In retrospect, it is conventional within Marxist scholarship to deal 
with this theme in relation to Marx’s notorious ‘Plan’ (see Rosdolsky 1968). Instead, 
we seek to locate it in the broader context where the political economists in his time 
conceptualised capitalist international economic relations. This approach is 
advantageous, not least considering that Marx’s value theory was presented as a 
critique of political economy.  
In the end, the main motivating and guiding questions of this thesis include:  
- How and against what background did Marx try to conceptualise the world 
market? 
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- What place does the discussion about the world market occupy in his overall 
theoretical engagement with modern society? Does it change? If so, how? 
- How can Marx’s thought on the globality of capitalism be incorporated in his 
value theory? Especially in respect of the critique of political economy, what 
critical argument does it make against the existing body of discussions on the 
same theme within political economy? 
 
1.2.	OUTLINE	OF	THE	THESIS	
This thesis is composed of two parts. Part I (‘Marx’s Political Economy and the 
World Market’) traces Marx’s intellectual development and his changing thought on 
the globality of capitalism. In order to highlight the peculiarities of Marx’s thought, it 
is placed against the relevant broader intellectual background in each chapter. To be 
shown is that as his main interest moved from philosophy and politics to political 
economy, and as his approach to political economy became more sophisticated over 
time, the meaning of globality and its place in his overall thought changed. Especially 
after what we call the ‘methodological sophistication’ around the time he wrote the 
Grundrisse in 1857-58, it is apparent that, grasping the globality of capitalism in the 
concept of the world market, Marx was planning to deal with it as a crucial moment in 
the reproduction of the capitalist world economy. 
 
To begin with, Chapter 2 examines early stages in the development of Marx’s 
thinking that amounted to the ‘turn’ to political economy around the mid-1840s. At 
first sight, this development appears to be changes in the field of interest from religion 
to reality, and then, from politics and jurisprudence to political economy. But these 
changes also involved a transformation of the way to look at society as the object of 
study. It will be shown, in § 2.1, that the main force that drives Marx’s early 
intellectual odyssey may be said to be a quest for the real and the material in social 
processes, and his ‘turn’ to political economy marks a culmination of this ‘quest’. 
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In § 2.2, the significance of Marx’s turn to political economy is expounded in his 
changing attitude towards the problématique of ‘alienation’. At first, Marx tried to lay 
bare the material basis of the Hegelian idealised concept of alienation, and to 
transform it materialistically; in doing so, he counted upon the political economy 
analysis of some key categories. However, as his quest for the real and the material 
proceeded, he at last dissolved the problématique of alienation which was 
philosophical in nature, and more focused upon the material conditions of modern 
society which necessarily produced the so-called alienation. Now, political economy 
acquired the opportunity of being appropriated more positively. Further, it is to be 
noted in this section that almost at the same time with his arrival at political economy, 
Marx began to be deeply impressed by the rapid development of the world market, 
precisely because it appeared to him to epitomise what Hegel had tried to address 
using the ideal concept of the state.  
 
Even after his full engagement with political economy, his attitude towards it showed 
further evolution. Of course, Marx’s ultimate intention was from the outset, and 
always, to criticise political economy. But, as long as political economy was the self-
understanding of modern civil society, his way of engaging with it was necessarily 
dependent upon which aspect of society as the object of study he emphasised. In 
Chapter 3, the relationship between Marx’s problématique on society and the 
significance of political economy is investigated. Marx’s consistent thought on 
society is that it is as good as a living organism, which has two distinct meanings: 
change and self-reproduction. In his early years, he emphasised the historical 
character of modern society against his Hegelian compatriots who tried to idealise it 
and, in doing so, wanted to secure the legitimacy and possibility to overcome the 
modern conditions. Here, according to Marx, political economy was superior to 
philosophy and jurisprudence in that it directly concerned the material basis of 
modern society, but was in the end to be abolished since it shared the fundamental 
presupposition of private property with modern society. It is in this sense that political 
economy was the destination of Marx’s early intellectual journey. 
However, as Marx’s approach to political economy became more sophisticated over 
time, his main interest as for modern society moved from its historical dissolution to 
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its contradiction-ridden structural reproduction. Now he found himself obliged to 
make up his own political economy in detail and, with this, criticised the existing 
system of political economy for being incapable of grasping the contradictory aspect 
of every single moment in the reproduction of the capitalist economy. Such a 
transformation of the way Marx engaged himself with political economy is termed in 
this thesis the ‘methodological sophistication’ (§ 3.2). It means that Marx’s 
understanding of political economy became deeper, and his critique immanent. To 
show this, the development of political economy before Marx is to be outlined in § 
3.1. 
 
Chapter 4 is devoted to showing how Marx’s way of conceptualising the world 
market changed as a result of the ‘methodological sophistication’ in his overall 
approach to political economy. Indeed, the globality of the modern world was a 
popular theme for some 18th century European social thinkers, and Marx’s early 
thought on it could be interpreted in that tradition. In § 4.1, the general intellectual 
context concerning the world market will be expounded. It will be demonstrated that, 
by the latter half of the 18th century, West European thinkers of the modern began to 
deal with the global material movement of the modern world seriously, and conceive 
‘globality’ as a decisive property of modern society which distinguished it from other 
forms of society. Although such a thinking of the globality of modern society was 
eventually accommodated into nationalist discourses in the 19th century, it is true that 
Marx was heavily indebted to that tradition. 
In the second section, two concepts of Marx’s world market will be identified 
distinctly. Firstly, the world market is represented both as the historical entity and the 
concept into which the latest developmental phase of the material dynamics of 
modern society is aggregated and summarised. That is, he regarded the radical 
expansion of human relationship made possible thanks to the globality of the modern 
economy as an essential condition for human emancipation and the conquest of the 
modern limitations. However, after the ‘methodological sophistication’, the globality 
came to be captured in the economic concept of the world market, as a category 
which made up the capitalist world economy, and as something continuously 
reproduced in the operation of the whole system. Not only did it mark the excellence 
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of Marx vis-à-vis his preceding thinkers of the global, but also meant that the 
globality of capitalism could be analysed in his mature theory of value. 
 
Part II (‘Value Theory and the World Market’) of the thesis is devoted to presenting 
a possible realisation of Marx’s unfinished plan. Of course, this is to extend Marx’s 
value theory in his Capital by introducing the world market as a new theoretical 
category. This is necessarily concerned with a critique of the existing theories, 
mainstream or Marxist, of the international economic relations under capitalism. Our 
conclusion suggests that, unlike the significance the younger Marx attached to the 
globality of capitalism, the global development of capitalism present in his more 
mature thought tends to expose the fetishism of capitalism even further. 
 
To perform the above task properly, it is necessary to expose some important 
characteristics of Marx’s value theory to a certain degree, which is the subject matter 
of Chapter 5. Here, the inner structure of the existing body of Marx’s value theory is 
investigated. Especially, since value theory is not only a structural and logical 
reconstruction of the capitalist economy, but also an immanent critique of ‘bourgeois’ 
political economy, it is crucial in introducing a new category to extend such a critical 
drive consistently. Firstly, § 5.1 seeks to spell out the characteristics of Marx’s 
critique by clarifying the multi-dimensionality of Marx’s critique, and shows that the 
fact that his value theory is a critique of political economy determines the content, 
principal tasks, and process of his theory building. This suggests that, to maintain 
consistency in extending Marx’s value theory, it is crucial to bear in mind what are 
the critical points to address in the new theoretical terrain.  
The second section (§ 5.2) traces Marx’s radically varying attitude toward dialectics 
over his intellectual life: how did his initial hate turn into a fully-fledged acceptance? 
Here, we challenge the conventional knowledge that his dialectical method was one of 
presentation, by demonstrating that Marx’s dialectics was first and foremost about 
thinking rather than presentation, and that his problem in presentation was basically 
about exposing his superiority in thinking, esp. vis-à-vis the Hegelians, at the 
dimension of presentation, not about securing the so-called (autonomous) inner 
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‘logic’ of presentation itself. Also emphasised is how Marx understood the limitations 
that dialectical method in thinking necessarily implied, and how he sought to 
complement them.  
 
Chapter 6 concerns the eventual extension of value theory. Since Marx’s value 
theory is a critique of political economy, its extension with the world market as a new 
category can be performed only based upon the equivalent discussions put forward 
within conventional political economy. In the first section, the way capitalist 
international economic relations (IERs) are conceptualised in economics is chronicled 
from the mercantile school to neoclassical economics. To characterise this way, we 
define the Ricardian framework. Those who observe IERs in this framework tend to 
reduce the myriad of forms of IERs to a barter relation between national economies. 
Here, nations are made to maximise their benefits by determining whether to produce 
a commodity themselves or to import it. Within this framework, it may be always 
possible to prove that a relations is mutually beneficial, but it is hardly sufficient to 
address the dynamics of IERs. 
The second section (§ 6.2) is devoted to composing a theory of IERs based upon 
Marx’s value theory by taking the world market as a new category. Here, it is very 
important to maintain his critical perspective on conventional political economy, for the 
analytical directions and themes are determined by the critical case he wanted to make against 
political economy (see § 5.1.3). As a result, it is crucial to extend value theory in two ways, 
analytical and critical, and to show how the analytical conclusions serve to illuminate the 
critical points. 
 
Chapter 7 summarises the whole thesis, and discusses its limitations presenting some 
directions for future research. 
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PART I 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF MARX’S POLITICAL 
ECONOMY AND HIS CONCEPTUALISATION OF 
THE WORLD MARKET 
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CHAPTER TWO 
MARX’S POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE 
CONTEXT OF HIS EARLY INTELLECTUAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
In this chapter, early stages in the development of Marx’s thinking that at last 
amounted to the ‘turn’ to political economy will be traced. However, this is never a 
chronological or bibliographical examination nor an exhaustive study of his early 
development in general. Rather, the main purpose of this chapter is confined to 
clarifying the main features of Marx’s theoretical motivations compared with those of 
Hegel and his Young Hegelian contemporaries. It will be shown, moreover, that the 
main force that drives the development may be said to be a quest for the real and the 
material in social processes, and his ‘turn’ to political economy marks a culmination 
of this ‘quest’.  
The first section is concerned with the structural features observed in the development 
of Marx’s early thinking. This development, more than anything else, appears as 
changes in the field of interest; that is, from religion to reality, and then, from politics 
and jurisprudence to political economy. But, as will be shown, these changes also 
involve philosophical or methodological transformations; this is why Marx’s early 
development should be understood as a process of successive sublation, where 
‘sublation’ contains both the meanings of retention (of the positive) and abolition (of 
the negative) as does the original German word for it, Aufhebung.  
In the next section, a more detailed exposition of the ‘turn’ to political economy is to 
be attempted with reference to the problem of alienation. While Marx’s ‘turn’ begins 
with his conceptualisation of alienation, this concept will eventually lead to the 
deconstruction of the problématique of alienation altogether, completing his ‘turn’ to 
political economy. Moreover, just at the same time both with the deconstruction and 
the completion, Marx begins to consider seriously the category of world market, the 
main object of interest of this thesis. 
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2.1.	THE	DISCOVERY	OF	POLITICAL	ECONOMY	
During the first half of the 1840s, the basic framework of Marx’s thinking was formed, 
and this process was so dynamic that it often accompanied fundamental changes. 
These changes at first sight appear just ones in the field of interest but, to understand 
the significance of the changes, one has to consider the fundamental forces that 
brought them about; i.e. they were the result of the complex workings of fundamental 
factors such as the development of the intellectual discussions at that time, social 
circumstances as well as Marx’s own personal experience. 
 
2.1.1. Marx’s Declaration 
It looks a bit strange that Marx started one of his first serious theoretical articles, ‘A 
Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Introduction’ 
(‘Introduction’, hereafter) published in the short-lived journal, founded by Marx and 
Arnold Ruge, Deutsch-Fransösische Jahrbücher in February 1844, by saying:  
For	 Germany,	 the	 criticism	 of	 religion	 has	 been	 essentially	 completed,	 and	 the	
criticism	of	religion	is	the	prerequisite	of	all	criticism.	(Introduction:	243)	
For he had never performed his own criticism of religion before then (nor after). So, 
in order to make this avowed ‘declaration’ understood fully, one is required to situate 
it in broader context. 
In the first place, the intellectual circumstances at that time are to be considered. Well 
before Hegel’s death in 1831, his philosophy had already become hegemonic among 
German thinkers and, not surprisingly, disagreements appeared in the Hegelian 
School — small and big — in interpreting the Master’s theory after his death. It was 
the publication of David Friedrich Strauss’s The Life of Jesus [Das Leben Jesu] in 
1835 that publicised the internal conflicts. In the course of the consequent discussion 
over this book, a group of people were identified, by others and themselves, to be ‘the 
Young Hegelians’,1 and they continued religious criticism more radically based upon 
                                                
1	For	 details	 on	 the	 debate	 and	 division	 of	 the	 Hegelian	 School,	 see	 Lawler	 (1986).	 Brief	
expositions	are	also	to	be	found	in	Brazill	(1970:	Introduction)	and	McLellan	(1969:	1-9).	
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the Hegelian philosophy as they interpreted it, which in turn made them more and 
more distinguished from the other groups. It was during this discussion that Bruno 
Bauer changed his identity from an advocate of the Orthodox Hegelianism to a radical 
interpreter of Hegel, and that Ludwig Feuerbach presented a series of critical 
contributions that some researchers later thought influenced Marx so much.2 
Secondly, the political atmosphere in Germany in the 1830s and 1840s is important. 
The Prussian Government under King Frederick William III in the 1830s was in 
principle reformist but not enough to satisfy radical democratic intellectuals. Indeed, 
the Government often interrupted even academic debates, and tried to set their 
boundaries (Brazill 1970: 83-94). Intellectuals were allowed to discuss only religious 
matters and, under such circumstances, dissatisfaction on the part of young radical 
intellectuals piled up. In this respect, the split of the Hegelian School and the 
confrontation between different parties were not simply theoretical or religious but 
also political matters. While the difference between the two main parties of 
Hegelianism was due to the ambivalence of Hegel’s theory in itself, their different 
interpretations of the Master was in part influenced by their different political 
perspectives. More than anything else, this difference was most strikingly shown in 
their understanding of the proposition of the unity of idea and reality in the state 
which is central to Hegel’s political philosophy;3 paraphrasing Hegel’s famous dictum 
that the real is rational and the rational is real,4 Isaiah Berlin once wittily expressed 
the difference in political perspectives between the Old and the Young Hegelians as 
follows:5 
The	 conservatives,	 proclaiming	 that	 only	 the	 real	 was	 rational,	 declared	 that	 the	
measures	 of	 rationality	 was	 actuality,	 or	 capacity	 for	 survival	 —	 that	 the	 stage	
                                                
2 	Among	 others,	 Engels	 (1886)	 and	 Althusser’s	 essays	 on	 ‘Feuerbach’s	 ‘Philosophical	
Manifestoes’’	(Althusser	1963:	43-8)	are	remarkable.	
3	Harold	Mah	(1987)	describes	the	development	of	the	thoughts	of	some	Young	Hegelians	in	
terms	of	the	prospect	for	this	‘unity’	and	its	break.		
4	See	the	‘Preface’	to	Philosophy	of	Right.		
5	‘Hegel	should	not	be	blamed	for	describing	the	essence	of	the	modern	state	as	it	is,	but	for	
identifying	what	is	with	the	essence	of	the	state.	That	the	rational	is	real	is	contradicted	by	
the	irrational	reality	which	at	every	point	shows	itself	to	be	the	opposite	of	what	it	asserts,	
and	to	assert	the	opposite	of	what	it	is’	(Critique:	127).		
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reached	by	social	or	personal	institution,	as	they	existed	at	any	given	moment,	was	
the	sufficient	measure	of	their	excellence.	.	.	
The	 radicals,	 stressing	 the	converse,	protested	 that	only	 the	 rational	was	 real.	The	
actual,	 they	 insisted,	 is	 often	 full	 of	 inconsistencies,	 anachronisms	 and	 blind	
unreason:	 it	 cannot	 therefore	 be	 regarded	 in	 any	 genuine,	 that	 is	 metaphysical,	
sense	as	being	real.	(Berlin	1978:	48-9.	My	italics.)	
The reactionary atmosphere in Prussia reached its height with the accession of 
Frederick William IV to the Prussian throne in the year of 1840. The sincere Christian 
King, who had been deemed liberal before his accession and so attracted a good deal 
of hope from liberals and radicals, turned out to be a suppressor of Hegelianism as a 
whole. The Young Hegelians, whose ideas were especially considered radical in itself 
and offensive to the regime not simply theoretically but also politically and practically, 
were the main victims. Strict and arbitrary censorship on publications wiped out key 
Young Hegelian journals from Prussia,6 and expelled Young Hegelian scholars from 
universities.7 
These developments of German reality must have had an enormous influence on 
Marx who was forming his identity as Young Hegelian. After being granted a PhD in 
philosophy from the University of Jena in the spring of 1841, Marx was hoping to get 
a post in the University of Bonn with the help of his then close friend Bauer who was 
based there. But he was forced to find another job in journalism after Bauer was 
dismissed from the university. To make matters worse, his life as journalist did not 
last for long because the Rheinische Zeitung whose editorship Marx was holding from 
October 1842 was forced to close at the end of March 1843 as a result of the 
                                                
6	The	Prussian	Government	 forced	 the	Hallische	 Jahrbücher	 für	deutsche	Wissenschaft	und	
Kunst,	 the	most	popular	Young	Hegelian	 journal	 founded	by	Arnold	Ruge	 in	 January	1838,	
out	 from	Prussia	 in	 1841,	 and	Ruge	 established	 the	Deutsche	 Jarhbücher	 in	 Saxony	 in	 the	
same	year.	But	the	Pressian	Government	finally	succeeded	in	making	the	Saxon	Government	
cease	 the	 publication	 of	 the	 Deutsche	 Jarhbücher	 in	 1843.	 It	 is	 then	 that	 another	 Young	
Hegelian	journal,	the	Rheinische	Zeitung	disappeared.	See,	for	detail,	Brazill	(1970:	87-91).		
7	At	 that	 time,	 the	 Prussian	 Government	 had	 the	 legal	 right	 of	 ‘prior	 censorship’	 of	 some	
journals,	and	‘the	authority	to	suppress	any	journal	whose	views	they	regarded	as	inimical’.	
In	 addition,	 ‘academic	 posts	 were	 part	 of	 government	 service,	 and	 the	 candidates	 for	
academic	posts	were	submitted	to	the	choice	of	government’	(Brazill	1970:	83).		
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Government’s harsh censorship and the indecisive attitude of the shareholders of the 
newspaper.  
It was against this background that Marx’s declaration that ‘the criticism of religion 
has been essentially completed’ came out. This was more than anything else 
emphasising the need for transcending the limitation set upon intellectuals by the 
government, and for the criticism of reality and, in this sense, it was also Marx’s own 
‘ex post facto approval’ of a certain tendency in Hegelianism; some Young Hegelians 
had already felt the need to go beyond the realm of religion, and were extending their 
criticism to reality.8 Indeed, it is quite obvious that Marx was then a diligent follower 
of Bauer, and deeply influenced by some other Young Hegelians. It is generally 
accepted amongst specialists on the theme that Marx’s ‘declaration’ was, too, 
presented under the authority of Bauer (McLellan 1969: 79-80; Rosen 1977: 122). 
Nevertheless, it is still strange to say that the criticism of religion has been ‘completed’ 
and, indeed, other Young Hegelians — including Bauer, and unlike Marx who 
actually never tried religious criticism after the declaration in February 1844 (as well 
as before it) — continued to debate religion critically until, at least, 1848 when the 
name ‘Young Hegelianism’ saw its extinction.  
Here, it may be useful to recall the role played by Feuerbach. If Bauer, as an earnest 
student of Hegel while he was alive, was in most part interested in extending and 
refining his Master’s philosophy, Feuerbach was breeding a different kind of ambition 
— negating Hegel’s system as a whole, and building his own. Although his first 
criticism of Hegel in 1839 failed to attract much of an audience, his 1841 book was 
quite a success. Engels recollected its impact: 
Then	came	Feuerbach’s	Essence	of	Christianity	[Das	Wesen	des	Christentums,	1841].	
With	one	blow,	it	pulverized	the	contradiction	[between	idealism	and	materialism],	
in	that	without	circumlocutions	it	placed	materialism	on	the	throne	again.	…	Nothing	
exists	 outside	 nature	 and	man,	 and	 the	 higher	 beings	 our	 religious	 fantasies	 have	
created	are	only	the	fantastic	reflection	of	our	own	essence.	The	spell	was	broken;	
the	 “system”	was	 exploded	 and	 cast	 aside,	 and	 the	 contradiction,	 shown	 to	 exist	
only	 in	 our	 imagination,	 was	 dissolved.	 One	 must	 himself	 have	 experienced	 the	
liberating	 effect	 of	 this	 book	 to	 get	 an	 idea	 of	 it.	 Enthusiasm	was	 general;	 we	 all	
                                                
8	According	to	Harold	Mah	(1987),	not	all	the	Young	Hegelians	were	politically	instigated,	but	
only	such	Prussians	as	Bruno	Bauer,	Arnold	Ruge	and	Karl	Marx.		
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became	 at	 once	 Feuerbachians.	 How	 enthusiastically	 Marx	 greeted	 the	 new	
conception	and	how	much	—	in	spite	of	all	critical	reservations	—	he	was	influenced	
by	it,	one	may	read	in	the	The	Holy	Family.	(Engels	1886:	364)	
In spite of Engels’s exaltation, however, it is doubtful if the Young Hegelians ‘all 
became at once Feuerbachians’ and obviously, it was not The Essence of Christianity 
so much as ‘Provisional Theses for the Reformation of Philosophy’ [Vorlaüfige 
Thesen zur Reform der Philosophie] and ‘Principles of Philosophy of the Future’ 
[Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft] that Marx applauded so much.9 At any rate, 
the brilliance of Feuerbach to Marx was not his materialism as Engels recalled but his 
way of combating Hegelianism. In his Essence, Feuerbach attempted to purify 
religion that theology had falsified, by conceiving man as a species-being 
[Gattungswesen] and God as ‘the manifested inward nature, the expressed self’ of 
man (Feuerbach 1841: 139); according to this understanding, the essence of theology 
is nothing but anthropology. Two years later, he took another step forward in ‘Theses’ 
and ‘Principles’. Here he argued that speculative philosophy from Descartes all the 
way to Hegel was no more than theology and, consequently, could apply the criticism 
that he imposed on theology to speculative philosophy: 
The	 secret	of	 theology	 is	anthropology,	 but	 the	 secret	of	 speculative	philosophy	 is	
theology,	 the	 speculative	 theology.	 Speculative	 theology	 distinguishes	 itself	 from	
ordinary	theology	by	the	fact	that	it	transfers	the	divine	essence	into	this	world.	That	
is,	 speculative	 theology	envisions,	determines,	 and	 realizes	 in	 this	world	 the	divine	
essence	 transported	 by	 ordinary	 theology	 out	 of	 fear	 and	 ignorance	 into	 another	
world.	(Feuerbach	1843:	156)		
In a nutshell, according to Feuerbach, both theology and speculative philosophy were 
in their nature anthropology and, as such, had to be reformulated with human-beings 
at the centre of them. It is beyond doubt that this kind of humanism appeared 
attractive to Marx who felt very unhappy about Hegelian ideal concept of man. 
Nevertheless, the real influence on Marx of Feuerbach’s philosophy was not so much 
its substance as its method. For instance, while Marx employed Feuerbach’s ‘reversal 
method’ [Umkehrmethode] to criticise Hegel in ‘Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the 
State’ (1843, ‘Critique’, hereafter), he filled the emptiness created by criticism with 
                                                
9	McLellan	(1969:	94-5)	develops	this	doubt	more.		
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his own content which was above all social.10 This is also true of religious criticism. 
When such Young Hegelians as Bauer spoke of the need to extend their criticism 
from religion to reality, or politics and the state, they thought of it simply as a matter 
of changing the fields of criticism, i.e., only in terms of the content. Consequently, 
they just performed their ‘political’ criticism with the same logic as applied to 
religious criticism: ‘True criticism … consists in the discovery of the particular logic 
of the particular object’ (Critique: 158, 159). 11  And, more importantly, they did 
continue religious criticism; in the end, as far as content is concerned, religious 
criticism can never be completed! 
Modern	German	criticism	was	so	preoccupied	with	the	old	world	and	so	entangled	
during	the	course	of	its	development	with	its	subject-matter	[religious	criticism]	that	
it	had	a	completely	uncritical	attitude	to	the	method	of	criticism	and	was	completely	
unaware	of	the	seemingly	formal	but	in	fact	essential	question	of	how	we	now	stand	
in	relation	to	the	Hegelian	dialectic.	(Manuscripts:	379.	Italics	are	original,	and	bolds	
are	mine.)	
To Marx, the declaration of the ‘completion’ of religious criticism meant not simply 
the irrelevance of the substantial criticism of religion but also a death sentence to 
Hegelian ideal philosophy in general. Based on such an idea, he at last presented new 
tasks of philosophy and history:  
It	 is	 therefore	 the	 task	 of	 history,	 once	 the	 other-world	 of	 truth	 has	 vanished,	 to	
establish	the	truth	of	this	world.	 It	 is	 the	 immediate	task	of	philosophy,	which	 is	 in	
the	 service	 of	 history,	 to	 unmask	 self-alienation	 in	 its	unholy	 forms	 once	 the	holy	
form	 of	 human	 self-alienation	 has	 been	 unmasked.	 Thus	 the	 criticism	 of	 heaven	
                                                
10	Feuerbach’s	anthropology	was	naturalistic	and	contemplative,	and	he	kept	himself	distant	
from	social	matters.	Marx	was	always	discontented	with	this	even	while	praising	Feuerbach.	
Compare	 his	 letter	 to	 Arnold	 Ruge	 dated	 13	March	 1843	 (CW01:	 399),	 and	 two	 surviving	
letters	 to	 Feuerbach	on	3	October	 1843	 and	11	August	 1844	 (CW03:	 349-50	 and	354-57).	
Marx’s	judgement	on	Feuerbach	is	well	summarised	in	‘Theses	on	Feuerbach’	(1845).		
11	Christopher	J.	Arthur	cites	this	same	sentence	out	of	the	blue	when	he	tries	to	justify	his	
Hegelian-prone	interpretation	of	Marx’s	‘method’	in	Capital	(2002:	3).	Interestingly,	Jacques	
Bidet	says	in	the	exactly	opposite	way:	‘A	specific	object	possesses	the	specific	categories.	It	
does	not	possess	the	specific	logic’	(1985:	170).	While	debate	concerning	this	difference	will	
be	delivered	in	the	following	chapters,	it	seems	to	suffice	for	the	time	being	to	note	that	it	
hardly	seems	to	be	relevant	for	one,	while	talking	about	Capital,	to	cite	the	above	sentence	
which	was	written	25	years	before	it.	
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turns	into	the	criticism	of	earth,	the	criticism	of	religion	into	the	criticism	of	law,	and	
the	criticism	of	theology	into	the	criticism	of	politics.	(Introduction:	244-5)	
Now Marx is able to depart from the realm of religious criticism which, ironically, he 
has never stepped in before, and enter into the domain of reality — not only in terms 
of the ‘subject-matter’ of criticism but also of its method or logic behind it. To him, 
those Young Hegelians who are deeply concerned with religious arguments — 
religious, either in substance or in method, or both — appear as the ‘Holy Family’. 
 
2.1.2. The Discovery of ‘the Material’ 
In just a few months after the ‘declaration’ in February 1844, Marx turned his 
attention to political economy in a series of manuscripts written in Paris, the 
‘Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts’ (abbreviated as the ‘Manuscripts’, 
hereafter). But the advance from religion to reality did not lead Marx to this ‘turn’ 
automatically. As apparent in the last quotation, the ‘reality’ as opposed to ‘religion’ 
meant to him those spheres of politics and law, not economy. This is not surprising if 
one remembers that Marx’s theoretical interest was, then, still to a large extent 
Hegelian. Political economy had yet to show up before his eyes, which signifies that 
other conditions were required for the ‘turn to political economy’. To reconstruct with 
reference to Marx’s own explanation in the ‘Preface’ to A Contribution to the Critique 
of Political Economy (1859, Contribution, hereafter), he still has to discover that legal 
and political relations are in fact rooted in certain material interests, that civil society 
is the world of such material interests, and that political economy is the tool for 
analysing it — ‘the anatomy of civil society’ (Contribution: 19-22 passim).  
At first, the influence of Marx’s German contemporaries is remarkable. In the 
‘Preface’ to the ‘Manuscripts’, Marx praised Weitling, Hess and Engels for their 
originality in their political economic research (Manuscripts: 281), and among those 
he later expressed his continuing admiration for Engels’s article ‘Outline of a Critique 
of Political Economy’ published in the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, by calling 
it a ‘brilliant essay on the critique of economic categories’ (Contribution: 22). 
Maximilien Rubel sums up its influence upon Marx as follows:  
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Not	only	did	Marx	adopt	certain	ideas	from	Engels’s	Outlines;	we	sometimes	hear	its	
tone	 as	 well	 echoed	 in	 the	 commentaries	 of	Marx’s	 Parisian	 notebooks.	 …	Marx,	
fifteen	years	 later,	called	it	“a	work	of	genius”	and	cited	it	several	times	in	Capital.	
(Rubel	1968:	117)	
However, Engels’s influence on the formation of Marx’s political economy should 
not be too much emphasised; as Allen Oakley once observed, that work of Engels ‘in 
no way defined or bounded the study that Marx undertook’ (Oakley 1983: 3).12 Even 
if Marx’s political economic study might have been triggered by Engels’s ‘Outline’, 
he had already been ‘in the embarrassing position of having to discuss what is known 
as material interests’ (Contribution: 19) in his own life. This ‘embarrassing position’ 
can be seen mainly in two respects. Firstly, in the course of dealing with ‘Debates on 
the Law on Thefts of Wood’ (1842), for instance, he showed an understanding that 
what appeared to be legal or political matters were in fact based on certain material 
interests, i.e. that what was called ‘general interest’ claimed by the state in the form of 
law could be illusory. Secondly, faced with the Prussian Government’s decision to 
ban further publication of the Rheinische Zeitung after April 1843, Marx who was 
then the editor of the paper was obliged to stand in contrast with the interest of its 
shareholders who were deemed to be liberal, but who also did not want to make the 
Government angry by ignoring its decision, and realised that they actually had the 
same material interest with the Government.13  
Through such experiences as briefly sketched above, and through ‘a critical re-
examination of the Hegelian philosophy of law’, Marx at last concludes:  
that	neither	 legal	 relations	nor	political	 forms	could	be	comprehended	whether	by	
themselves	or	on	the	basis	of	a	so-called	general	development	of	the	human	mind,	
but	that	on	the	contrary	they	originate	in	the	material	conditions	of	life,	the	totality	
of	 which	 Hegel,	 following	 the	 example	 of	 English	 and	 French	 thinkers	 of	 the	
                                                
12	Rubel	quickly	adds	just	after	the	above	quote:	‘This	was	Marx’s	homage	to	the	first	author	
who,	although	he	may	not	have	revealed	to	him	any	new	theoretical	truth,	at	 least	shared	
his	 own	 hatred	 for	 a	morality	 disguised	 as	 science	 in	 order	 to	 justify	 the	 scandal	 of	mass	
poverty	and	human	degradation’	(Rubel	1968:	117).		
13	See	Marx’s	draft	 reply	to	the	accusations	contained	 in	the	ministerial	 rescript	of	 January	
21,	1843,	titled	‘Marginal	Notes	to	the	Accusations	of	the	Ministerial	Rescript’	(CW01:	361-
65).		
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eighteenth	 century,	 embraces	within	 the	 term	 “civil	 society”;	 that	 the	 anatomy	of	
this	civil	society,	however,	has	to	be	sought	in	political	economy.	(Contribution:	20)	
All in all, Marx’s intellectual journey until he arrived at above conclusions may be 
summarised into this phrase: a quest for the real and the material in social processes. 
From religious criticism performed by his colleagues he was able to realise that what 
matters was reality and real human-beings, together with the necessity to reconstruct 
a new theoretical or philosophical framework appropriate to the new objects. And in 
the lives of the real human-beings, he observed the deterministic power of the 
material. Although lots of examples of how to deal with ‘the material’ were laid 
before him in the form of ‘political economy’, he had yet to find out how to construct 
his own political economy. Of course, this can only be answered in the development 
of his thinking so far, which will be traced in the next section. 
 
2.2.	THE	FOUNDATION	OF	MARX’S	POLITICAL	ECONOMY:	THE	CASE	OF	ALIENATION	
After the ‘turn’ to political economy occurred in early 1844, the fundamental 
framework of Marx’s own political economy was to be formed mainly in the 
‘Manuscripts’ (1844) and The German Ideology (1845-6, Ideology, hereafter). As will 
be shown below, the concept ‘alienation’ [Entfremdung] plays an essential role in this 
process, and Marx’s quest for the real and the material still prevails here. This attitude 
led Marx not only to produce his own concept of alienation but, in the end, to 
deconstruct it and transcend the problématique concerning alienation. 
 
2.2.1. The Genesis of Marx’s Theory of Alienation 
The term ‘alienation’ was first employed meaningfully by social contract theorists 
such as Grotius, Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. They used it in the sense that a man is 
to lay down — voluntarily — part of his ‘natural rights’ for the sake of the 
community or political society. This was imported to Germany by Hegel’s 
contemporaries like Fichte and Schiller, and Hegel himself also used it in his early 
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works (Schacht 1971: 8-17). But it was in the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) that 
Hegel finally gave the term ‘alienation’ his own sense. In this work, he attempted ‘to 
take into account all of the great human achievements of the past up to his time, and 
to present them as aspects of a single continuous development’ (31) — the 
development of the human spirit. Here, ‘alienation’ refers to a stage that spirit as the 
supreme human essence inevitably experiences in the process that it achieves its ‘self-
consciousness’ — that is, recognising everything in the world as its objectification. 
To the human spirit, everything in the world is an object of recognition, knowledge. 
At first, it just exists ‘out there’ indifferent to spirit and, at some point in time, spirit 
would recognise the object as such, as an outer object. It is then that spirit is said to be 
alienated; the outer object, which will ultimately be understood by spirit as its 
creature or a form of its existence, is recognised as something external to it. But in the 
end, man ‘regards it as the objectification of the human spirit, in which spirit finds the 
objective form that is essential to its actualization’ (32); in this way alienation is 
overcome.  
It is generally agreed that the main difference of Marx’s theory of alienation from that 
of Hegel’s is that the former grasps the concept of alienation in terms of labour — not 
abstract and mental but material and manual. As Marx put it, Hegel was interested, if 
ever, only in the former form of labour in the Phenomenology.14 Given that, it is also 
a generally accepted view to seek the genesis or source of Marx’s revolution of the 
concept from the section on ‘Lordship and Bondage’ in the Phenomenology where 
Hegel does deal with material and manual labour unlike the other parts of the book. 
However, as Christopher J. Arthur aptly argues, it is very unlikely that Marx actually 
referred to that section to reconstruct Hegel’s concept of alienation from the 
perspective of labour.15  Instead, Arthur delivers alternative exposition of Hegel’s 
                                                
14	See,	especially,	 the	 last	pages	of	 the	 ‘Manuscripts’	where	Marx	 tries	 to	make	an	overall	
assessment	of	Hegel’s	philosophy.		
15	For	 full	debate,	 see	Arthur	 (1986:	Chapter	7).	This	 is	a	 reproduction	with	 revision	of	 the	
earlier	version	published	in	New	Left	Review,	No.	142	(Arthur	1983).	According	to	him,	the	
mythical	insistence	on	the	influence	of	the	‘Lordship	and	Bondage’	section	on	Marx’s	theory	
of	 alienation	 was	 first	 created	 and	 popularised	 by	 such	 prominent	 authors	 as	 Alexandre	
Kojève,	 Jean-Paul	 Sartre,	 Jean	 Hyppolite	 and	 Herbert	Marcuse.	 Since	 then,	 that	 view	 has	
widely	been	accepted	as	the	‘standard’	interpretation	of	the	relationship	of	Marx	to	Hegel,	
argues	Arthur.		
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influence on the formation of Marx’s own theory of alienation by drawing attention to 
other sections of the Phenomenology that Marx did actually mention (Arthur 1986: 
84-91).  
However, when it comes to the genesis or formation of Marx’s concept of alienation, 
it is insufficient to refer only to the Phenomenology even if this is where Hegel finally 
formulated his own theory of alienation. Instead, it is much more natural to suppose 
the influence of his fellow Young Hegelians who, prior to Marx, had been developing 
economic and political theories of alienation. And, more importantly, it has to be 
remembered that Marx had already been in the process of ‘a critical re-examination of 
the Hegelian philosophy of law’ (Contribution: 20) on his own; according to a letter 
to Arnold Ruge in March 1842, he was thinking of contributing ‘a criticism of 
Hegelian natural law’,16 and it was finally written during the middle months of the 
next year. Unfortunately, this was not to be published in his lifetime as was the case 
with the ‘Manuscripts’ written in 1844, but it was here that Marx for the first time 
appropriated the concept of alienation in a meaningful way:17 
…	the	whole	content	of	law	and	the	state,	is	broadly	the	same	in	North	America	as	in	
Prussia.	Hence	the	republic	is	just	as	much	a	mere	form	of	the	state	as	the	monarchy	
here.	The	content	of	the	state	lies	beyond	these	constitutions.	…	Of	all	the	different	
expressions	of	the	life	of	the	people	the	political	state	…	was	the	hardest	to	evolve.	
When	it	did	appear,	 it	developed	in	the	form	of	universal	reason	opposed	to	other	
spheres	and	transcending	them.	The	task	set	by	history	was	then	the	reclamation	of	
universal	reason,	but	the	particular	spheres	do	not	have	the	feeling	that	their	own	
private	existence	declines	with	…	the	political	state	 in	 its	transcendent	remoteness	
[jenseitigen	 Wesen],	 and	 that	 its	 transcendent	 existence	 is	 anything	 but	 the	
affirmation	 of	 their	 own	 alienation.	…	 The	 sphere	 of	 politics	 has	 been	…	 the	 only	
                                                
16	‘Another	 article	 which	 I	 also	 intended	 for	 the	 Deutsche	 Jahrbücher	 is	 a	 criticism	 of	
Hegelian	natural	law,	insofar	as	it	concerns	the	internal	political	system.	The	central	point	is	
the	 struggle	 against	 constitutional	 monarchy	 as	 a	 hybrid	 which	 from	 beginning	 to	 end	
contradicts	and	abolishes	itself’	(CW01:	382-3).		
17	Following	the	general	way	of	expression,	 I	use	 ‘alienation’	 in	 this	 thesis	 to	 refer	 to	what	
Hegel	 and	Marx	 tried	 to	 express	 by	 the	German	Entfremdung.	 However,	 in	Early	Writings	
(Marx	 1975),	my	main	 reference	 for	Marx’s	main	works	written	 in	 1843-4,	 the	 translators	
distinguish	the	German	terms	Entäusserung	and	Entfremdung	from	each	other	by	matching	
English	alienation	and	estrangement,	respectively,	for	them.	So,	for	the	sake	of	convenience,	
I	 replace	 in	 all	 the	 quotations	 the	 word	 ‘estrangement’	 with	 ‘alienation’	 without	 further	
notice.	For	a	detailed	discussion	on	translation,	see	the	appendix	to	Arthur	(1986:	147-9).	
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sphere	in	which	the	content,	like	the	form,	was	species-content	[Gattungsinhalt],	i.e.	
the	 true	universal.	At	 the	same	time	however,	because	politics	was	opposed	to	all	
other	 spheres,	 its	 content	 too	 became	 formal	 and	 particular.	 Political	 life	 in	 the	
modern	 sense	 is	 the	 scholasticism	 of	 the	 life	 of	 the	 people.	 The	monarchy	 is	 the	
perfected	 expression	 of	 this	 alienation.	 The	 republic	 is	 the	 negation	 of	 that	
alienation,	but	within	its	own	sphere.	...	
…	 In	 the	Middle	Ages	 the	 life	of	 the	people	was	 identical	with	 the	 life	of	 the	state	
[Staatsleben].	Man	was	the	real	principle	of	the	state,	but	man	was	not	free.	Hence	
there	was	 a	democracy	 of	 unfreedom,	 a	 perfected	 system	 of	 alienation.	 (Critique:	
89-90.	Translation	modified.)		
Even	 though	 this	 atomistic	 point	 of	 view	 [the	 view	 that	 man	 is	 regarded	 as	 an	
individual	person,	not	a	member	of	a	community]	vanishes	in	the	family	and	perhaps	
(??)	also	 in	civil	society,	 it	returns	 in	the	political	state	 just	because	the	 latter	 is	an	
abstraction	from	the	family	and	civil	society.	The	converse	is	equally	true.	However,	
the	mere	 fact	 that	Hegel	draws	attention	 to	 the	strangeness	 [das	Befremdliche]	of	
this	situation	does	not	imply	that	he	has	eliminated	the	alienation	[die	Entfremdung]	
it	entails.	(Critique:	145)	
Apparently here Marx really looks like a Hegelian who regards the political state as a 
‘form of universal reason’ or ‘the true universal’. At the same time, however, he 
recognises that, specifically in the modern situation, the state exists in opposition to 
other spheres of life which still remain in their particularity, and is in turn made to 
appear ‘formal and particular’, i.e. another particular sphere! In such circumstances, 
whilst modern man has become a free individual, he also loses the universal content 
of life. All this is what Marx signifies above by the German word Entfremdung.  
Interestingly, however, in his Philosophy of Right, the object of Marx’s ‘re-
examination’, Hegel himself never uses the term ‘alienation’ in the sense he 
developed in the Phenomenology.18 Of course, this does not mean that Marx created 
his concept of alienation for himself. On the contrary, as a letter to his father in 1837 
implies, he must have read Hegel’s Phenomenology then, and had acquainted himself 
to Hegel’s concept of alienation long before he embarked on the ‘re-examination’. 
What requires an explanation is how the gap between the years of 1837 and 1843 
could be bridged, and the answer may be found in the development of the concept of 
alienation by the Young Hegelians. 
                                                
18	He	does	use	the	term	in	the	Philosophy	of	Right,	but	mostly	in	the	conventional	and	plain	
sense	that	the	English	and	French	social	contract	theorists	meant.		
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2.2.2. The Formation and Characteristics of Marx’s Theory of Alienation 
It was David Friedrich Strauss who first appropriated Hegel’s concept of alienation 
for the criticism of religion, and thereafter it became widely circulated amongst the 
Young Hegelians especially by Feuerbach and Bauer in the early-1940s. Basically, 
the two representatives of Young Hegelianism developed the concept of alienation to 
argue that in religion — especially Christianity — man is alienated from his own 
essential nature:  
Bauer	 sees	 the	 idea	 of	 God	 and	 of	 religion	 in	 general	 as	 an	 expression	 of	 man’s	
alienation	 from	 himself,	 and	 in	 this	 respect	 he	 has	 certainly	 been	 influenced	 by	
Feuerbach	and	particularly	by	the	thoughts	contained	in	The	Essence	of	Christianity	.	
.	.	
Following	 Feuerbach,	 Bauer	 sees	 religion	 as	 the	 dehumanization	 of	 humanity,	 for	
within	its	frame	man	is	deprived	of	his	authentic	content	and	attributes	to	God	what	
he	 himself	 lacks.	 Religion	 splits	 man’s	 personality	 into	 two	 components:	 his	
alienated	essence	which	does	not	belong	to	him	but	 to	heaven,	and	what	remains	
after	the	alienation.	(Rosen	1971:	391-2)19	
However, unlike Feuerbach who kept silent about politics,20 Bauer tried to extend 
further his criticism from religion to politics and the state. From the perspective of 
politics, the main reason Bauer opposed Christianity was ‘because it separates men 
from each other and their true essence’ (McLellan 1969: 67). In other words: ‘The 
aim of the state is unity and harmony, whereas the Church divides man from himself’ 
(68). At first Bauer kept his faith in the Prussian state with all its shortcomings; he 
regarded them as a necessary evil that inevitably arose in the development of history. 
But his attitude towards the state abruptly changed after his was dismissed from the 
                                                
19	However,	the	concrete	ways	they	understood	God	were	quite	different;	while	Feuerbach	
tried	to	identify	the	real	meaning	of	religion,	regarding	God	as	man’s	transcendent	essence,	
Bauer	dismissed	the	idea	of	God	in	toto	as	an	illusion.	Zvi	Rosen	also	makes	a	quick	note	that	
‘the	 semblance	 between	 Bauer	 and	 Feuerbach	 is	 purely	 external	 and	 formal’,	 and	 briefly	
discusses	 their	 philosophical	 differences,	 aside	 from	 the	 political	 ones.	 See	 Rosen	 (1971:	
392n).		
20	Marx	 W.	 Wartofsky	 (1970)	 in	 his	 biography	 of	 Feuerbach	 identifies	 that	 he	 joined	 the	
German	Social	Democratic	Party	(SPD)	in	1870,	only	two	years	before	he	died.		
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University of Bonn and deprived of the right to teach in the Prussian universities in 
the spring of 1842: ‘He identified his dismissal as a world-historical break’ (Mah 
1987: 71). Defining the present Prussian state as Christian, he now applies the 
religiously extended concept of alienation to politics. Just as he dismissed God, so 
does he now deny the present state, demanding that it should be transformed into a 
Republic. Interestingly, he believed all this could be achieved by means of ‘pure 
criticism’. It is a matter of fact that this point of view of Bauer’s deeply influenced 
Marx.21 His ‘declaration’ on the need for the extension of religious criticism to other 
spheres is clearly a neat summary of Bauer’s theoretical transition above,22 and his 
unpublished manuscript ‘Critique’ is full of the inspiration given by Bauer: from 
labelling the Prussian state as Christian to advocacy of republicanism.23  
In the end, Marx’s ‘critical re-examination’ of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right may be 
said to be a criticism, by means of the politically transformed concept of alienation, of 
Hegel’s problématique of the separation of the political state and civil society in 
modern world and its Aufhebung by the former. To Hegel who basically regards the 
‘separation’ as a contradiction, however, the same separation appears as an evolution 
of the Idea, or a ‘logical development’ from civil society, the sphere of particularities, 
to the state, ‘the reality of ethical Idea’ (PR: §257).24 The alienation Marx finds here 
is two-fold: on one hand, in this situation of separation, man is inevitably alienated 
from the universal content of life and, on the other, Hegel’s way of conceptualisation 
                                                
21	When	Marx	 was	 still	 skeptical	 about	 the	 communist	 movement,	 he	 wrote:	 ‘Clearly	 the	
weapon	 of	 criticism	 cannot	 replace	 the	 criticism	 of	weapons,	 and	material	 force	must	 be	
overthrown	by	material	force.	But	theory	also	becomes	a	material	force	once	it	has	gripped	
the	masses’	(Introduction:	251).	This	is	exactly	what	Bauer	had	in	mind.	
22	For	more,	see	McLellan	(1969:	78-81).		
23	It	 is	 not	 suitable	 to	 trace	 Bauer’s	 influence	 on	Marx	 any	 further	 in	 this	 thesis.	 For	 full	
discussion,	 see	 Zvi	 Rosen’s	 masterly	 work	 on	 the	 theme	 (Rosen	 1977).	 McLellan’s	 (1969)	
concise	exposition	 is	sufficient,	 though.	 It	goes	without	saying	that	most	of	 the	similarities	
between	 Bauer	 and	Marx	 to	 be	 observed	 in	 their	 writings	 in	 the	 early-1840s	 were	 to	 be	
rejected	by	Marx	before	long	as	he	established	his	own	point	of	view.		
24	‘The	deeper	truth	is	that	Hegel	experiences	the	separation	of	the	state	from	civil	society	as	
a	contradiction.	The	mistake	he	makes	is	to	rest	content	with	the	semblance	of	a	resolution	
which	he	declares	to	be	the	real	thing’	(Critique:	141).	
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of the separation simply expresses the alienation of his own consciousness.25 Since, 
according to Marx, ‘the political state cannot exist without the natural basis of the 
family and the artificial basis of civil society’ (Critique: 63), and since ‘the state as 
such’ is merely an ‘abstraction’ as long as its real and material basis is not considered 
properly (90), Hegel’s consciousness is in alienation when he simply identifies ‘what 
is with the essence of the state’ (127).26 Moreover, while man has been given the 
chance to develop as an ‘individual’ only in modern society, he, whose real and 
material life is still carried on in the sphere of civil society, is at once subject to the 
disruption of life and personality in the situation of the ‘separation’; briefly, he 
himself is alienated. The latter idea is further elaborated and nicely formulated in ‘On 
the Jewish Question’ (‘Question’, hereafter):27  
The	perfect	political	state	is	by	its	nature	the	species-life	of	man	in	opposition	to	his	
material	life.	All	the	presuppositions	of	this	egoistic	life	continue	to	exist	outside	the	
sphere	of	the	state	in	civil	society,	but	as	qualities	of	civil	society.	Where	the	political	
state	has	attained	its	true	development,	man	leads	a	double	life,	a	heavenly	and	an	
earthly	 life,	 not	 only	 in	 his	 thought,	 in	 his	 consciousness,	 but	 in	 reality,	 in	 life.	 He	
lives	in	the	political	community,	where	he	regards	himself	a	communal	being,	and	in	
civil	 society,	 where	 he	 acts	 as	 a	 private	 individual,	 regards	 other	 men	 as	 means,	
debases	 himself	 to	 a	 means	 and	 becomes	 a	 plaything	 of	 alien	 powers.	 The	
relationship	of	the	political	state	to	civil	society	is	just	as	spiritual	as	the	relationship	
of	heaven	to	earth.	The	political	state	stands	in	the	same	opposition	to	civil	society	
and	 it	 prevails	 over	 the	 latter	 in	 the	 same	 way	 as	 religion	 prevails	 over	 the	
narrowness	 of	 the	 secular	 world,	 i.e.	 it	 [the	 political	 state]	 always	 has	 to	
acknowledge	 it	 [civil	 society],	 reinstate	 it	and	allow	 itself	 to	be	dominated	by	 it.	 In	
his	most	 immediate	 reality,	 in	civil	 society,	man	 is	a	secular	being.	Here,	where	he	
regards	 himself	 and	 is	 regarded	 by	 others	 as	 a	 real	 individual,	 he	 is	 an	 illusory	
[unwahre]	phenomenon.	 In	the	state,	on	the	other	hand,	where	man	is	considered	
to	 be	 a	 species-being,	 he	 is	 the	 imaginary	 member	 of	 a	 fictitious	 [eingebildeten]	
                                                
25	This	‘two-foldness’	remains	an	important	and	resilient	character	of	Marx’s	‘critique’.	Marx	
in	 principle	 criticises	 other	 theories	 for	 failing	 to	 grasp	 the	 real	 essence	 of	 the	 aspect	 of	
reality	 in	 which	 they	 are	 interested,	 and,	 by	 tracing	 why	 they	 have	 failed,	 criticises	 the	
deceptive	appearance	of	reality	as	well.	This	argument	will	be	more	developed	in	Chapter	5	
where	the	meaning	of	the	critique	in	Capital	is	investigated.	
26	‘Hegel	 proceeds	 from	 the	 assumption	 that	 ‘civil	 society’	 is	 separate	 from	 the	 ‘political	
state’,	that	they	are	two	fixed	antitheses,	two	really	different	spheres’	(Critique:	137).	
27	Marx’s	exposition	on	the	alienation	of	Hegel’s	consciousness	is	to	be	found	in	many	pages	
of	the	‘Critique’,	and	the	last	section,	‘Critique	of	Hegel’s	Dialectic	and	General	Philosophy’,	
of	the	‘Manuscripts’.		
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sovereignty,	 he	 is	 divested	 of	 his	 real	 individual	 life	 and	 filled	 with	 an	 unreal	
universality.	(Question:	220.	Translation	modified.)		
As shown above, the alienation man experiences in the reality of the separation of the 
state and civil society is, again, two-fold: on one hand, he is in practice alienated from 
his communal life since, whereas his real and immediate life belongs to civil society, 
the universality claimed to be given to him by the state is merely an ‘unreal’ one.28 
But, on the other hand, man is destined to be ‘an illusory phenomenon’ in civil society 
as well, for here every man is regarded as ‘a private individual’, not as a species-
being, and degraded into ‘a plaything of alien powers’.29 It is here that the main theme 
of Marx’s theoretical endeavour is to be found: to overcome such separation and 
alienation in modern society.30 
Indeed, it is true that this kind of problem was felt more or less commonly by the 
Young Hegelians as well as Hegel. Despite, one does not have to bother to suppose 
here any influence of particular thinkers on Marx; rather, more plausible is that this 
kind of thinking was more or less general in Germany in the early-19th century.31 But 
what matters is the difference between Marx and them. Unlike others, Marx searched 
for the real and material basis for the separation and alienation (‘a quest for the real 
and the material’) and, consequently, tried to find the solution as well as the root of 
the problem in civil society, the sphere of material life and interests. Moreover, unlike 
Hegel and Bauer who tried to find the solution in the state, Marx argues that ‘the state 
                                                
28	‘…	man	considers	political	life,	which	is	far	removed	from	his	actual	individuality,	to	be	his	
true	life	…	Political	democracy	…	regards	man	…	as	a	sovereign	and	supreme	being;	but	man	
…	as	an	alien	being	distinct	from	actual	man	…’	(Question:	225-6).	
29	Michael	Heinrich	also	recognises	this	(2006:	99).		
30	These	 two	 kinds	 of	 alienation,	 together	 with	 their	 abolition,	 are	 later	 thematised	 in	 a	
different	but	closely	related	way:	as	the	political	alienation	to	be	overcome	by	establishing	a	
new	communality,	 and	as	 the	economic	one	 to	be	overcome	by	 abolishing	exploitation	 in	
the	sphere	of	production.		
31	As	 for	 Marx,	 he	 had	 already	 written	 in	 one	 of	 his	 Gymnasium	 graduation	 essays	
‘Reflections	 of	 a	 Young	Man	 on	 the	 Choice	 of	 a	 Profession’	 as	 early	 as	 in	 August	 1835	 as	
follows:	‘the	chief	guide	which	must	direct	us	in	the	choice	of	a	profession	is	the	welfare	of	
mankind	and	our	own	perfection.	It	should	not	be	thought	that	these	two	interests	could	be	
in	 conflict,	 that	one	would	have	 to	destroy	 the	other;	 on	 the	 contrary,	man's	nature	 is	 so	
constituted	that	he	can	attain	his	own	perfection	only	by	working	for	the	perfection,	for	the	
good,	of	his	fellow	men’	(CW01:	10).		
 
 
33 
can liberate itself from a restriction without man himself being truly free of it’. 
Therefore, ‘man liberates himself from a restriction through the medium of the state, 
[merely] in a political way, by transcending this restriction in an abstract and 
restricted manner, in a partial manner, in contradiction with himself’ (Question: 218). 
For instance,  
The	property	qualification	is	the	last	political	form	to	recognize	private	property.		
And	yet	the	political	annulment	of	private	property	does	not	mean	the	abolition	of	
private	property;	on	the	contrary,	 it	even	presupposes	 it.	The	state	 in	 its	own	way	
abolishes	 distinctions	 based	 on	 birth,	 rank,	 education	 and	 occupation	 when	 it	
declares	birth,	rank,	education	and	occupation	to	be	non-political	distinctions	…	Far	
from	 abolishing	 these	 factual	 distinctions,	 the	 state	 only	 exists	 on	 the	
presupposition	of	their	existence;	it	feels	itself	to	be	a	political	state	and	asserts	its	
universality	only	in	opposition	to	these	elements	of	its	being.	(Question:	219)		
‘The property qualification’ has been abolished formally in modern society, but in 
fact continues to exist and operates as a basis for it. Civil society is nothing other than 
the world of private property, and of labour, need and division of labour. It is here that 
man’s alienation and the disruption of his life are rooted and, therefore, that the 
overcoming of them has to be sought. It is for this reason that Marx begins to pay 
attention to political economy which he later calls ‘the anatomy of civil society’, and 
the analysis of society in terms of political economy is first elaborated in the 
‘Manuscripts’.32  
It is against this complex background, not in relation to Hegel or his Phenomenology 
alone, that Marx’s theory of alienation advanced in the ‘Manuscripts’ is to be 
investigated.33 Although Marx must have been aware of Hegel’s concept of alienation 
as such, it was in the religiously, and then politically extended form by his fellow 
Young Hegelians that Marx seriously acknowledged the concept. Nonetheless, what 
                                                
32	‘On	the	 Jewish	Question’	and	 ‘Excerpts	 from	James	Mill’s	Elements	of	Political	Economy’	
written	shortly	before	Marx	writes	the	‘Manuscripts’	may	well	be	called	their	‘trial	versions’.		
33	Given	that,	it	is	very	surprising	that	this	is	very	little,	if	any,	developed	by	Marxist	writers	
—	 such	 as	 István	Mészáros	 (1975),	 Bertell	 Ollman	 (1976),	 Arthur	 (1986)	 as	well	 as	 Georg	
Lukács	 (1923).	David	McLellan’s	 (1969)	groundbreaking	work	 looks	 like	an	exception.	But	 I	
would	 argue	 that	 to	 conceal	 others’	 influence	 on	Marx	 has	 nothing	 to	 do	 with	 glorifying	
Marx,	not	to	speak	of	understanding	him	correctly.	The	real	value	of	Marx	can	be	revealed	
only	in	comparison	with,	and	in	his	debt	on,	others.		
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is remarkable in Marx is that he went back to the Phenomenology, ‘the true birthplace 
and secret of the Hegelian philosophy’ (Manuscripts: 383), and put his concept of 
alienation under serious scrutiny through critical confrontation with Hegel’s. 
However hard other Young Hegelians might criticise religion, politics, and even their 
Master, and thereby however radically they might try to extend the concept of 
alienation, they were in the end idealistic Hegelians, as long as they are couched in 
the Hegelian problématique of the overcoming of the contradictions of modern 
society by the state as ‘the reality of ethical Idea’. Marx, on the contrary, transcended 
it simply by giving the initiative back to civil society from the state. On the other 
hand, equipped with this ‘reversed’ — or corrected — problématique and the 
understanding of civil society as a system of alienation, he was able to criticise the 
(classical) political economists who ignored this fact: ‘Political economy conceals the 
alienation in the nature of labour’ (Manuscripts: 325), and ‘has merely formulated the 
laws of alienated labour’ (332). However, Hegel was not so different from them in 
that he, too, failed to grasp the essential nature of civil society — especially of labour. 
And his theory is, like that of political economy, nothing but a product of alienation of 
his consciousness as long as he tries to overcome the contradiction of modern society 
only spiritually: ‘Hegel adopts the standpoint of modern political economy’ (386). 
 
2.2.3. The ‘Aufhebung’ of Marx’s Problématique of Alienation 
So far, the context in which Marx’s theory of alienation — mostly in the pre-
‘Manuscripts’ days — was presented, together with its significance within the 
context, has been examined. Now his theory of alienation worked on in the 
‘Manuscripts’ is to be treated, and it will be shown that the problématique concerning 
alienation is at last transcended in the Ideology written in 1845-6.  
In the previous sub-section (§2.2.2), it was suggested that a modern man, according to 
Marx unlike other contemporaries of his, suffers from two kinds of alienation. One is 
the alienation caused by the disruption of the life’s integrity. In the separation of the 
state and civil society, while man’s life is mostly carried on in the latter sphere, he is 
only given a ‘fictitious sovereignty’ from the state; thereby he is alienated from the 
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universal content of life which is concentrated in the state. The other form of 
alienation is concerned with man’s life in civil society conceived as a system of 
labour, need, and private property.34 Here, man appears to be a ‘private individual’ 
treating others as means, and is also treated by them as such. It is this latter form of 
alienation that is discussed in the ‘Manuscripts’ and, given that the separation of the 
two domains of life is rooted in the conditions of civil society, it may be said to be the 
more fundamental form of alienation.35 
However, this way of sophistication or reformulation of the concept of alienation 
introduces a new problem to be solved. By problematising alienation, Marx is trying 
to restore in man his communal being and life from which he is detached in modern 
society, and thus to enable him to identify his individual and communal life. Actually, 
this is exactly what Hegel and his ‘Young’ disciples sought to do. But Marx is faced 
with a problem that others did not bother to consider; that is, by basing alienation in 
civil society, the sphere which is defined as one of real individuals, his concept of 
alienation is rendered real but, at the same time, individual — not immediately 
social.36 Therefore, for him to be able to argue to the effect that the Aufhebung of 
alienation should restore in man his communality which obviously can hardly be dealt 
with at the individual level, Marx is required to develop his concept of alienation 
beyond the individual horizon. It is this necessity that constitutes the immanent drive 
for the development of his concept of alienation. In the ‘Manuscripts’, Marx 
addresses it in four steps,37 starting from the alienation an individual immediately 
experiences in the capitalist labour-process, and progressively advancing it onto the 
communal sphere — the alienation of man from other men. At last he says: ‘Man’s 
                                                
34	See	 Hegel’s	 characterisation	 of	 civil	 society	 in	Philosophy	 of	 Right,	 esp.	 §182-208.	Marx	
basically	accepts	his	analysis	(critically).		
35	It	means	that,	when	it	comes	to	the	Aufhebung	of	alienation,	abolishing	the	latter	form	of	
alienation	is	more	essential.	The	abolition	of	the	former	form,	leaving	the	latter	untouched,	
will	 inevitably	 be	 reduced	 to	 being	 fictitious,	 which	 is	 what	 Marx	 called	 ‘political	
emancipation’.		
36	It	goes	without	saying	that	the	conditions	for	this	alienation	are	social.		
37	Alienation	of	man	 (1)	 from	his	product,	 (2)	 from	his	 labour,	 (3)	 from	his	 species-nature,	
and	 (4)	 from	 (other)	 men.	 See	 the	 last	 section	 ‘Estranged	 labour’	 of	 the	 first	 of	 the	
‘Manuscripts’.		
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alienation, like all relationships of man to himself, is realized and expressed only in 
man’s relationship to other men’ (Manuscripts: 330). Indeed, it is easily observable 
that Marx develops his concept of alienation from simple/individual/subjective 
moments (the relationship of man to himself) to complex/relational/objective ones 
(the relationship of man to others). And, of course, this development appears subject 
to the immanent necessity of the concept, until the concept of alienation is properly 
situated in the social relationship between men. 
In this way, the newly addressed problem looks as if it were solved. But what has to 
be remembered here is that Marx in the ‘Manuscripts’ heavily drew upon Feuerbach’s 
concept of man as a species-being [Gattungswesen]. Marx employed this concept as a 
substitute for Hegel’s universality which he dismissed on the ground that it was ideal. 
But to define the essence of man in some way or other is ideal at any rate — whether 
it is called universality or species, and whatever content it is claimed to have. Indeed, 
the problématique of alienation necessarily and always presupposes the ‘good state’ 
and the ‘essence’ of man, and displacement of man from this state is defined as 
‘alienation’. This is nothing but ideal thinking and, thus, teleological as well, for it 
aims at recovering the ideally conceived ‘good state’ or ‘essence’. Marx’s realisation 
of it is strikingly shown in the pages of the Ideology such as: 
German	criticism	…	by	no	means	examines	 its	general	philosophic	premises,	but	 in	
fact	 all	 its	 problems	 originate	 in	 a	 definite	 philosophical	 system,	 that	 of	 Hegel.	 …	
Their	[German	critics’]	polemics	against	Hegel	and	against	one	another	are	confined	
to	 this	—	each	 takes	one	aspect	of	 the	Hegelian	system	and	 turns	 this	against	 the	
whole	 system	 as	well	 as	 against	 the	 aspects	 chosen	 by	 the	 others.	 To	 begin	with	
they	 took	 pure,	 unfalsified	 Hegelian	 categories	 such	 as	 “substance”	 and	 “self-
consciousness”	[Strauss	and	Bauer],	later	they	secularised	these	categories	by	giving	
them	more	profane	names	such	as	“species”,	“the	unique”,	“man”,	etc	 [Feuerbach	
and	Stirner].	(Ideology:	34-5)38		
…	 at	 every	 historical	 stage	 “man”	 was	 substituted	 for	 the	 individuals	 existing	
hitherto	 and	 shown	 as	 the	 motive	 force	 of	 history.	 The	 whole	 process	 was	 thus	
conceived	as	a	process	of	the	self-alienation	of	“man”,	and	this	was	essentially	due	
to	the	fact	that	the	average	individual	of	the	later	stage	was	always	foisted	on	to	the	
                                                
38	More	 accusations	 against	 Feuerbach’s	 concept	 of	 species	 include:	 ‘Feuerbach	 …	 posits	
“Man”	 instead	 of	 “real	 historical	 man”’	 (Ideology:	 44),	 ‘the	 ideal	 “compensation	 in	 the	
species”’	(47),	‘a	speculative-idealistic,	i.e.,	fantastic,	way	as	“self-generation	of	the	species”’	
(59).		
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earlier	stage,	and	the	consciousness	of	a	later	age	on	to	the	individuals	of	an	earlier.	
Through	this	inversion,	which	from	the	first	disregards	the	actual	conditions,	it	was	
possible	 to	 transform	 the	 whole	 of	 history	 into	 an	 evolutionary	 process	 of	
consciousness.	(Ibid.:	97-8)	
Consequently, Marx in the Ideology departs from the problématique of alienation, and 
never deals with it in his later writings at least in the same way as in the 
‘Manuscripts’. 39  Of course, this is not to say that Marx now dismisses man’s 
alienation altogether. On the contrary, what is called ‘estranged, alienated labour’ 
was, to him, nothing but a ‘conceptual form’ of ‘an economic fact’, i.e., ‘the 
alienation of the worker and of his production’ (Manuscripts: 330): ‘The 
transformation, through the division of labour, of personal powers (relations) into 
material powers, cannot be dispelled by dismissing the general idea of it from one’s 
mind’ (Ideology: 86). Then, what matters is in what way to understand that ‘economic 
fact’ without presupposing an ideal image of man.  
That is what Marx, together with Engels, tries to do in the Ideology.40 Here, instead of 
defining man’s essence a priori, he insists on ‘setting out from real, active men, and 
on the basis of their real life-process demonstrating the development of the 
ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process’ (Ideology: 42). Man is now 
understood in the context of the actual relationship in which he is situated.41 
This	sum	of	productive	 forces,	capital	 funds	and	social	 forms	of	 intercourse,	which	
every	 individual	and	every	generation	 finds	 in	existence	as	 something	given,	 is	 the	
                                                
39	Among	the	few	exceptions,	two	occasions	are	remarkable;	one	is	 in	the	Grundrisse	 (831-
3),	and	the	other	is	the	aborted	manuscript	for	Capital,	‘Results	of	the	Immediate	Process	of	
Production’	(Capital	1:	949-1084).	Still,	to	connect	them	directly	to	the	concept	of	alienation	
as	in	the	‘Manuscripts’	looks	misleading.	Rather	the	‘alienation’	in	those	later	manuscripts	is	
considered	as	‘an	economic	fact’,	the	meaning	of	which	is	to	be	expounded	in	the	following	
sentences.	On	the	other	hand,	concerning	the	discussion	of	alienation	in	the	Grundrisse	and	
Capital,	and	the	progressive	—	and	inevitable	—	disappearance	of	the	category	of	alienation,	
see	Jacques	Bidet’s	brief	but	clear	argument	(1985:	166-8).	
40	However,	 the	profundity	of	 this	 realism	must	not	have	been	done	 justice	by	Engels	who	
was	 totally	 ignorant	 of	 Marx’s	 intellectual	 development	 just	 before	 they	 embarked	 on	
writing	the	Ideology.		
41	Not	 recognising	 this,	 Arthur	 (1986)	 just	 insists	 that	 Marx’s	 concept	 of	 species	 has	 a	
different	 content	 from	 that	 of	 Feuerbach’s;	 he	 never	 questions	 the	 ideal	 nature	 of	 the	
problématique	of	alienation	per	se.	
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real	basis	of	what	the	philosophers	have	conceived	as	“substance”	and	“essence	of	
man”,	and	what	they	have	deified	and	attacked	…	(Ideology:	62)	
Individuals	have	always	proceeded	 from	 themselves	…	within	 their	 given	historical	
conditions	 and	 relations,	 not	 from	 the	 “pure”	 individual	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 the	
ideologists.	(87)		
Based on such an understanding of man, Marx reformulates civil society:  
The	form	of	intercourse	determined	by	the	existing	productive	forces	at	all	previous	
historical	stages,	and	in	its	turn	determining	these,	is	civil	society.	(Ideology:	57)		
Civil	society	embraces	the	whole	material	intercourse	of	individuals	within	a	definite	
stage	of	 the	development	of	productive	 forces.	 It	embraces	 the	whole	commercial	
and	industrial	life	of	a	given	stage	…	(98)		
On the other hand, even within the renewed framework, still relevant is the most 
fundamental problem Hegel and his disciples including Marx tried to address; the 
disruption of life’s integrity, or the loss of what Hegel and Feuerbach called 
universality and species-nature, respectively. At the same time, however, this problem 
is now to be approached, not from this or that (ideal) definition of man, but from the 
real social relationships he establishes in reality. Concerning this matter, it is 
important to note that, by conceiving man in terms of the relationships he establishes 
in the network of production and intercourse, and by regarding history as the 
development of such relationships, Marx is enabled to take notice of the positive, as 
well as the negative, moment in the development — the moment of doing away with 
alienation as a present economic fact. This implies an evolution of Marx’s thinking, 
considering he used to emphasise the negative aspect of alienation blaming Hegel for 
seeing its positive side alone (Manuscripts: 386). In other words, Marx now sees in 
the development of alienation the emergence of the conditions for overcoming it, 
which is summarised in the following passage:   
…	 this	 development	 of	 productive	 forces	 (which	 itself	 implies	 the	 actual	 empirical	
existence	 of	men	 in	 their	world-historical,	 instead	 of	 local,	 being)	 is	 an	 absolutely	
necessary	 practical	 premise	 [for	 the	 abolishment	 of	 alienation]	 because	without	 it	
privation,	 want	 is	 merely	 made	 general,	 and	 with	 destitution	 the	 struggle	 for	
necessities	 and	 all	 the	 old	 filthy	 business	 would	 necessarily	 be	 reproduced;	 and	
furthermore,	because	only	with	this	universal	development	of	productive	forces	is	a	
universal	 intercourse	 between	 men	 established,	 which	 …	 finally	 puts	 world-
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historical,	empirically	universal	 individuals	 in	place	of	 local	ones.	 (Ideology:	54	and	
57)	
It is true that, from the first time he negated the Hegelian prescription for man’s 
alienation, the ideal overcoming of it by the absolute Idea or the state, Marx had 
difficulty in finding an alternative to it, which made his critique look incomplete. As 
long as he seeks the root of the problem from civil society, the solution is also to be 
found there. Moreover, this solution has to transcend the fictitiousness and 
narrowness of the state, too; it has to replace the ‘fictitious sovereignty’ implied to be 
given by the state, by producing real relationships between men. All this is found in 
the ‘universal intercourse between men’ that is to be established with the ‘universal 
development of productive forces’. Indeed, these productive forces ‘which have been 
developed to a totality’ can ‘only exist within a universal intercourse’. This universal 
intercourse will for its part build up ‘a totality of capacities in the individuals 
themselves’ (Ideology: 96), and turn individuals who have so far been bound to the 
locality of ‘the state and the nation’ (98) into ‘world-historical, empirically universal 
individuals’. Marx thinks that this is being actualised by the development of the 
world market. It is more than anything else ‘an economic fact’: ‘the extension of 
markets into a world market, which had now become possible and was daily 
becoming more and more a fact’ (78). Only ‘the wealth of [their] real connections’ to 
be fulfilled in the world market  
…	will	 liberate	the	separate	individuals	from	the	various	national	and	local	barriers,	
bring	 them	 into	 practical	 connection	 with	 the	 production	 (including	 intellectual	
production)	 of	 the	 whole	 world	 and	 make	 it	 possible	 for	 them	 to	 acquire	 the	
capacity	to	enjoy	this	all-sided	production	of	the	whole	earth	(the	creations	of	man).	
(Ideology:	59)	
To sum up, Marx is now permitted to transcend not only Hegelian idealism but also 
the problématique concerning alienation altogether. By adhering to what is real and 
material, he could develop from the sphere of civil society the real and material 
equivalent of what Hegel tried to secure by composing the concept of the state in an 
ideal way; the world market, so to speak. And, in doing so, he could depart from the 
problématique of alienation which always presupposes the ideal initial state of affairs; 
this is not simply solving the problem. Rather, by accepting alienation as an economic 
 
 
40 
fact, not problematising it in a philosophical way at all, Marx now finds out the 
moment of abolishing it in the course of its development.42 
 
2.3.	CONCLUSION	
So far, the early development of Marx’s thinking has been discussed. The early 19th 
century German and European intellectual and social circumstances, together with 
Marx’s personal experience from the late-1830s to the early-1840s, appear to have 
largely determined the course of development, as well as the starting point of his 
much troubled intellectual journey. Like other young radical German intellectuals, 
Marx was facing the problems which were deemed to have been borne out of the 
newly emerging modern world, and which Hegel, among others, tried to address and 
solve from a specific point of view.  
But unlike the other Young Hegelians who in essence remained in the Hegelian 
framework even when they were criticising him, Marx was able to transcend it by 
means of adhering to the real and the material in social processes. For Marx, Hegelian 
concepts of man, alienation, the state, etc. were ideal in the sense that they were 
posited by Hegel and others as the subject that had brought about the real social 
contents they represented, not the other way round. So, Marx’s critique of Hegel was 
basically getting the reversed relationship between concepts and reality right, and 
criticising, restricting and redefining the concepts by clarifying the real and material 
basis they justifiably reflected. However, this sort of radical critique will inevitably 
lead to the ‘dissolution’ of the concepts themselves, simply because Hegelian 
concepts cannot consist with reality; because, in other words, while what seemed 
obvious to Marx was that the contents of a concept had to be given by reality, 
Hegelian concepts were characteristic in that they generated their contents for 
themselves! Once the critique gets to the realisation of this, then the concepts cannot 
be sustained any more.43  
                                                
42	Michael	Heinrich	calls	it	‘the	moment	of	dissolution	of	Marx’s	concept’	(2006:	118-20).		
43	This	will	be	discussed	more	in	the	next	chapter.		
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This was shown in the second section of this chapter with the concept of alienation 
taken as an example; however, this is much more than an illustration, for it is the key 
concept in Marx’s early development, at least before he started to write the Ideology 
in 1845. We have seen here how Marx’s attempts at substantiating Hegelian concept 
of alienation gave way to the final rejection of it (‘a process of successive 
Aufhebung’). However, Marx did not ignore the reality represented (ideally) by the 
concept of alienation altogether, but tried to capture this reality by calling it 
‘alienation as an economic fact’. Indeed, he regarded political economy as a tool for 
dealing with the economic fact although political economists did not seem to Marx so 
successful in carrying out that job.  
On the other hand, even if the modern reality which had been destroying man’s life 
was now grasped as such, not by way of conceptualisation, this was totally different 
from a contemplative understanding of it, represented by Feuerbach.44 This disruptive 
reality was not to be taken for granted (partly as in Feuerbach), but at the same time, 
the need for, and the inevitability of overcoming it should not be given by the 
categorical imperative imposed by the logic of the concept (as in Hegel). This is 
exactly where man’s practice comes in; Marx replaces the Hegelian speculative 
inevitability with man’s practical collective will to overturn the disruptive reality, but 
again, as long as man is understood in the context of the social relationship around 
him, the latter is to be constituted in the social processes as well. That is, Marx is 
asking here what kind of development of reality is it that makes man’s collective 
practice — the communist movement as Marx names it in the Ideology — inevitable? 
The answer is, as discussed in the previous section with textual evidence, the 
multiplication of the real relationship with which man gets involved in his every-day 
life, and which is aggregated in the development of the world market. Since all these 
phenomena — the development of universal intercourse, world-historical, universal 
individuals with all-round capacities, and the world market — were being actualised 
as economic facts, they were to be analysed with political economy.45 Moreover, the 
                                                
44	See	‘Theses	on	Feuerbach’,	especially	the	first	one.		
45	Put	differently,	all	these	phenomena	had	the	potential	to	terminate	the	contradictions	in	
modern	 society,	and	man’s	practice	—	the	communist	 revolution	—	was	conceived	as	 the	
power	 to	 actualise	 this	 potential.	 At	 any	 rate,	 though,	 the	 practical	 movements	 for	 the	
communist	 revolution	 can	 hardly	 be	 the	 object	 of	 political	 economic	 theory,	 and	 it	 is	
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world market was all the more important, for it was identified by Marx as the real and 
material substitute for the state which was suggested by Hegel as the moment of 
restoring man’s communal being once lost in the modern conditions. Therefore, for 
the rest of Part I, Marx’s further development in the sphere of political economy, and 
the varying significance of the world market during the development will be dealt 
with. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
observable	 that,	 as	 Marx’s	 political	 economy	 develops,	 his	 analysis	 is	 centred	 on	 the	
potential	conditions	which	are	deemed	to	be	objective	and	material.		
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE EVOLUTION OF MARX’S POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 
In the previous chapter, the formation and early development of Marx’s thinking was 
broadly analysed. It was attempted there to show that Marx, having started his 
academic career as a philosopher, eventually arrived at the terrain of political 
economy in the course of searching for the real and material basis of social 
phenomena and, moreover, of the theories put forward by his German predecessors 
and contemporaries.  
Another main conclusion of the last chapter was that, almost at the same time with his 
arrival at the terrain of political economy, Marx began seriously to consider the world 
market. He appeared to be deeply impressed by the rapid development of the world 
market at that time, precisely because it appeared to him to epitomise what Hegel had 
tried to address using the concept of the state. That is, the world market was 
conceived by Marx as the material, real-world equivalent for the state which had been 
ideally conceptualised by Hegel.  
However, since the significance Marx attaches to the concept of world market — the 
main object of concern of this thesis — changes over time as his political economy 
proceeds, we need to analyse further Marx’s intellectual development in the domain 
of political economy (Chapter 3) before we can properly understand the varying 
significance of the concept of world market in Marx’s critical theoretical project as a 
whole (Chapter 4). 
 
3.1.	POLITICAL	ECONOMY	BEFORE	MARX	
Considering Marx’s whole life, political economy can be said to be the ultimate 
destination of his lifetime intellectual journey. Since he got to the terrain of political 
economy at the age of 26 in 1844, his remaining life was hugely marked by an 
extensive and critical study of political economy. In the meantime, however, he only 
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produced two remarkable political economy works; one is A Contribution to the 
Critique of Political Economy in 1859 and the other Capital in 1867. What is worse, 
they made up only a part of his project, the Critique of Political Economy. Naturally 
enough, in the long process of his occupation with political economy, Marx’s attitude 
towards it changed a lot. In this section, before examining what changes actually 
happened in Marx’s own political economy over time, the historical and intellectual 
context around political economy itself will be expounded at a general level. 
 
3.1.1. The Historical and Social Background of Political Economy 
Throughout social sciences, the term ‘political economy’ is used broadly in a variety 
of senses. The Internet encyclopaedia Wikipedia (http://www.wikipedia.org), for 
example, registers seven different usages of political economy in various disciplines 
of contemporary social science, and one could increase the number with other 
measures. For the purpose of this thesis, however, political economy is more than 
anything else the old name for what we now call ‘economics’ in the 18th and 19th 
centuries; the renaming took place around the turn of the century, and the new name, 
economics, seems to have firmly established its sovereignty within its own discipline 
in the early-20th century.46 Consequently, when used side by side with ‘economics’ 
within the economics discipline, the term ‘political economy’ sometimes refers to 
something distinct from ‘economics’; i.e., economics with a political tinge. But this is 
a really vulgar way of using the term, not least considering the historical and social 
context in which ‘political economy’ was originally born; the term ‘political economy’ 
                                                
46	Of	course,	there	is	a	geographical	variation	as	well.	In	some	old	European	universities	the	
term	political	 economy	 is	 still	 used	 retaining	 its	 traditional	 sense,	while	 in	 those	 countries	
where	 Western	 styled	 disciplinary	 systems	 were	 introduced	 recently,	 political	 economy	
refers	 to	something	very	different;	 in	South	Korea,	 for	example,	 it	 is	generally	 regarded	as	
‘Marxist’	political	economy.		
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reflected the social transformation — in its broad sense — that had been happening 
for centuries before it was actually coined.47  
According to the historiographers of the science of economics, the origin of political 
economy dates back to the 18th century, and Adam Smith is generally regarded as the 
founder of modern political economy. However, the history of man’s dealing with 
economic matters should be as old as human history itself. As the text books of the 
history of economic thought suggests, it was the Ancient Greek people who, in the 
Western tradition, first discussed economic matters in any serious and systematic 
manner. The origin of the word ‘economy’ is also to be found in the Ancient Greek 
language — oikonomia. It is said to have been coined by Plato’s contemporary, 
Xenophon (ca. 431–355BC), who wrote a book entitled Oeconomicus (Xenophon 
1970). Oikonomia is a compound of oikos and nemein meaning ‘household’ and ‘to 
manage’ respectively and, thus, Xenophon’s Oeconomicus is mainly about household 
management (Knight 1973; Strauss 1970). 
It is very important to note that ‘economy’ originally referred among the Ancient 
Greeks to the management of the household, simply because it seems rather strange 
and even contradictory to describe the management of the household as political; it is 
more private than political.48 Further, what has been dealt with under the heading of 
political economy or economics for the last several hundred years was mostly ‘bigger’ 
matters than those concerning household management.  
In the first place, it has to be remembered that the Ancient Greek household was quite 
different from that of today.  
The	 polis	 households	 analyzed	 by	 Aristotle	 in	 his	 Politics	 and	 Ethics	 had	 little	 in	
common	with	the	households	of	contemporary	developed	states.	For	Aristotle	as	for	
most	Greeks,	modern	households	would	not	have	been	households	at	all.	...	
The	differences	were	profound	and	manifold.	 In	 the	eyes	of	Greeks,	most	modern	
households	would	have	been	seen	as	deficient,	incomplete	economic	entities	failing	
                                                
47	In	a	sense,	the	renaming	also	reflects	in	itself	some	social	transformation,	and	it	is	natural	
that	the	content	and	aim	of	‘economics’	should	be	different	from	those	of	 its	predecessor.	
See	below.	
48	Of	course,	it	 is	hardly	relevant	here	to	refer	to	the	extended	meaning	of	‘the	political’	as	
suggested	by	the	term	‘micro-politics’.		
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in	the	all-important	aspect	of	being,	at	least	minimally,	self-sustaining.	In	this	regard,	
modern	 households	 are	 the	 reverse	 of	 polis	 households	 in	 that	 they	 are,	 by	 and	
large,	 dependent	 for	 their	 subsistence	 on	 income	 originating	 from	 outside	 the	
household.	Without	 jobs	 provided	 by	 the	 disembedded,	 non-household	 economy,	
modern	households	 could	not	exist.	Households	of	 this	 type	are	merely	 consumer	
and	 reproductive	 units.	 By	 contrast,	 the	 Greek	 oikos	 was	 expected	 to	 be	 a	 self-
sustaining	joint	enterprise	…		
However,	 it	 was	 much	more	 than	 a	 business	 enterprise.	 The	 driving	 force	 of	 the	
oikos	 economy	was	 not	 profit	 in	 the	modern	 sense	 of	 the	 term.	 The	oikos	 was	 a	
moral	 and	 religious	 entity	 in	 its	 own	 right	 whose	 purpose	 was	 not	 just	 the	
generation	 of	 legally	 recognizable	 citizens,	 but	 the	 proper	 formation	 of	 morally	
acceptable	members	 of	 the	 particular	polis	 community	where	 it	 was	 located,	 and	
the	passing	on	of	the	household’s	religious	cults	to	future	generations.	(Nagle	2006:	
1-2)49		
It was, in brief, the household as understood in such a way as above that formed both 
the foundation of the Ancient Greek society and of Aristotle’s economic theory which 
was firmly based on his knowledge of the society’s actual conditions. Therefore, they 
simply did not need the adjective ‘political’ to describe the ‘(political) economic’ 
affairs as the 18th century thinkers called them.50 And it was precisely in this way that 
the term ‘economy’ had been understood for more than 1800 years since Aristotle 
before the term ‘political economy’ got to be used widely in the 18th and 19th 
centuries.  
                                                
49	‘The	 family	 (genos),	 as	 the	Greeks	 first	 knew	 it,	 is	 an	 extensive	 group.	All	who	own	 the	
same	hero	 for	ancestor	 remain	united	round	the	same	hearth.	Although	they	are	married,	
the	 fifty	 sons	 and	 the	 twelve	 daughters	 of	 Priam	 dwell	 together	 under	 the	 paternal	 roof.	
While	the	family	group	has	obligations	towards	the	city,	the	individuals	composing	it	depend	
on	 it	 alone.	 It	 keeps	 its	 autonomy,	 and	 has	 its	 own	 chief,	 its	 own	 worship,	 its	 own	
administration,	and	its	own	justice’	(Glotz	1920:	7-8).		
50	In	this	sense,	Schumpeter’s	argument	is	quite	misleading:	‘It	is	not	true,	as	has	often	been	
maintained,	that	the	economy	of	the	‘oikos’	with	its	autarky	of	the	household	produced	no	
problems	 of	 a	 ‘political’	 economy	 proper,	 and	 the	 ‘oikos’	 economy	 was	 not	 quite	 so	
prevalent	 as	 is	 assumed	 in	 this	 argument’	 (Schumpeter	 1914:	 10).	 Based	 on	 this,	 he	
continues	to	champion	Aristotle	as	‘the	first	and	for	a	long	time	the	only	thinker	to	recognize	
that	 the	 economic	 activity	 of	man	 represents	 a	 problem	of	 intrinsic	 interest	 distinguished	
clearly	and	incisively	from	mere	household	and	workshop	management	on	the	one	hand	and	
from	the	art	of	the	legislator,	on	the	other’	(Schumpeter	1914:	11).		
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Then one can reasonably suppose that, in order for ‘economy’ to be ‘political’ 
although this coinage seems contradictory, there should be some sort of social 
transformations that made the household insufficient as the basic unit of social 
organisation. Indeed, for centuries, the household was on its way to being reduced to a 
mere unit of consumption while the scale of economic affairs that required serious 
consideration got bigger and bigger. People, of course, still performed traditional 
‘economic’ activities of production, exchange, and consumption mainly to manage 
their family as before, but at the same time new kinds of economic problems were 
emerging such as trade between countries, the management of the government, the 
maintenance of the value of money vis-à-vis other currencies, etc. They were new, not 
in the sense that they had not existed before, but that their emergence was very 
closely related to the newly arising modern states especially from the 16th century.  
However, the transformations took place very slowly, and the intellectual 
appropriation of them was even slower. Concerning this, Neal Wood provides an 
interesting study of a few early Tudor social thinkers, and Sir Thomas Smith (1513-
1577) is one of them. He was among the first to distinguish government from the 
state, and to recognise the rise of a form of society — ‘societie civill’, ‘a society 
organised by government and law’ (Wood 1994: 203) — which was distinct from 
other human societies (198-9). However, while recognising all these problems were 
beyond the household both in content and form, he still tried to explain them resorting 
to an analogy with the management of the household:  
Following	 Aristotle,	 Smith	 …	 saw	 the	 origins	 of	 the	 first	 state	 in	 the	 patriarchal	
household,	 and	 in	 general	 he	 viewed	 the	 rule	 of	 the	 family	 as	 similar	 to	 the	
government	 of	 existing	 polities	 …	 [In	 his	A	 Discourse	 of	 the	 Commonweal	 of	 This	
Realm	of	England,	published	posthumously	 in	1581]	he	 implied	 that	 the	 state	was	
the	 household	 in	 macrocosm	 by	 his	 comparisons	 of	 the	 economic	 life	 of	 each.	
(Wood	1994:	216)	
Considering that Smith had already recognised the unprecedented fundamental 
changes of human life that could not be reduced to mere household affairs, his 
employment of the analogy seems largely due to a lack of relevant concepts and 
analytical tools. But the ‘household–state metaphor’, says Wood, ‘became quite 
popular since Smith first employed it’ (217). But, over time, analogy seems to have 
given way to distinction. Antoine de Montchrétien, though employing the term 
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‘political economy’, still relied on the household–state analogy in his Traité 
d’économie politique, published in 1615,51 but Sir James Steuart at last made it clear 
in his An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy (1767) that he distinguished 
‘political economy’ from ‘economy’ as such:  
Oeconomy,	 in	 general,	 is	 the	 art	 of	 providing	 for	 all	 the	 wants	 of	 a	 family,	 with	
prudence	and	frugality.	…		
What	oeconomy	is	in	a	family,	political	oeconomy	is	in	a	state.	(Steuart	1767:	15,	16)	
And, later on, James Mill also opened his Elements of Political Economy (first 
published in 1821) with the following remark: ‘Political Economy is to the State, 
what domestic economy is to the family’ (Mill 1826: 210). What is notable here is 
that he made the distinction even clearer by referring what had been called ‘economy’ 
as ‘domestic economy’. Side by side with the gradual emergence of the term ‘political 
economy’ as something distinct from ‘economy’, its meaning also became fixed after 
a series of transformations; as seen in Steuart’s remark, just like ‘economy’, it had 
been regarded as an ‘art’ of managing the state,52 but over time it confirmed its status 
as an independent field of social science. For example, John Stuart Mill defined 
political economy as follows:  
“The	 science	which	 traces	 the	 laws	 of	 such	 of	 the	 phenomena	 of	 society	 as	 arise	
from	the	combined	operations	of	mankind	for	the	production	of	wealth,	in	so	far	as	
these	phenomena	are	not	modified	by	the	pursuit	of	any	other	object”	 (Mill	1844:	
323).53		
                                                
51	On	Montcrétien,	see	McNally	(1988:	68-72).	This	Frenchman	has	generally	been	regarded	
as	the	first	to	use	the	term	‘political	economy’	in	the	title	of	his	book,	but	this	is	not	the	case.	
According	to	James	E.	King	(1948),	 it	was	in	the	year	1611	by	Louis	de	Mayerne-Turquet	in	
his	 work	 La	monarchie	 aristodémocratique	 that	 ‘political	 economy’	 was	 used	 for	 the	 first	
time	in	history.		
52	This	state	 is	by	definition	simply	the	same	as	 the	civil	 society	as	Hegel	conceptualised	 in	
Philosophy	 of	 Right.	 And	 Adam	 Smith’s	 definition	 of	 political	 economy	 in	 his	Wealth	 of	
Nations	(1776)	is	not	very	different	from	Steuart’s.	See	Groenewegen	(2002:	67-8).		
53	Peter	 Groenewegen	 (2002)	 provides	 a	 collection	 of	 definitions	 of	 political	 economy	 by	
various	authors,	ranging	from	Sir	James	Steuart	to	Paul	Samuelson,	and	shows	how	the	ways	
(political)	economists	define	their	own	field	of	study	have	changed	over	time.		
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In conclusion, the emergence of the concept of political economy, together with its 
independence as an individual field of study of society, was a result of a long and 
slow transformation of society itself, and of the way of people looking at it. In relation 
to the term’s origin, especially, at the most immediate level, it implied that the 
‘economic’ significance of the household had been changed. In the modern state, 
people got freed from all kinds of bondages taken for granted in former societies, and 
were no longer regarded as members of a family, nor of these or those (small and 
arbitrary) societies. Instead, in the newly emerging state, each of them was now 
related to the whole society as an individual. In this situation, no commensurability 
remained between the state and any smaller units that might be thought of as family 
by analogy. This is why the household-state metaphor could no more be valid. On the 
other hand, one of the main forces that drove such developments was 
industrialisation, and gradually it became the single most important determinant of 
modern society. It was in this sense that Marx and Engels regarded political economy 
as the science of modern industrial capitalism. Industrialisation transformed society 
under the principles which were radically different from those of the former eras. 
Even if some parts of society might not be ‘industrialised’ in themselves, the whole 
society was indeed reorganised under the leadership of the most industrialised part 
and, consequently, the significance of the ‘unindustrialised’ parts vis-à-vis the whole 
society was necessarily to change. Political economy, generally speaking, arose as the 
science of this society. 
 
3.1.2. Political Economy between Smith and Hegel 
Actually the historical development briefly exposed above took place not only in 
Britain but was shared by, at least, Western and Northern Europe as a whole and, not 
surprisingly, the intellectual endeavour — which was very often guided by practical 
needs — to understand this changing situation was also arising across Europe from 
the sixteenth century onward.54 The first remarkable fruit of such an effort is what we 
                                                
54	Schumpeter’s	(1914:	Chapter	1)	short	but	thorough	exposition	is	a	good	summary	of	the	
landscape	of	the	major	European	countries.	And	Magnusson	(1987;	1992)	is	only	one	of	the	
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call Mercantilism in the 17th and early 18th centuries in England, and this was 
paralleled by its equivalents in other countries; Colbertism in France and Cameralism 
in Germany, for instance.  
In the first place, it is very important that each of these three strands of thought, or 
rather state policies was in its own country a product of a series of political and social 
developments that culminated in the establishment of the modern state in each 
country. Since most of those who developed these thoughts and policy suggestions 
were not in the academia but commercial actors or state servants, the reflection of 
reality in discourse was quick and immediate, if crude and not very systematic. They 
‘took it for granted that national commercial policy should serve national ends’ 
without seriously discussing what ‘national’ meant at all (Schumpeter 1914: 39), and 
‘generally agreed to certain fundamental principles of what caused economic growth’ 
(Reinert 2005: 272) with all the national differences. On the other hand, it is true to 
the same degree that the modern state gradually took its form through ‘Mercantilist’ 
practices; in this sense, Mercantilism — and its equivalents in other countries — can 
be said to have been ‘a means for the creation of national economic units’. But in 
defining national interests as distinguished from private ones, a possibility of a clash 
between the two inevitably arose (Schumpeter 1914: 39, 41), and it seems that the 
consequent development of economic theories in different countries had much to do 
with how to deal with this problem. And, more importantly to this thesis’ purpose, 
this difference was crucial in defining the way that Marx intervened in those theories 
— political economy, so to speak. 
In tackling the above problem England and Germany showed a striking contrast, 
which is worth looking into for a while since it played a crucial role in forming 
Marx’s problematisation in political economy. Indeed, while he had a great deal of 
interest, if not always positive, in English political economy, he showed no mercy 
towards the economic science developed in his own country although his father had 
                                                                                                                                      
examples	 that	 remind	 us	 that	 the	 same	 phenomenon	 was	 taking	 place	 in	 the	 European	
countries	Schumpeter	did	not	consider.			
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been quite eager to make his son study it ‘for future’.55 The different ways for the two 
countries to react to the problem of the conflict between public, national interests and 
private, individual ones is hinted most wittily and briefly by Albion Small in the 
conclusion of his classic work on Cameralism:  
In	 spite	 of	 the	 necessary	 inaccuracy	 of	 a	 brief	 theorem,	 especially	 when	 it	 is	
antithetic	in	form,	the	contrast	between	German	and	American	conceptions	of	civic	
experience	 may	 be	 stated	 approximately	 as	 follows:	 From	 the	 beginning	 the	
Germans	 have	 regarded	 the	 state	 as	 primarily	 a	 unit,	 and	 only	 secondarily	 an	
aggregate.	 From	 the	beginning	Americans	have	 regarded	 the	 state	as	primarily	an	
aggregate,	and	only	secondarily	a	unit.	(Small	1909:	493.	Original	italics.)	
Although Small is here making a comparison between Germany and the U.S., simply 
replacing the latter with the 18th century England perfectly serves our purpose. Even 
more interesting is the two contrasting views of the state — a unit in itself or a mere 
aggregation of its elements. This juxtaposition appears somewhat vulgar and crude (as 
Small himself admits), but it is actually how this matter has been conceived so far,56 
and does reflect the truth of the matter. In Germany, the cameralist tradition remained 
strong for a long time, and the possible clash of the public and the private interests 
was not so problematic in this framework, even after Cameralism gave way to its 
successor, the German Historical School. What is interesting here is that the classical 
household-state metaphor still worked quite well in this situation:  
According	to	the	cameralistic	conception	then,	the	state	was	a	magnified	family	with	
a	big	farm	as	its	property.	The	unity	of	this	family	with	its	estate	was	symbolized	by	
the	prince.	 Its	 interests	were	represented	by	the	prince	 in	such	a	way	that	no	one	
could	 very	 clearly	 discriminate	 between	 the	 personality	 of	 the	 prince	 and	 the	
interests	 of	 the	 state.	 The	 unity	 of	 this	 farm-patriarchate-	 principality	 was	 so	
impressive	 that	 at	 first	 very	 little	 occasion	 seems	 to	 have	 been	 found	 for	
distinguishing	between	the	concepts	“welfare	of	the	prince,”	“welfare	of	the	state,”	
“welfare	 of	 the	 people”	 (considered	 collectively),	 and	 “welfare	 of	 the	 people”	
(considered	individually).	(Small	1909:	495)		
                                                
55	See	 the	 two	 letters	 sent	 in	1836	by	 the	 father	Heinrich	Marx;	one	 is	 to	his	 son,	and	 the	
other	 is	a	consent	 letter	to	his	son’s	transfer	from	Bonn	to	the	University	of	Berlin	(CW01:	
649-51,	655-6).		
56	As	in	the	two	paths	of	capitalist	development;	American-type	and	German-	or	Rhein-type.		
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On the other hand, in England, while emphasis was moving towards the individual, 
what could be termed ‘national interests’ or ‘communal interests’ was not to be 
ignored; people were always seeking hard to compromise the two, and those like Sir 
Thomas Smith were the earliest to deliberate over such a matter (Wood 1994).57 As 
mentioned in the previous sub-section (§3.1.1), Smith resorted to the household-state 
analogy to deal with ‘political economy’ in the 18th century sense of the term, but 
there was (at least) one element that could not be captured in this analogy — the 
individual.58 Actually, this is why Hegel posited the family as the first moment — 
thus the moment to be sublated to a higher one, civil society — of what he called 
‘ethical life’ in the Philosophy of Right; in the family, one cannot have one’s own 
actual [wirklich] individuality:  
The	family,	as	the	 immediate	substantiality	of	mind,	 is	specifically	characterized	by	
love,	which	is	mind’s	feeling	of	its	own	unity.	Hence	in	a	family,	one’s	frame	of	mind	
is	to	have	self-consciousness	of	one’s	 individuality	within	 this	unity	as	the	absolute	
essence	of	oneself,	with	the	result	that	one	is	in	it	not	as	an	independent	person	but	
as	a	member.	(Philosophy	of	Right:	§158.	My	italics.)		
Originally	the	family	is	the	substantive	whole	whose	function	it	is	to	provide	for	the	
individual	 on	 his	 particular	 side	 by	 giving	 him	 either	 the	 means	 and	 the	 skill	
necessary	 to	 enable	 him	 to	 earn	 his	 living	 out	 of	 the	 resources	 of	 society,	 or	 else	
subsistence	 and	 maintenance	 in	 the	 event	 of	 his	 suffering	 a	 disability.	 But	 civil	
society	 tears	 the	 individual	 from	 this	 family	 ties,	 estranges	 the	 members	 of	 the	
family	from	one	another,	and	recognizes	them	as	self-subsistent	persons.	(§238.	My	
ltalics.)		
It was through the generations of Scottish moral philosophers in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries that the Smithian household-state metaphor was replaced 
completely, and the problems of the individual and of the individual-community 
                                                
57	This	contemplation	led	him	to	think	vaguely	about	what	Marx	called	later	‘social	division	
of	 labour’	 (Wood	 1994:	 213-4).	 Interestingly,	 this	 thought	 was	 not	 so	 much	 developed	
further	 nor	 conceptualised	 distinctly	 by	 later	 thinkers;	 rather	 it	 was	 evaporated	 in	 the	
narrower	concept	of	in-factory	division	of	labour	of	Adam	Smith.		
58	In	 a	 way,	 this	 is	 not	 a	 matter	 of	 whether	 the	modern	 individual	 actually	 exists,	 but	 of	
whether	 one	 has	 the	 concept	 of	 it.	Of	 course,	 the	 concept	 is	 here	 assumed	 to	 have	 been	
‘extracted’	 (Althusser	and	Balibar	1968:	35-6)	 from	the	study	of	reality.	As	 long	as	one	has	
the	concept	of	 individual,	then	there	is	an	immanent	necessity	that	this	concept	should	be	
well	integrated	into	the	whole	theory.		
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relationship were discussed from a totally different perspective.59  Sticking to the 
individual as the starting point,60 they assumed that there were natural propensities in 
human beings given by God. ‘The basic task,’ says Andrew Skinner, ‘was to explain 
how it was that a creature endowed with both self and other-regarding propensities 
was fitted for the social state’ (Skinner 1996: 110).  
It was against this background that Adam Smith presented his system of economic 
thought, and that modern political economy at last made its appearance. Indeed, he 
was a professor of moral philosophy in the University of Glasgow, and his political 
economy was intended as part of his ambitious project of ‘social science’ that 
consisted of ethics and jurisprudence as well as political economy (Skinner 1976: 13-
4; 1996). In the tradition of Scottish moral philosophy, he approached the individual-
community problem by conceptualising the interplay of two main human propensities 
— fellow feeling and self-love. That is, for Smith, man was naturally selfish on the 
one hand, but at the same time willing to keep himself in harmony with the 
community. To compromise these two conflicting propensities, argued Smith, it 
became necessary ‘to establish sources of control such as the rules of justice and 
morality’ (Skinner 1976: 15-27). Therefore, as a number of researchers have pointed 
out, to consider this is essential to understand his system of economic thought,61 
                                                
59	They	were	 the	 contemporaries	 of	 Immanuel	 Kant	 (1724-1804),	 Johann	Gottfried	Herder	
(1744-1803),	 Giambattista	 Vico	 (1668-1744),	 etc.	 Stephen	 Toulmin	 makes	 an	 interesting	
argument	that	their	geographical	locations	were	an	important	factor	which	enabled	them	to	
come	 up	 with	 the	 most	 profound	 observations	 as	 for	 their	 time	 (Toulmin	 1992).	
Edinburgh/Glasgow	(Scottish	moralists),	Königsberg	 (Kant,	Herder),	and	Naples	 (Vico)	were	
largely	out	of	the	centre	in	each	country.	
60	Cf.	Marx’s	brief	criticism	of	this	can	be	found	in	the	‘Introduction’	to	the	Grundrisse	(1857	
Introduction:	82-3).	We	will	come	back	to	this	point	later.	
61	However,	 the	desire	 to	 ‘understand’	something	correctly	must	be	differentiated	 from	all	
sorts	of	apologetic	explanations	of	it.	For	example,	Jeffrey	T.	Young’s	following	argument	is	
hardly	 acceptable.	 According	 to	 him,	 Smith’s	 political	 economy	 is	 so	 deeply	 rooted	 in	 his	
moral	philosophy	crystallised	 into	The	Theory	of	Moral	Sentiments,	 and	Smith’s	 two	major	
books,	 the	 Sentiments	 and	 the	 Wealth	 of	 Nations,	 are	 so	 closely	 related	 that	 his	
abandonment	of	the	 labour	theory	of	value	and	adoption	of	the	cost	of	production	theory	
‘must	be	seen	as	a	reflection	of	the	jurisprudential	ancestry	of	his	economics’	(Young	1995:	
772).	 Compare	 this	 with	 Ben	 Fine’s	 (1982)	 critique	 of	 Smith	 especially	 in	 terms	 of	 his	
abandonment	of	the	labour	theory	of	value.	On	the	other	hand,	at	the	most	general	level,	It	
is	a	matter	of	 the	 interpretation	of	Smith’s	 thought	as	a	whole,	especially	 the	 relationship	
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although political economy actually became more and more detached from its ethical 
foundation in the hands of Smith’s followers.  
In Hegel can be found the same degree of ambitiousness. Indeed, it was this same 
problem that Hegel was faced with when he launched his enormous philosophical 
project. A significant part of the Philosophy of Right (1821), Hegel’s most developed 
social philosophical work, was devoted to a conceptual reconstruction of modern civil 
society with all its contradictions to be overcome later by the State, and it was largely 
based upon the analysis of the British political economists such as Sir James Steuart, 
Adam Smith, and David Ricardo.62 Thanks to them, Hegel was able to develop the 
insight of civil society as a system of needs, work, and division of labour. In a sense, 
Hegel’s dependence on them (or others from outside Germany) was inevitable since 
German reality was not so suitable to develop such ideas. As Shlomo Avineri 
indicates, Hegel’s social philosophy, especially the theory of civil society in the 
Philosophy of Right was not based on any empirical or historical study, but ‘rather a 
distillation of the model of society presented by modern political economy raised to 
the level of a philosophical paradigm’ (Avineri 1972: 90). 
However, while Avineri is here simply pointing out that Hegel widely read the works 
of British political economists, and was very much influenced by them, this 
explanation seems insufficient. Rather, as Manfred Riedel explains, Hegel had already 
been engaged with the consideration of ‘a reciprocal dialectical relationship between 
private and public ends forming the basis of a “social connection” which encompasses 
“personal” activity’ (Riedel 1969: 44), and the problem he was faced with before 
encountering political economy was as follows:  
…	 Rousseau	 drew	 false	 conclusions	 from	 the	 ‘true’	 premises	 which	 were	 at	 his	
disposal:	his	design	 for	 the	Social	Contract	 succumbs	 to	 the	 traditional	 illusions	by	
thinking	of	the	state	as	a	 ‘community	of	citizens’	 in	the	manner	of	Plato’s	Republic	
and	Aristotle’s	Politics	as	well	as	by	identifying	it	with	‘civil	society’.	On	the	contrary,	
one	 of	 the	 most	 important	 results	 of	 Hegel’s	 debate	 with	 classical	 politics	 and	
                                                                                                                                      
between	the	Sentiments	and	the	Wealth	of	Nations,	and	it	has	been	called	‘Das	Adam	Smith	
Problem’.	See,	for	the	origin	and	development	of	the	debate,	Montes	(2003).		
62	His	 first	 encounter	with	British	political	 economy	was	 in	 1799	 through	Christian	Garve’s	
translation	of	Sir	 James	Steuart’s	An	Inquiry	 into	the	Principles	of	Political	Economy	 (1767).	
But	his	research	in	this	field	was	not	clearly	known	during	Marx’s	time.	
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modern	natural	 law	 theory	 is	 that	on	 the	basis	of	 the	double	 insufficiency	of	both	
their	principles	he	draws	a	conclusion	which	severs	their	 traditional	 relationship	at	
just	 this	decisive	point.	As	distinct	 from	natural	 law	 theory,	which	 from	Hobbes	 to	
Kant	 posits	 ‘individual’	 and	 ‘general’	 will,	 or	 ‘civil	 society’	 and	 ‘state’	 as	mutually	
identical,	 Hegel,	 under	 the	 influence	 of	 the	 historical	 experience	 of	 the	 French	
Revolution,63	begins	with	the	 insight	 that	 the	opposition	between	these	terms	as	a	
differentiating	 principle	 must	 be	 recognized	 and	 made	 theoretically	 valid.	 The	
contrast	between	classical	politics	and	modern	natural	 law	theory	made	 it	clear	 to	
him	 that	 clinging	 to	 the	 identity	 of	 state	 and	 civil	 society	 is	 an	 illusion	 and	 a	
contradiction	 of	 the	 presuppositions	 historically	 conditioning	 each.	 (Riedel	 1969:	
107.	My	italics.)		
In other words, Hegel was struggling with the same problem as Adam Smith and 
other Scottish moral philosophers — the individual-community conundrum — but 
from a different perspective; i.e., in the confrontation, and discontent, with the 
classical Platonic-Aristotelian tradition on the one hand, and modern Natural Law and 
Social Contract theories on the other. In this situation, what Hegel seems to have felt 
obliged to do is to develop the concepts of modern ‘civil society’ as distinct from the 
(ideal) state in the classical sense, and of the ‘individual’ residing in the civil society 
thus defined and differentiated.  
They	 [the	 ‘societies’	as	meant	by	Natural	Law	theorists]	are	associations	of	people	
who,	by	means	of	rational	discussion	and	action,	form	a	common	will	which,	for	all	
those	 bound	 by	 it,	 is	 the	 will	 of	 one	 ‘legal	 individual’.	 …	 For	 Hegel,	 on	 the	 other	
hand,	‘society’	consists	by	definition	in	private	persons	bound	together	by	need	and	
labour.	 …	 Hegel’s	 philosophical	 achievement	 in	 this	 field	 consists	 above	 all	 in	 his	
having	seen	the	‘private’	frame	of	reference	of	individuals	as	publicly	mediated	and	
grasped	 their	 natural	 basis	 as	 a	 social	 constant.	 The	 theory	 of	 civil	 society	 is	 not	
oriented	around	the	contract,	the	union	of	rational,	articulate	individual	agents,	but	
the	 ‘system	of	needs’	—	a	network	of	 relations	between	 ‘private	persons’	 resulting	
from	need,	the	means	of	satisfaction	and	labour	that	is	constantly	reproducing	itself.	
(44.	My	italics.)	
This is exactly what the ‘new science’ of political economy as Adam Smith meant it 
to be was all about, although he approached it in a different language. And, moreover, 
just as for Smith, political economy constituted only a part of his system of social 
science, so it was for Hegel who regarded it as the science of civil society and of 
                                                
63	On	the	influence	of	the	French	Revolution	on	the	formation	of	Hegel’s	thought,	see	Ritter	
(1965).	
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actual individuality (Philosophy of Right: §199), and who thought civil society was to 
be raised to a higher level, the state. 
 
3.1.3. Summary and Conclusion 
In the intellectual context of the 18th and early 19th centuries in Europe, the term 
‘political economy’ referred either to the real issues concerning the management of 
the whole community, civil society, or simply to the study of them. And both the 
usages were confirmed as a result of a series of preceding historical and social 
developments. On the one hand, as the double movement of the formation of the 
modern state, and of the emergence of the individual unfolded, the so-called 
‘economic’ problems could not be properly approached based upon the traditional 
sense of the term ‘economy’. In this process, on the other hand, the endeavour of 
many people to understand the nature and working mechanism of the newly defined 
economy, i.e., political economy, gave rise to a new science of it. Of all the newly 
posed, or redefined, problems in the modern world, most crucial was to deal with the 
conflict between the public and the individual interests, and between (groups of) 
individuals with different interests. It is in this vein that Adam Smith laid down the 
foundation for modern political economy through a critical engagement with English 
Mercantilism and the French Physiocrats.  
In this respect, Hegel was not so different from Smith. Against the background of the 
development of the modern world, he also struggled to correctly understand the 
modern problems and transcend them. In this process, he was enormously influenced 
by the works of the British political economists. 
Lastly, it is important to note that the significance of political economy for both Smith 
and Hegel was quite limited, given the grand scale of their social philosophical 
projects. For Hegel, political economy was the science for the understanding of civil 
society which however was for him only a purgatory-like passing stage on the way to 
the realisation of man’s real freedom. Indeed, whereas analyses and excerpts taken 
from the works of political economists are easily found in his relatively early 
manuscripts such as System der Sittlichkeit (written in 1802-3) and two versions of 
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Realphilosophie (written in 1803-4 and 1805-6, respectively), most of them do not 
feature, except leaving but some traces, in his later social philosophical work like the 
Philosophy of Right published in 1821. In Smith, on the other hand, political 
economic analyses were performed quite strictly, but as soon as these analyses and 
the laws derived from them were placed into the whole system of his social science, 
they often found themselves violated. It is actually this that Jeffrey Young (1995) tries 
to legitimise in the quotation mentioned in the footnote 61 of this chapter. 
However, regardless of what they intended political economy to be, it did thrive 
among those in the later generations, and was at long last established as an 
independent field of social science detached from its ‘moral philosophical’ 
foundations. On the one hand, this opened up the road to vulgarity and narrowness 
that characterise today’s ‘economics’. But, on the other, it also reveal the fact that as 
such political economy is in a profound way concerned with the material interests in 
civil society which cannot be fully addressed in any ideal or speculative framework.64 
Actually this contradictory significance of the development of political economy 
since Adam Smith gave Marx a reason for his distinction between ‘classical’ and 
‘vulgar’ political economy, and for his commitment to the study of political economy 
for most of his life. 
 
                                                
64	The	 speculative	 character	 of	 Smith	 and	 Hegel	 is	 especially	 remarkable	when	 they	 dealt	
with	 history	 and,	 indeed,	 this	 was	 the	main	 case	Marx	 tried	 to	make	 against	 them.	 They	
were	 so	 obsessed	 with	 the	 ideas	 of	 the	 individual	 and	 civil	 society	 that	 they	 even	
reconstructed	human	history	as	a	process	of	 the	 realisation	of	 these	 ideas.	Of	course,	 this	
tendency	was	much	more	obvious	and	systematic	 in	Hegel	who	derived	the	 individual	and	
civil	society	from	earlier	states	of	human	life	logically	as	a	categorical	imperative.	Smith,	too,	
though	 less	 systematically,	 attempted	 to	 reconstruct	 history	 as	 a	 realisation	 of	 the	
relationships	in	modern	civil	society.	Hence,	Marx’s	accusation	against	the	18th	century	social	
thinkers	 including	 Smith:	 They	 regarded	 the	 individual	 ‘not	 as	 a	 historic	 result	 but	 as	
history’s	 point	 of	 departure’	 (1857	 Introduction:	 17-18).	 Skinner	 (1976:	 30-42)	 delivers	 a	
good	summary	of	Smith’s	reconstruction	of	history,	if	not	critically.		
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3.2.	 MARX’S	 PROBLEMATISATION	 IN	 POLITICAL	 ECONOMY:	 ‘METHODOLOGICAL	
SOPHISTICATION’	
Now we are going to turn to the central question of this chapter: the relationship Marx 
established between himself and political economy, and its development over time. In 
the ‘Preface’ to the Contribution in 1859, he said that ‘the anatomy of … civil society 
… has to be sought in political economy’ (Ccontribution: 262). Apart from the rather 
metaphoric expression ‘anatomy’, this is exactly what political economy meant to 
Smith and Hegel as explained in the previous section. This basic attitude remained 
unchanged for Marx until he finally succeeded in working out his own comprehensive, 
if incomplete, version of the ‘anatomy’ in Capital.65 However, such significance of 
political economy as this did not occur to Marx from the very first moment, but was 
forged through the process of his political economic study, embarked on at the 
beginning of 1844. From this point, it may well be said depth and breadth was 
progressively added to the importance attached to political economy. 
Nevertheless, this process can be characterised neither linear nor quantitative 
evolution. Indeed, one can easily observe, if one tries, that, whereas in the early years 
Marx primarily endeavoured to focus on the historically transient character of 
capitalist society, his main concern subsequently moves to investigating its inner 
dynamics in his later works, from the Contribution through to Capital. Considering 
that this transition of Marx’s research in its focus on capitalist society has so far 
largely been ignored, or oversimplified, within the Marxist scholarship, to recognise it 
is itself very crucial.66 In this chapter, this transition in the focus of Marx’s political 
economy is to be identified, with the contention that it reflects the changes in his view 
on modern capitalist society as well as on political economy. 
                                                
65	‘[In]	 the	 analysis	 of	 economic	 forms	 neither	 microscopes	 nor	 chemical	 reagents	 are	 of	
assistance.	The	power	of	abstraction	must	replace	both.	But	for	civil	society,	the	commodity-
form	of	 the	 product	 of	 labour,	 or	 the	 value-form	of	 the	 commodity,	 is	 the	 economic	 cell-
form.	To	the	superficial	observer,	the	analysis	of	these	forms	seems	to	turn	upon	minutiae.	
It	 does	 in	 fact	 deal	with	minutiae,	 but	 they	 are	 of	 the	 same	 order	 as	 those	 dealt	with	 in	
microscopic	anatomy’	(Capital:	90.	My	italics).	
66	It	 is	 worth	 underlining	 that	 we	 are	 now	 speaking	 of	 Marx’s	 transition	within	 political	
economy,	 not	what	 is	 called	 his	 life-time	 transition	 from	philosophy	 to	 political	 economy.	
The	former	is	a	question	that	has	very	rarely	been	raised.	
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3.2.1. Political Economy as Destination 
It was stated in the previous section that political economy had been regarded by its 
founders as the science of the movement of civil society per se. It was recognised as a 
fait accompli by the political economists in the 18th century that political economy 
was a science which concerned itself with the material movement — i.e., the 
production, exchange, distribution, and consumption of material wealth — amongst 
the main classes that constituted the basic relations in civil society, and that this 
political economy, when advanced as a complete system, was the theoretical 
expression of the core of this society. Following this tradition, Marx eventually came 
to regard political economy as the anatomy of civil society, but it was more than a 
decade later that he commenced the study of political economy on his own; by this 
time his view on it had substantially evolved.  
As already mentioned, it was Engels who walked on in the terrain of political 
economy earlier of the two. In his article ‘Outline of a Critique of Political Economy’ 
contributed to the Deutsch-Fransösische Jahrbücher in 1844, he already offered a 
critique of economic categories, if elementary, that later informed Marx’s critique 
tremendously, and displayed a sharp and intuitive understanding of political economy. 
According to Engels, 
Political	economy	came	into	being	as	a	natural	result	of	the	expansion	of	trade	…		
The	 term	 national	 wealth	 has	 only	 arisen	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 liberal	 economists’	
passion	 for	 generalisation.	 As	 long	 as	 private	 property	 exists,	 this	 term	 has	 no	
meaning.	…	One	must	either	discard	this	term	completely,	or	accept	such	premises	
as	give	it	meaning.	Similarly	with	the	terms	national	economy	and	political	or	public	
economy.	 In	 the	 present	 circumstances	 that	 science	 ought	 to	 be	 called	 private	
economy,	 for	 its	 public	 connections	 exist	 only	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 private	 property.	
(Engels	1844:	418,	421-2)		
It is notable that Engels’ commentary reflected the significance of political economy 
as implied by its early advocates outside Germany and, at the same time, contained a 
criticism of it. 
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Obviously, Marx was enormously encouraged by Engels’ work, but was not so much 
interested in developing what was suggested in his article, the critique of economic 
categories;67 instead, for him, political economy was more a destination arrived at 
after a series of critical engagements in various discourses (see Chapter 2). He was 
not ready to perform any detailed criticism on his own. But he did declare with 
confidence in the ‘Preface’ to the ‘1844 Manuscripts’, his first remarkable 
contribution to political economy, that ‘I arrived at my conclusions through an 
entirely empirical analysis based on an exhaustive critical study of political economy’ 
(218). His understanding of political economy shown in the body of the ‘1844 
Manuscripts’ is superficial, and sometimes simply wrong. Although Marx by this time 
had already read the French translation of On the Principles of Political Economy and 
Taxation whose author, David Ricardo, he later praised highly for synthesising 
classical political economy, he did not fully appreciate its significance (cf. Mandel 
1967). This is why his reference to Ricardo was very limited. Further, as if to show 
his lack of research, he heavily relied on authors — apart from Adam Smith — such 
as Frederic Skarbek and Wilhelm Schulz whose status in the history of economic 
thought was much lower than those with whom Marx later became familiar.  
Indeed, what is remarkable here is that both Engels and Marx sought, like their 
contemporary French socialists, for the fundamental cause of social problems in 
private property. Especially in dealing with the deliberations of the Rhenish Landtag 
on forest thefts when he was editing the Rheinische Zeitung, Marx had already gained 
the insight that the state, laws, and ideologies were only an instrument for protecting 
the prevailing system of private property. In this respect, Marx’s encounter with 
political economy was vital to him because it was a good opportunity for him to 
develop that insight systematically. Put differently, by way of political economy, 
Marx was enabled to realise clearly the contradiction that, whereas the source of the 
wealth of a society was labour, the product of labour under the present system of 
                                                
67	Marx	 does	 not	 initially	 seem	 to	 have	 realised	 the	 significance	 of	 this	 kind	 of	 critique	
immediately	even	though	he	was	deeply	inspired	by	Engels’	article	from	when	it	first	came	
out.	 Paradoxically	 nor	 does	 Engels	 recognise	 its	 importance	 even	 though	 he	 was	 actually	
addressing	it.	On	the	other	hand,	it	took	fifteen	years	for	Marx	to	be	able	to	give	due	credit	
to	 Engels’	 early	 contribution	 as	 a	 ‘brilliant	 essay	 on	 the	 critique	 of	 economic	 categories’	
(Contribution:	264.	My	italics).		
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private property belonged to the owner of the means of labour, not to the executors of 
the labour. Of course, this contradiction appeared in the form of the struggle between 
social classes with different material interests and, among others, the most crucial 
struggle took place between labour and capital, most notably expressed in 
distributional form. 
…	 English	 political	 economy	 took	 a	 big	 step	 forward,	 and	 a	 logical	 one,	 when	—	
while	acknowledging	 labour	as	the	sole	principle	of	political	economy	—	it	showed	
with	 complete	 clarity	 that	wages	 and	 interest	 on	 capital	 are	 inversely	 related	 and	
that	as	a	rule	the	capitalist	can	push	up	his	profits	only	by	forcing	down	wages,	and	
vice-versa.	(1844	Manuscripts:	336)	
Thus, the problematisation of the legal and political relations alone, characteristic of 
his Young Hegelian colleagues, was to Marx failing to address the fundamental 
problems concerning the material relations that underlay them and, even if they were 
to succeed in seeing these, the way they dealt with them was easily reduced to 
idealism, as was the case with Hegel. The political economy as mainly developed in 
Britain and France, on the contrary, was understood by Marx as a science that directly 
concerned itself with the real material relations under all the visible social processes.  
Nevertheless, political economy was to Marx an estranged science. For, although it 
recognised ‘labour as its principle’ (341), it ‘proceeds from the fact of private 
property’ without explaining it (322); it was ‘under the rule of private property’ (314). 
In other words: ‘Political economy starts out from labour as the real soul of 
production, and yet gives nothing to labour and everything to private property’ (332).  
It	 grasps	 the	material	 process	 of	 private	 property,	 the	 process	 through	 which	 it	
actually	passes,	in	general	and	abstract	formulae	which	it	then	takes	as	laws.	It	does	
not	comprehend	[begreift]	these	laws,	i.e.	it	does	not	show	how	they	arise	from	the	
nature	 of	 private	 property.	 Political	 economy	 fails	 to	 explain	 the	 reason	 for	 the	
division	of	labour	and	capital,	between	capital	and	land.	(322)		
In brief, ‘it assumes what it is supposed to explain’ (323) — ‘perversion of concepts’. 
In this way, political economy, by acknowledging ‘the hostile opposition of interests, 
struggle and war’ between social classes, which it has unveiled, ‘as the basis of social 
organization’ (311), in reverse, ‘establishes the unity of labour and capital in a 
number of different ways’ (364). ‘Under the semblance of recognising man, the 
political economy whose principle is labour rather carries to its logical conclusion the 
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denial of man’ (342. My italics). Eventually, political economy ends up with negating 
its own achievement, and abolishing the contradictions in civil society it has 
discovered negatively. 
There can be mainly two responses to this fallacy of political economy: to take it for 
granted, or to try to put it right. Marx’s choice was the former in the 1840s when he 
wrote the 1844 Manuscripts, the Holy Family (1845), and the Poverty of Philosophy 
(1847). This was obviously because he regarded the estranged science, political 
economy, as the theoretical expression of the system of estrangement, civil society. 
Accordingly, he did not need to criticise the individual categories of political 
economy eventually to be able to reconstruct the whole system of political economy, 
although he had the insight that ‘political economy fails to grasp the interconnections 
within the movement’ (1844 Manuscripts: 323. My italics) and, moreover, although 
he recognised this task: ‘We now have to grasp the essential connection between 
private property, greed, the separation of labour, capital and landed property, 
exchange and competition, value and the devaluation [Entwertung] of man, monopoly 
and competition, etc. — the connection between this entire system of estrangement 
[Entfremdung] and the money system’ (323. My italics). Therefore, his following 
comments on Proudhon in the Holy Family have to be understood to the letter, i.e., in 
the sense that political economy, given its inherent limitations, cannot abolish itself, 
and that, in order to do that, we have to depart from political economy:  
He	has	done	all	 that	criticism	of	political	economy	 from	the	standpoint	of	political	
economy	 can	 do.	 …	 Proudhon	 abolishes	 economic	 estrangement	within	 economic	
estrangement.	…	Proudhon	reinstates	man	in	his	rights,	but	still	in	an	economic	and	
therefore	contradictory	way.	…	
The	 criticism	 of	 political	 economy	 from	 the	 standpoint	 of	 political	 economy	
recognizes	all	the	essential	determinants	of	human	activity,	but	only	in	an	estranged,	
alienated	 form.	 Here,	 for	 example,	 it	 converts	 the	 importance	 of	 time	 for	 human	
labour	into	its	importance	for	wages,	for	wage-labour.	(Holy	Family:	33,	43,	49,	50)		
This critical attitude of Marx towards political economy appears similar to Hegel’s 
relation to it as envisaged in the last section, although Marx, who was not fully aware 
of the fact that Hegel had actually studied political economy extensively before 
writing the Phenomenology (§3.1.2), levelled a simple accusation against Hegel: 
‘Hegel adopts the standpoint of modern political economy’ (1844 Manuscripts: 
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386). 68  Moreover, the argument that Hegel’s negative, passive position vis-à-vis 
political economy had to do with the vastness of the temporal scale of his theoretical 
project holds good for Marx as well. For, while he was distancing himself from the 
Hegelian ideal problématique of alienation, he kept hold of a historical — or 
‘historicist’ — perspective on society which was characteristic of Hegel’s thought. 
Looking at modern civil society from the perspective of its life-cycle (formation, 
development, and dissolution or transformation into another form of society), Marx 
emphasised, like Hegel, both explicitly and implicitly, and intentionally and 
unintentionally, the ‘historical temporariness’ of civil society, and the ‘inevitability’ 
of its abolition. Of course, as already discussed in the previous chapter, the 
approaches Hegel and Marx took were radically different from each other in every 
moment; after the Ideology Marx began to conceive that the problems that man faced 
in civil society were deeply rooted in the material relations around him even if they 
sometimes assumed non-economic forms and, therefore, to try to find the moment of 
their abolition — in Chapter 2 was argued that this moment was summarised in the 
development of the world market, and all-round individual therein — in the real 
development of the same material relations. In sum, while on the one had he was 
leaving the Hegelian territory by departing from the ‘humanistic’ problématique of 
alienation, and by understanding man in a material way, it can be said, on the other, 
that Marx was still under the shadow of Hegelianism in that he was still clinging to a 
characteristically historical perspective on (civil) society. This is why his triumph 
over Hegel in the German Ideology was partial as well as it was brilliant.  
                                                
68	The	 first	 Part	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 mainly	 about	 Marx’s	 intellectual	 development.	 So,	 in	
treatment	of	Marx’s	 criticism	of	other	 scholars	or	 their	 ideas,	 the	main	 interest	 lies	 in	 the	
content	of	his	criticism,	not	 in	 its	 legitimacy.	For	his	criticism,	whether	 it	was	 justifiable	or	
not,	reflects	the	way	he	wanted	to	present	his	own	ideas	in	a	certain	context	and,	in	turn,	his	
ideas	evolved	through	the	criticism.	To	test	the	legitimacy	of	his	criticism,	though,	requires	a	
different	set	of	debate.	 Indeed,	as	stated	in	the	last	section	referring	to	Avineri	(1972)	and	
Riedel	(1969),	for	instance,	Marx’s	denounce	of	Hegel	that	the	only	labour	Hegel	knew	was	
‘abstract	mental	 labour’	(1844	Manuscript:	386)	have	turned	out	to	be	wrong	since	he	had	
actually	 thought	 about	 the	 negative	 effect	 of	 manual	 labour	 well	 before	 he	 wrote	 the	
Phenomenology	and	the	Philosophy	of	Right.	Given	this	fact,	however,	Marx’s	criticism	is	still	
relevant	 in	 that	 it	 raises	 the	 issue	of	 the	 ideal	way	 that	Hegel’s	profound	consideration	of	
manual	labour	in	his	unpublished	manuscripts	showed	up	in	his	main	works.		
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In this historical perspective, interestingly, political economy is employed only 
instrumentally, and this is indeed the way it appeared in the Ideology, the Holy 
Family, and partly in the Poverty of Philosophy. Although political economy was to 
Marx very limited in that it did not raise the fundamental problems, i.e., those 
concerning the historical formation of the assumptions — most important of which to 
Marx was private property — it took for granted, it was most useful to express the 
reality of material interests that surrounded the modern man. Especially in the 
Ideology and later works where Marx confirmed his point of view that man should be 
understood as the ensemble of the material relations around him, the degree of his 
dependence on political economy which directly dealt with those relations became 
higher; here, Marx did not so much criticise political economy as utilised it, its 
language, its economic categories such as production, exchange, division of labour, 
etc. to express man’s material reality more effectively and more precisely. In this 
framework in which political economy is subordinate to a higher problématique, the 
only thing that matters is the critical use of it in recognition of its own limitations; the 
need to reconstruct political economy through a critique of its constituent categories 
as well as the whole system — the central imperative that guided Marx to write 
Capital — is not raised. But, again, this way of employing political economy is very 
similar to that of Hegel. The latter also exploited the categories of political economy 
to describe man’s reality in civil society under the larger project of conceptualising 
the birth of civil society, its development, and finally its transformation into a higher 
form of society — the state.  
As long as political economy is understood in its essence a science of civil society, it 
is natural and inevitable that one’s attitude towards it should be linked with his view 
on (civil) society. Moreover, one’s views on these should be formed and pronounced 
in a specific theoretical, discursive context; it was, for the Young Marx in the early 
1840s, Hegelianism, so to speak. From the outset, Marx’s critique of Hegel and his 
disciples was focussed upon two points; their lack of realism on the one hand, and 
their neglect of real history on the other. While, by adhering to political economy (as 
destination), Marx has apparently succeeded in reinstating the real and material, or in 
understanding and formulating more clearly the issues concerning the real and 
material interests in modern society, the other missing element, history, still remained 
to be recovered. According to Marx, the perspective of the British and French 
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political economists was not profound enough to question the legitimacy of the 
categories and assumptions they took for granted; of course, this question of 
legitimacy was raised in terms of the history of their formation. The essence of the 
critique of political economy from this point of view is well summarised in the 
following passage in the Poverty:  
Economists	 explain	 how	 production	 takes	 place	 in	 the	 above-mentioned	 relations	
[the	relations	of	bourgeois	production,	the	division	of	labor,	credit,	money,	etc.],	but	
what	 they	do	not	explain	 is	how	 these	 relations	 themselves	are	produced,	 that	 is,	
the	 historical	 movement	 which	 gave	 them	 birth.	 …	 But	 the	moment	 we	 cease	 to	
pursue	the	historical	movement	of	production	relations,	of	which	the	categories	are	
but	 the	 theoretical	expression,	 the	moment	we	want	 to	see	 in	 these	categories	no	
more	 than	 ideas,	 spontaneous	 thoughts,	 independent	 of	 real	 relations,	 we	 are	
forced	 to	 attribute	 the	origin	 of	 these	 thoughts	 to	 the	movement	 of	 pure	 reason.	
(Poverty:	162.	My	italics.)	
It was in this respect that Marx equated Hegel and political economists. Just as Hegel 
ideally dissolved the human history into his system of universal concepts, so political 
economy reduced it to an ideal construct (cf. Adam Smith), too, by positing its 
categories and assumptions as eternal, without questioning their historical legitimacy. 
In order to criticise and overcome this weakness of political economy, therefore, 
Marx kept emphasising history especially in the works written in the latter half of the 
1840s. In the Ideology and the Poverty, he tried to reconstruct the material relations 
between men in a given society, which had been changed over time, using the 
categories of political economy — this is what has been called ‘historical 
materialism’. But, put in reverse, it was at the same time an exercise of locating the 
categories in historical context; instead of deriving an a-historical concept of 
‘production in general’, ‘property in general’, or ‘division of labour in general’ from 
the present relations and, then, postulating history as their realisation, for instance, 
Marx traced the historically changing forms of production, property, and division of 
labour, negating their generalisation.69 In short, Marx’s critique was one firmly rooted 
                                                
69	This	attitude	is	approved	later	on:	‘Whenever	we	speak	of	production	…	what	is	meant	is	
always	 production	 at	 a	 definite	 stage	of	 social	 development’	 (1857	 Introduction:	 85).	 But,	
now,	the	validity	of	the	generalisation	of	concepts	is	endorsed	to	some	extent:	‘Production	
in	general	is	an	abstraction,	but	a	rational	abstraction	in	so	far	as	it	really	brings	out	and	fixes	
the	 common	 element	 and	 thus	 saves	 us	 repetion’	 (Ibid.).	 This	 suggests	 that	 there	 was	 a	
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in a historical perspective on society (its formation – development – dissolution), but, 
at the same time, it was obviously criticising political economy from its outside. 
 
3.2.2. Political Economy as Anatomy 
By implicitly distinguishing history and reality from each other, Marx could find the 
historical still remaining lost in political economy, in spite of the recovery of the real 
and material. However, it is certainly impossible to draw a definite line between 
history and reality. And, indeed, Marx did recognise that the deficiency in historicity 
was crippling political economists’ understanding of reality. According to him, for 
example, political economy deserved praising for its discovery of the importance of 
labour — and its reclamation of the determinacy of the material — in modern society, 
but this labour was understood nothing more than as wage-labour which was merely a 
form assumed by human labour in capitalist society; further, understanding this 
historical form of labour as natural and eternal, political economy failed to grasp the 
specificity of this labour in particular, and the capitalist economy in general.70  
But there is a lot more to be found in the relationship between history and reality. 
Among others the most crucial is the fact that what Marx would have called the 
deceptiveness of political economy, i.e., its forgetfulness of history — the history 
behind the formation of the categories and assumptions it took for granted — is not 
simply about the knowledge of the past; it actually realises and reproduces itself not 
only through everyday operation of the present system, but also, more importantly, 
through the political economists’ illusory understanding of this operation. 71  This 
problem cannot be aptly addressed, still less being solved, in the critique of political 
economy from its outside, or from the historical perspective on society (its formation 
                                                                                                                                      
change,	 delicate	but	 radical,	 in	Marx’s	methodology,	which	will	 be	 expounded	 in	 the	next	
sub-section.		
70	It	goes	without	saying	that,	to	perform	this	critique	completely,	an	immanent	approach	to	
political	 economy	 is	 needed;	 i.e.,	 the	 categorical	 critique.	 This	 serves	 as	 a	 (ex	 post)	
legitimation	of	what	is	called	here	‘methodological	transformation’.	
71	‘The	 whole	 profundity	 of	 those	modern	 economists	 who	 demonstrate	 the	 eternity	 and	
harmoniousness	of	the	existing	social	relations	lies	in	this	forgetting’	(1857	Introduction:	85).	
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– development – dissolution). As is shown in the last excerpt, this critique against the 
political economy which represents an illusory understanding of history, resorts to the 
historical legitimacy obtained through a ‘truthful’ understanding of history, to the 
power of objectivity held by the irrefutable (past) facts called ‘history’. However, this 
is a very naïve view of history, if only in light of the generally accepted proposition 
that history is not a set of past events but an interpretation by a historian. Further, in 
case the problem of material interests between different ‘interpretations’ is engaged, 
even if one succeeded in identifying the ‘absolutely objective history’ — to allow this 
contradictio in abjecto for a while —, it would hardly be accepted as it is. In 
conclusion, history is itself a product of given material interests and, therefore, has to 
be considered in terms of how it is (re)-produced in contemporary reality where such 
material interests prevail. 72  This is the limit of the historical critique, and the 
necessity of turning attention to the material reproductive mechanism of modern 
society, not its historical life-cycle. Consequently, the significance of political 
economy, together with the focus of the critique of it, would be defined in a totally 
different way; now, political economy is the anatomy of civil society, and the critique 
of it is replacing bad anatomies with a good one by clarifying the connection between 
each part of the whole body.  
It is neither possible nor necessary to determine with confidence the exact moment in 
the development of Marx’s thinking when this double transformation — of the points 
of view in dealing with society (from history to reality/structure), and with political 
economy (from instrumental employment to reconstruction) — took place. By 
contrast, this was not a process that Marx devised with intention and, for this reason, 
must be understood to have happened slowly for a long time, and without consistency. 
The early sign of the new perspective was already present in the Poverty (1847), the 
old one did not disappear completely in the Grundrisse (1857-8). What can be said 
with certainty is no more than that Capital (1867) was written under the dominance of 
the new standpoint; here, (modern) society is considered utterly as an organic whole 
which reproduces itself, and Marx’s critique of political economy is carried out by 
                                                
72	This	way	of	understanding	history	 is	 to	be	developed	 in	detail	 in	Chapter	5,	Part	 II.	And	
this	must	not	imply	that	a	historical	study	as	such	is	useless.	At	the	very	least,	it	provides	the	
basic	 knowledge	 for	 the	 correct	 approach	 to	 the	 question	 of	 the	 ‘contemporary	 (re)-
production	of	history’.		
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way of discovering the laws of the inner dynamics of this society (cf. the 
‘Introduction’ to Capital). Both before and after the transformation, Marx’s attitude 
towards political economy can be summarised as ‘critique’, but its content is quite 
different; whist it referred to a negation of political economy in the former frame, it 
now aims at a reconstruction of it. 
Although it is true that the new perspective on society and political economy, and the 
new direction of the critique of the latter constituted the apex of Marx’s theory of 
capitalism, the methodological transformation was not a result of the inner-theoretical 
immanence, but of a series of incidents with contingencies. And, here, two crucial 
moments are to be distinguished. More than anything else, the influence of Pierre 
Joseph Proudhon must not be ignored. His book on What is Property? (1840) earned 
the Young Marx’s positive attention, and later praised by the Mature Marx for being 
‘undoubtedly his best’ (CW20: 26-33). In the System of Economic Contradictions or 
the Philosophy of Misery (1846), Proudhon, positing an antinomy between political 
economy and socialism, criticised both for employing inappropriate methods to fulfil 
their goals which Proudhon claimed were one and the same (Proudhon 1846: 45-52). 
Concerning political economy, in particular, his main point of critique was 
concentrated on its obsession with ‘facts’, and ignorance of philosophy (cf. Ibid.: 89, 
86); thus, Proudhon’s purpose was to present political economy in a systematic and 
lawful way by defining the inner relationship between individual categories with the 
aid of Hegelian philosophy of contradiction (and Kantian philosophy of antinomy).73 
In his polemic against this work of Proudhon, consequently, Marx could have the first 
chance in his life to deal with individual categories of political economy — value, 
competition, monopoly, division of labour, etc. — critically tracing Proudhon’s line 
of argument. This is the background that Marx said in the ‘Preface’ to the 
Contribution in which his ‘methodological transformation’ was almost completed: 
‘The salient points of our [Engels and himself] conception were first outlined in a 
scientific [wissenschaftlich] … form in my Misere de la philosophie [Poverty of 
Philosophy]’ (Contribution: 22. My italics). However, in the German context at that 
                                                
73	Actually,	Proudhon	did	not	credit	Hegel’s	influence	on	himself	in	the	Philosophy	of	Misery;	
it	 was	 Marx	 who	 related	 the	 two	 explicitly	 (Marx	 1847),	 which	 seems	 plausible,	 though,	
given	his	close	relationship	with	Proudhon	especially	when	he	was	staying	in	Paris	in	1843-4	
(CW20:	26-33).	
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time, that is, in the tradition of Hegelian philosophy on the one hand, and that of the 
Historical School on the other, the problématique of ‘critical intervention’ or ‘critical 
reconstruction’ of British/French political economy appears to have been quite 
prevalent; for example, Lorenz von Stein wrote the System der Staatswissenschaft 
(Vol. 1, 1852; Vol. 2, 1857) in the first tradition, and Wilhelm Roscher’s Die 
Grundlagen der Nationalökonomie (1852) was remarkable in the latter.74  
The other crucial moment that determined the ‘transformation’ of Marx’s 
methodology in the research of society and political economy was his migration to 
England. After a series of deportation for political reasons since he moved to Paris in 
October 1843 (Paris → Brussels → Paris → Cologne), Marx at last moved to London 
in August 1849 to live the rest of his life there. His stay in London provided him with 
an opportunity to experience the reality — both good and bad — of the most 
advanced industrial capitalism and, more importantly, the library in the British 
Museum was there to make a huge amount of governmental documents, and almost 
all the works of political economy available to him. Marx managed to become a 
registered reader of the library on 12 June 1850, and resumed his political economic 
study three months later. One of the most important bridges — and the first one — 
that led to Capital, the Grundrisse written in 1857-8, was based on the study since 
then. Marx later recalled these days as follows:  
The	publication	of	 the	Neue	Rheinische	 Zeitung	 in	 1848	and	1849	and	 subsequent	
events	cut	short	my	economic	studies,	which	I	could	only	resume	in	London	in	1850.	
The	 enormous	 amount	 of	 material	 relating	 to	 the	 history	 of	 political	 economy	
assembled	 in	 the	 British	 Museum,	 the	 fact	 that	 London	 is	 a	 convenient	 vantage	
                                                
74	Concerning	Stein,	only	one	of	his	books	has	so	far	been	translated	in	English	(Stein	1850).	
And,	 to	 my	 knowledge,	 there	 are	 only	 two	 remarkable	 articles	 on	 him	 and	 his	 academic	
achievements	 available	 in	 English;	 one	 is	 Kaethe	 Mengelberg’s	 short	 but	 comprehensive	
‘Introduction’	 to	 the	 English	 translation	 of	 above	 book,	 and	 the	 other	 is	 Singlemann	 and	
Singlemann	 (1986).	 And	 Roscher’s	 Grundlagen	 was	 translated	 in	 English	 under	 the	 title	
Principles	of	Political	Economy	 as	early	as	 in	1878.	Here,	he	claimed	 the	 superiority	of	 the	
historical	method	to	other	—	traditional	and	idealistic	—	ones,	calling	the	former	‘anatomy	
and	physiology	of	public	economy’	(Roscher	1852:	111-5).		
Marx’s	attitude	to	these	two	is	interesting.	While	what	the	few	references	of	his	to	
Stein	indicate	that	he	was	quite	favourable	to	the	latter	(Mengelberg	1964:	28-31),	Roscher	
who	was	 the	 representative	of	 the	German	Historical	 School,	 the	object	of	Marx’s	 lifelong	
hatred,	was	ridiculed	whenever	he	was	mentioned	(e.g.,	Cap1:	325-6;	TSV3:	502).		
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point	 for	 the	 observation	 of	 bourgeois	 society,	 and	 finally	 the	 new	 stage	 of	
development	which	this	society	seemed	to	have	entered	with	the	discovery	of	gold	
in	California	and	Australia,	induced	me	to	start	again	from	the	very	beginning	and	to	
work	carefully	through	the	new	material.	(Contribution:	264-65)	
The main contents of the ‘methodological transformation’ which took place through 
above moments are summarised in Table 3.1. As most of them have already been 
discussed so far, a few important points will be added here. Firstly, there is a question 
of how to deal with history in the new structural framework. In spite of the change in 
the focus of research, the object of Marx’s research has always been modern civil 
society, and even if it is viewed as a self-reproducing structure, it still remains as a 
historical system. As Marx has always warned, unless one manages to accommodate 
this historical character of society in his theoretical system, it would be reduced to a 
bunch of empty concepts (‘lifeless abstraction’). More generally speaking, this is 
concerned with the problem of how to consider history in the later framework. This 
will be discussed in Chapter 5 in detail, but for the time being, it suffices to mention 
that Marx appears to try to solve this problem mainly in two ways. In the first place, 
he tends to replace the historicity of modern society, i.e., its ‘transitoriness’ on the 
absolute time horizon, with its ‘(historical) specificity’. In other words, capitalism is 
not a transitional system (from one to another), and therefore not a form of society 
that has ultimately to collapse and be substituted for another, but is a ‘specific’ form 
that is ‘different’ from the others and, therefore, a form of society whose specific 
modus operandi has to be studied closely. In this new framework, what matters is not 
the history of the economic categories representing the human relations in civil 
society, but the structural relationship between them therein. It is easily observable 
how radical this ‘transformation’ was, by simply comparing Proudhon’s statement on 
which Marx exerted a full-scaled condemnation in the Poverty, with Marx’s own 
argument after the ‘transformation’ advanced to some extent, though this does not 
mean that Marx came to ‘agree’ with Proudhon: 
…	we	are	not	constructing	a	history	 in	accordance	with	the	order	of	events,	but	 in	
accordance	 with	 the	 succession	 of	 ideas.	 The	 economic	 phases	 or	 categories	 are	
now	contemporary,	now	inverted,	in	their	manifestation	…	(Proudhon	1846:	184).		
It	 would	 …	 be	 unfeasible	 and	 wrong	 to	 let	 the	 economic	 categories	 follow	 one	
another	in	the	same	sequence	as	that	in	which	they	were	historically	decisive.	Their	
sequence	 is	 determined,	 rather,	 by	 their	 relation	 to	 one	 another	 in	 modern	 civil	
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society,	which	is	precisely	the	opposite	of	that	which	seems	to	be	their	natural	order	
or	 which	 corresponds	 to	 historical	 development.	 The	 point	 is	 not	 the	 historic	
position	of	the	economic	relations	in	the	succession	of	different	forms	of	society.	…	
Rather,	their	order	within	modern	civil	society.	(1857	Introduction:	107-8).	
 
View on society  
(1) An overall view: 
(2) Main character: 
(3) Focus of research: 
A historical system → A given structure. An organic whole 
Historical transitoriness → Historical specificity 
Formation/development/dissolution → Reproduction 
View on political economy  
(4) Significance: 
(5) Way of usage: 
(6) Point of focus 
 on categories: 
Destination → Anatomy 
Instrumental employment → Reconstruction of it all 
Their historical formation → Their reproduction / Each    
considered as both presupposition and result of the whole 
[Table 3.1] Marx’s ‘methodological transformation’ 
 
On the other hand, as his various versions of the plan to write a political economic 
work suggest, Marx seems to have thought he could integrate history in his system by 
allotting an individual part to history. But, again, it is to be noted that this history is 
the history of theory, not the real history. Regarding a theory as a conceptual 
expression of its contemporary society in principle, and assessing the existing theories 
of political economy in light of his historical knowledge and insight, Marx tried to 
rehabilitate history in his critique of political economy through a detour.75 
Another point to be made concerning Marx’s ‘methodological transformation’ is 
whether the new framework constitutes only a part of the old one, or individualisation 
of this part. For the ‘life-cycle’ of society contains its ‘reproduction’. However, what 
                                                
75	Indeed,	 this	 indicates	 that	now	Marx	has	 finally	 found	a	way	of	dealing	with	history	 in	a	
theoretical	way;	so	far,	he	only	used	historical	facts	negatively	to	expose	political	economy’s	
ignorance	of	it.	Moreover,	it	also	demonstrates	that	now	Marx	has	learned	the	necessity	to	
locate	himself	 in	a	given	discursive	system;	hence,	the	 immanent	and	categorial	critique	 in	
Capital	(see	§	5.1).	
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has to be remembered is that, in the ‘life-cycle’ framework, as already been discussed 
in Chapter 2, most questions were raised about the two poles of ‘formation’ and 
‘dissolution’, and that the ‘development’ inside civil society was considered mainly as 
a set of macro-tendencies, a movement that would eventually lead to its dissolution. 
In other words, here, political economy was employed to identify these tendencies, 
which is why Marx, while dealing with the concept of value in the Poverty, did not 
need to delve into it further.76  
It is natural for Marx to approach to political economy from a different perspective as 
his point of view on society changes. Regardless of how Marx conceives modern civil 
society, political economy has always been a conceptual representation of it, and 
understood as such by Marx. And, for this reason, it used to be employed 
instrumentally by Marx who was residing in the historical framework, but now is an 
object of thorough critique to Marx who is interested in the interior of civil society 
and, especially, its reproduction. Now his critique of political economy becomes ‘a 
Critique of Economic Categories or, … a critical exposé of the system of the 
bourgeois economy. It is at once an exposé and, by the same token, a critique of the 
system’ (CW40: 270. My italics).77 And, to speak of individual categories, rather than 
their (historical) ‘formation’, their ‘reproduction’ in civil society becomes crucial in 
the new framework. Further, as long as society is understood an organic whole, each 
category is deemed to serve as a presupposition for the whole to exist and, at the same 
time, regarded as a result which is reproduced according to the logic of the whole in 
its reproductive movement. 
 
                                                
76	This	 is	 why	 it	 is	 hardly	 relevant	 to	 reconstruct	 the	 development	 of	 Marx’s	 political	
economic	thinking	in	such	a	way	that	it	proceeded	from	the	negation	of	the	law	of	value	to	
the	approval	of	it,	as,	for	example,	Ernest	Mandel	(1967)	does.	This	is	projecting	Marx’s	later	
problématique	onto	his	earlier	stages	which	developed	under	a	different	problématique.		
77	This	is	taken	from	Marx’s	letter	to	Ferdinand	Lassalle	on	22	February	1858.		
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3.2.3. Conclusion 
To conclude, although Marx’s ‘methodological transformation’ was not explicitly 
outlined and intended, and its process was frequently marked by contingencies, it can 
be seen to have been in place to the extent that his project of critique of political 
economy, engaged by him from as early as 1844, fits in better with the new structural 
perspective on society rather than the old historical perspective. For political economy 
was a science of the inner structure of civil society, and of its self-reproduction. With 
the ‘transformation’, Marx’s critique has acquired more coherence, which is the 
reason why a (ex-post) judgement can be rightly made that the latter framework is 
superior to the earlier one, and why the ‘transformation’ is not just a ‘change’ but a 
‘sophistication’. Although Marx has never made such a distinction explicitly, the 
following passages from the Theories of Surplus-Value give a hint of the extent to 
which he was conscious of this matter:  
The	formation	process	of	capital	—	when	capital,	i.e.,	not	any	particular	capital,	but	
capital	 in	general,	only	evolves	—	is	the	dissolution	process,	 the	parting	product	of	
the	social	mode	of	production	preceding	it.		It	is	thus	a	historical	process,	a	process	
which	 belongs	 to	 a	 definite	 historical	 period.		 This	 is	 the	 period	 of	 its	 historical	
genesis	 …	 The	 process	 of	 capital	 becoming	 capital	 or	 its	 development	 before	 the	
capitalist	 production	 process	 exists,	 and	 its	 realisation	 in	 the	 capitalist	 process	 of	
production	itself	belong	to	two	historically	different	periods.		 In	the	second,	capital	
is	taken	for	granted,	and	its	existence	and	automatic	functioning	is	presupposed.		In	
the	first	period,	capital	is	the	sediment	resulting	from	the	process	of	dissolution	of	a	
different	 social	 formation.		 It	 is	 the	 product	 of	 a	 different	 [formation],	 not	 the	
product	of	its	own	reproduction,	as	is	the	case	later.		(TSV3:	491-2)		
Every	pre-condition	of	 the	social	production	process	 is	at	 the	same	time	 its	 result,	
and	 every	 one	 of	 its	 results	 appears	 simultaneously	 as	 its	 pre-condition.	All	 the	
production	relations	within	which	the	process	moves	are	therefore	just	as	much	its	
products	as	they	are	its	conditions.	(507)	
 
3.3.	CONCLUSION	
In concluding this chapter, a few points that could not so far have the right space for 
them are to be made about the development of political economy in general, and 
Marx’s own development in particular.  
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Firstly, a comment on the expression that society is an ‘organic whole’, ‘organic 
totality’, or ‘structure’. In spite of the ‘transformation’ thesis presented in this chapter, 
such a view on society does not belong utterly to Marx’s later thinking after the 
‘transformation’; rather, this view was not only held by Marx even when he was very 
young, but was quite prevalent among the German thinkers at that time. So what is 
important is what questions were actually raised based on the same view. In general, 
when something is metaphorically called ‘organism’, what is meant is it can be 
considered as experiencing the same life-process as a living organism does, and this 
life-process can be viewed in two respects; life-cycle, and metabolism or 
reproduction. As the ‘transformation’ or ‘sophistication’ thesis suggests, when Marx 
was in the first, historical framework, even though he was thinking of society as 
organism, what he had in mind was mainly its life-cycle, not its metabolism nor 
reproduction; hence, not its inner structure. Therefore, for instance, Chris Arthur, one 
of the leading advocates for a characteristically Hegelian interpretation of Marx’s 
political economy, is totally wrong when he uses the following sentence in Marx’s 
‘Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State’ written as early as in 1843 to support his 
argument for ‘systematic dialectic’ (Arthur 2002: 3): ‘[The] act of comprehension 
[Begreifen] does not … consist, as Hegel thinks, in discovering the determinations of 
the concepts of logic at every point; it consists in the discovery of the particular logic 
of the particular object’ (Critique: 159). While he refers to Marx’s long standing 
opinion that society is an organic whole, this opinion at this time is very little to do 
with the ‘systematicity’ in the method of representation that Arthur tries to vindicate, 
apart from the fact that this statement is so general that there is little inevitability to 
interpret it as Arthur does. The questions pertaining to Arthur’s ‘systematicity’ arise 
only in the later framework.  
Second, it seems, on the other hand, that the rise of the other aspect of society as 
organism, i.e., its reproduction, inner structure between each element, or 
systematicity, has to do with the identity of Marx’s main opponent at hand. Indeed, 
compared with Hegel who was an expert in representing the inner structure of an 
organic totality in a systematic way, the political economists must have appeared poor 
to Marx; as they did to Proudhon — this lack of systematicity in exposition was the 
main point the latter wanted to criticise in his Philosophy of Misery. This is all the 
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more so, considering the way political economy had been developed up to Marx’s 
contemporary political economists whom he called ‘vulgar (political) economists’:  
Whereas	the	classical,	and	consequently	the	critical,	economists	are	exercised	by	the	
form	of	alienation	and	seek	to	eliminate	it	by	analysis,	the	vulgar	economists,	on	the	
other	hand,	feel	completely	at	home	precisely	with	the	alienated	form	in	which	the	
different	parts	of	value	confront	one	another;	just	as	a	scholastic	is	familiar	with	God	
the	Father,	God	the	Son,	and	God	the	Holy	Ghost,	so	are	the	vulgar	economists	with	
land—rent,	capital—interest,	and	labour—wages.		For	this	is	the	form	in	which	these	
relationships	 appear	 to	 be	 directly	 connected	 with	 one	 another	 in	 the	world	 of	
phenomena,	 and	 therefore	 they	 exist	 in	 this	 form	 in	 the	 thoughts	 and	 the	
consciousness	of	those	representatives	of	capitalist	production	who	remain	captive	
to	 it.	 The	more	 the	 vulgar	 economists	 in	 fact	 content	 themselves	with	 translating	
common	 notions	 into	 doctrinaire	 language,	 the	 more	 they	 imagine	 that	 their	
writings	are	plain,	 in	accordance	with	nature	and	the	public	interest,	and	free	from	
all	 theoretical	hair-splitting.		Therefore,	 the	more	alienated	the	 form	 in	which	they	
conceive	 the	manifestations	of	 capitalist	 production,	 the	 closer	 they	 approach	 the	
nature	 of	 common	 notions,	 and	 the	 more	 they	 are,	 as	 a	 consequence,	 in	 their	
natural	element.	(TSV3:	502-3.	More	italics	added.)	
Marx’s slightly altered quotation of Goethe, ‘Where concepts are absent, words are 
brought in as convenient replacements’ (Capital: 161n), was really offered for the 
benefit of the vulgar economists who, where they had to conceptualise the 
‘phenomena’, and to analyse them to find out the inner connection between them, 
were preoccupied with doctrinising them into commonsensical ‘words’ — ‘the 
fantasies of a locus communis’ (1857 Introduction: 85; cf. Grundrisse: 893). It was 
not only that the vulgarity of Marx’s contemporary political economists was 
expressed in their inability to conceptualise, or to understand the inner connection 
between the concepts they had; as already corroborated, behind this inability was their 
ignorance of real history. On top of that, their total ignorance of their own history also 
obstructed political economy from developing in a scientific way.78  
                                                
78	This	 is	 strikingly	 evident	 in	 political	 economy’s	 new	 name,	 ‘economy’	 or	 ‘economics’;	
considering	 the	historical	 and	 social	 context	where	 it	 first	 came	 into	existence	expounded	
briefly	 in	 the	 first	 section	 of	 this	 chapter,	 this	 re-naming	 simply	 reflects	 economics’	 total	
ignorance	 of	 its	 own	 history,	 not	 just	 real	 history.	 Compared	 to	 this,	 Marx’s	 distinction	
between	 the	 method	 of	 investigation	 and	 that	 of	 representation	 appears	 even	 more	
brilliant,	for	he	derived	this	insightful	distinction	from	the	history	of	political	economy	itself	
—	a	derivation	of	a	meaningful	insight	from	an	unconscious	process	proceeded	by	the	older	
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Let	me	 point	 out	 …	 that	 by	 classical	 political	 economy	 I	mean	 all	 the	 economists	
who,	 since	 the	 time	of	W.	Petty,	have	 investigated	 the	 real	 internal	 relation	 [inner	
Zusammenhang]	 of	 bourgeois	 relations	 of	 production,	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 vulgar	
economists	 who	 only	 flounder	 around	 within	 the	 appearances	 of	 that	 relation,	
ceaselessly	 ruminate	 on	 the	 materials	 long	 since	 provided	 by	 scientific	 political	
economy,	and	seek	there	plausible	explanations	of	 the	crudest	phenomena	for	the	
domestic	purposes	of	the	bourgeoisie.	(Capital:	174-5n.	My	italics.)79		
In short, the vulgar political economy in Marx’s time, according to Marx, was 
incompatible to get hold of its own history, the history of its object of study — civil 
society — and, as a result, the inner structure of this object, all of which led them to a 
totally false and illusory representation of the capitalist economy. On the other hand, 
as for classical political economy, the basic task was clarifying what it did achieve, 
what it did not and, most importantly, to use Louis Althusser’s expression, what it did 
not see even though it had found them because of its lack of ‘vision’ (Althusser and 
Balibar 1968: 116-8). From this, a rough direction of Marx’s critique of political 
economy is to be derived: it is to radicalise the achievements of classical political 
economy, fully illuminating their scientific significance on the one hand, and to 
embed political economy back into the three terrains of its own intellectual history, 
real history, and contemporary reality, on the other; ultimately ‘to reveal the 
economic laws of motion of modern society’ (Capital: 92).80  
Third, in this respect, Marx’s ‘methodological sophistication’ was in itself a critique 
of political economy that was getting more and more vulgarised. Put differently, 
Marx’s version of political economy formed through the ‘sophistication’ marked a 
critical recovery of the critical content, together with its embeddedness in society 
which made classical political economy critical, that had been shared by those he 
called the ‘classical’ political economists (cf. §3.1.1). In this sense, Marx’s critique of 
political economy by way of the ‘sophistication’ was in principle a reclamation of the 
validity of political economy as the proper study of the real material relations in civil 
                                                                                                                                      
generations	of	 the	political	economists.	 See	 the	 first	passages	of	 the	 third	 section	 (‘3.	The	
Method	of	Political	Economy’)	of	the	‘1857	Introduction’.	
79	Ben	Fine:	‘[T]here	have	been	very	few,	if	any,	new	ideas	in	economic	theory	since	the	time	
of	Adam	Smith’	(Fine	1982:	7).		
80	More	discussion	on	the	main	characters	of	his	critique	of	political	economy	in	general	is	to	
be	found	in	§5.1.	
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society and, here, it was never been forgotten that these relations were but a 
materialisation of human relations.81 This is very important because it points to the 
‘peculiar’ status of Marx’s political economy vis-à-vis contemporary neoclassical 
economics which is deemed to deal only with the narrowly defined sphere of society 
which is called ‘economy’ as distinct from the other social spheres of ‘politics’ and so 
on. Contrary to this, Marx’s critically recast political economy has to be understood as 
general social theory on the material relations of modern society, which, it is hoped, 
has been suggested from the discussion of Marx’s intellectual journey which was 
called ‘a process of successive Aufhebung’ in Chapter 1, and of the historical, social, 
and intellectual circumstances of political economy in the first section of this chapter.  
Lastly, the ‘transformation’ or ‘sophistication’ thesis presented here puts into question 
the generally accepted interpretation of the Grundrisse. As already mentioned, this so-
called first draft of Capital contains a lot of pre-‘sophistication’ elements as well as 
the innovative contents that characterises the later framework. Given this, the 
Grundrisse might be the conclusion of Marx’s political economy prior to the 
‘sophistication’ as well as it is the (first) draft of Capital, at the very least. This will 
be more developed in the next chapter with a special light cast on Marx’s notorious 
‘plan’ of the political economic work. More generally, the next chapter is to be 
concerned with Marx’s changing view on the world market, based on the 
‘sophistication’ thesis proposed in this chapter. 
                                                
81	Indeed,	 this	 is	 exactly	 the	 issue	Marx	 was	 to	 raise	 with	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘fetishism’.	 Full	
argument	on	 it	can	be	found	 in	the	 last	section	(‘4.	The	Fetishism	of	Commodities	and	the	
Secret	thereof’)	of	the	first	chapter	of	Capital.		
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CHPATER FOUR 
MARX’S CONCEPTUALISATION OF THE WORLD 
MARKET 
This chapter, unlike preceding ones, directly concerns the main object of this thesis, 
the world market. How did Marx conceptualise it, and what status does it occupy in 
the whole corpus of his theory? Does its significance change over time and, if so, 
how? These are the questions to be addressed and answered, directly or indirectly, in 
this chapter. 
On the other hand, the discussion of the world market in this chapter is in itself an 
example of the ‘methodological sophistication’ thesis proposed in the last chapter; 
thereby, the content and meaning of the ‘sophistication’ will become more evident 
and realistic. However, if one can say that ‘globality’ is one of the most essential 
properties that distinguish capitalism as a mode of social reproduction from other 
(historical) forms of social organisation, and if especially in the case of Marx this 
globality is concretised in the concept of the world market, this chapter is much more 
than an example. The concept of world market to be developed here will be the basis 
for Part II which will be more positively engaged with extending Marx’s political 
economy with respect to this concept. 
In the first section, the general intellectual context concerning the world market will 
be expounded to a necessary degree. It will be demonstrated that, by the latter half of 
the 18th century, West European thinkers of the modern began to deal with the global 
material movement of the modern world seriously, and conceive ‘globality’ as a 
decisive property of modern society which distinguished it from other forms of 
society. In the second section, two concepts of Marx’s world market will be identified 
distinctly. Firstly, the world market is represented both as the historical entity and the 
concept into which the latest developmental phase of the material dynamics of 
modern society is aggregated and summarised. However, the significance Marx 
ascribes to the world market is never fixed; as his ‘methodological sophistication’ 
proceeds the concept of the world market also changes, which will imply that it is 
eventually established and presented as a category of political economy in Marx. In 
the last section, concluding remarks of Part I as well as this chapter will be given. 
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4.1.	 THE	WORLD	 MARKET	 AS	 AGGREGATION	 OF	 THE	 MATERIAL	 DEVELOPMENT	 IN	
MODERN	SOCIETY	
In Chapter 2, it was argued that Marx’s quest for the real and the material in social 
processes took him from philosophy, jurisprudence and politics to political economy, 
and that this intellectual journey finished as he drew his attention to the meaning of 
the real emergence of the world market. But it was not only Marx who saw the 
emerging global, and tried to apply a ‘world-historical’ significance to it whatever it 
might be called. This section will be concerned with a broader West European 
intellectual background of the thinking of the global, and how it evolved over time. It 
will be instrumental in assessing to what degree Marx as a global thinker was a child 
of the times, and how innovative his thought on the global was (§ 4.2.3). Then this 
discussion will necessarily lead us to today’s ‘globalisation’ debate (§ 4.3). 
 
4.1.1. ‘The World Economy’ versus ‘A World-Economy’ 
Fernand Braudel is not only one of the most influential figures in twentieth century 
historiography, but also one of those who gave the word ‘world’ currency in social 
and historical scholarship. He opened the last volume of his three-volume 
masterpiece, Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme, XVe~XVIIIe siècle by 
distinguishing ‘the world economy’ from ‘a world-economy’:  
The	 world	 economy	 [l’économie	 mondiale]	 is	 an	 expression	 applied	 to	 the	 whole	
world.	It	corresponds,	as	Sismondi	puts	it,	to	‘the	market	of	the	universe’	[le	marché	
de	 tout	 l’univers],	 to	 ‘the	 human	 race,	 or	 that	 part	 of	 the	 human	 race	 which	 is	
engaged	in	trade,	and	which	today	in	a	sense	makes	up	a	single	market’.		
A	 world-economy	 (an	 expression	 which	 I	 have	 used	 in	 the	 past	 as	 a	 particular	
meaning	of	the	German	term	Weltwirtschaft)	only	concerns	a	fragment	of	the	world,	
an	 economically	 autonomous	 section	of	 the	planet	 able	 to	 provide	 for	most	 of	 its	
own	needs,	a	section	to	which	its	internal	links	and	exchanges	give	a	certain	organic	
unity.	(Braudel	1979:	21-2)	
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Above distinction is quite useful, especially because it casts a guiding light on how to 
view so many discourses on the world that are observed even in ancient texts, and on 
how they differ from what we mean by the term ‘world (market)’ here. Indeed, human 
beings have always talked about the ‘world’, not only ‘economically’ but variously: 
‘There have been world-economies, if not always, at least for a very long time—just 
as there have been societies, civilizations, states and even empires’ (Braudel 1979: 
24).82 Even in Ancient Greek, people thought they were living in a kind of a ‘world’, 
or a ‘macrocosm’, which included and transcended the domain of their everyday 
lives, and constituted more or less a — economic and/or political — ‘unit’; thereby, 
they have developed ideas about the world. Such ideas were of course a product of the 
material development in reality, and did include some genuine insights about the 
world in some respects. And this is why Patrick K. O’Brien praised in his seminal 
article Herodotus for having addressed the tasks for global historians today:  
Global	 histories	 have	 been	 written	 since	 Herodotus	 (495-425	 BCE),	 whose	
cosmopolitan	 concerns	 were	 commended	 by	 Cicero	 [106-43	 BCE].	 .	 .	 Global	
historians	will	applaud	Herodotus	for	the	scale,	scope	and	empathy	of	his	histories;	
his	reflexive	interest	in	barbarian	virtues	as	well	as	Greek	vices;	and	regret	the	long	
hiatus	 that	occurred	 in	 the	writing	of	 secular	world	histories	until	Voltaire	 and	his	
generation	 carried	 the	 project	 forward	 again	 during	 those	 brief	 decades	 of	
Enlightenment	before	the	outbreak	of	the	French	Revolution.	(O’Brien	2006:	7-8)	
Of course, it is also possible to dismiss, as Bruce Mazlish, another prominent global 
historian does, such a long history of the discourse on the global as being mythical or 
simply visionary (e.g., Mazlish 1998a; 1998b). But, both O’Brien and Mazlish may 
well agree that it was only in modern times that the old thoughts about the world at 
last found their real material basis and, on this basis, met with a new moment of 
                                                
82 	This	 differs	 from	 Immanuel	 Wallerstein’s	 view.	 Braudel	 distinguishes	 himself	 from	
Wallerstein	 as	 follows:	 ‘A	 fine	 description	 of	 the	 problem	 is	 to	 be	 found	 in	 Immanuel	
Wallerstein's	 recent	 book,	 The	Modern	World-System.	 .	 .	 Our	 points	 of	 view	 are	 basically	
identical,	even	though	Wallerstein	believes	that	the	only	world-economy	was	the	European	
one,	 which	 was	 not	 founded	 until	 the	 sixteenth	 century,	 whereas	 I	 believe	 that	 by	 the	
Middle	Ages	and	even	in	antiquity,	long	before	Europeans	knew	that	world	in	its	totality,	the	
globe	 was	 already	 divided	 up	 into	 more	 or	 less	 centralized	 and	 more	 or	 less	 coherent	
economic	zones,	that	is,	into	several	world-economies	that	coexisted.	.	.’	(Braudel	1977:	82,	
83)	
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development; hence the world economy, ‘a true world-wide economy’ (Braudel 1977: 
93). 
 
4.1.2. The ‘Globality’ of Modern Society: The Emergence of the World Market 
Although Braudel in the above excerpt seems to give credit to Sismondi for the term 
‘the world economy’ or what he called ‘the market of the universe’, he was neither 
the only nor the first to draw attention to such a concept. Instead, generally speaking, 
the ‘globality’ of modern world had been an important and popular theme of 
discussion amongst intellectuals well before Sismondi published Nouveau principes 
d’économie politique in 1819 from which Braudel took the expression ‘the market of 
the universe’.  
It is a matter of fact that the thinking about the world, or the universalist thinking in 
general, has long been in place in West European intellectual history from Ancient 
Greece onwards, and notably in the Christian era. But it was only in the latter half of 
the nineteenth century that the whole world came to the general public’s mind as a 
single unit for the first time in (West European) history, and practical men acted 
literally ‘globally’. Of course, there were some sensible people who began earlier than 
others to speculate seriously and systematically over the human-historical implication 
of the new age they were witnessing. 
On the other hand, the formation of the world or globality in terms of material 
development well precedes its intellectual appropriation; it always takes time for the 
thinking mind to understand the meaning of real development, and appropriate it in its 
own way. For example, Marx and Engels estimated its inception to be around the 15th 
and 16th centuries when the revolutions in the means of transport and communication, 
and Europeans’ discovery of the ‘new’ continents had taken place, and today’s 
economic historians including ‘World Systems’ analysts also have a similar view. In 
this sense, it is rather natural that the actual agents—and those men of letters around 
them—of the new material movement, i.e., men in real business or in government 
administration, who not only thought but acted ‘globally’, were quicker and more 
desperate to try to understand what was going on around them. This partly explains 
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why political economy was first developed in the form of mercantilism around such 
themes as money and trade, and why it flourished in those small commercial centres 
like Italian cities (cf. Smith 1776: 426). It might suffice here to remind Thomas Mun 
(1571-1641) whose posthumous book, England’s Treasure by Forraign Trade 
(written in ca. 1630) Adam Smith praised as ‘a fundamental maxim in the political 
œconomy, not of England only, but of all other commercial countries’ (Smith 1776: 
434-5), was not only a merchant in Mediterranean trade, but later became a committee 
member of the East India Company. And it may be even more interesting to find that 
the same kind of wonder as we would have in the age of globalisation is shared by a 
17th century Italian astronomer and political economist, Germiniano Montanari (1633-
87): 
Intercourse	between	nations	spans	the	whole	globe	 [globo]	 to	such	an	extent	 that	
one	may	almost	say	all	the	world	[mondo]	is	but	a	single	city	in	which	a	permanent	
fair	 comprising	 all	 commodities	 is	 held,	 so	 that	 by	means	 of	money	 all	 the	 things	
produced	by	the	land,	the	animals	and	human	industry	can	be	acquired	and	enjoyed	
by	 any	 person	 in	 his	 own	 home.	 A	 wonderful	 invention!	 (Montanari	 1683:	 40;	 as	
translated	and	quoted	in	CW29:	165	and	384)	
However, more dramatic is the fate to befall to Montanari’s sheer wonder, not least 
since the early 19th century. As globality developed and became more materialised in 
various ways; as novelty surrendered to banality; as, in brief, globality came to be 
regarded as a normal social condition, the way it was received and discussed 
‘changed’, to say the least, or, was ‘vulgarised’, to employ Marx’s stronger 
expression (see § 4.1.3). 
First of all, it is notable that West European thinkers of the global in the late 18th and 
early 19th centuries debated it quite seriously. Basically they perceived it as a defining 
feature of newly emerging modern society, and sought its implication to the 
development of humanity from a long-term historical perspective. Moreover, their 
thought on globality was on the one hand a product of their serious engagement with 
reality and, on the other, a necessary development of their more fundamental ideas on 
human-beings and their existence in society such as liberty, right and equality; this is 
why their problematisation of globality was literally radical and critical. In Germany 
alone, there were Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), Johan Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) 
and G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831). Kant discussed the possibility of cosmopolitan 
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republic based upon peace not war (Kant 1795); Herder, dealing with Asian canonical 
and literary works, developed a point of view which we might call cultural relativism 
today (Herder 2002); and, lastly, Hegel reformulated human history from as far-away 
as China, and as far-back as Ancient Greece to his own time into one single 
framework (Hegel 1822, 1828, 1830).83 For example, Kant emphatically declares in 
Toward Perpetual Peace in 1795: 
Since	the	(narrower	or	wider)	community	of	the	nations	of	the	earth	had	now	gone	
so	 far	 that	a	violation	of	 right	on	one	place	of	 the	earth	 is	 felt	 in	all,	 the	 idea	of	a	
cosmopolitan	 right	 is	no	 fantastic	and	exaggerated	way	of	 representing	 right;	 it	 is,	
instead,	a	supplement	to	the	unwritten	code	of	the	right	of	a	state	and	the	right	of	
nations	 necessary	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 any	 public	 rights	 of	 human	 beings	 and	 so	 for	
perpetual	 peace;	 only	 under	 this	 condition	 can	 we	 flatter	 ourselves	 that	 we	 are	
constantly	approaching	perpetual	peace.	(Kant	1795:	330-1)	
As the above passage shows, the global thinkers at that time tried with their ideas on 
the globality of modern society to address some questions of their own time in a 
specific way—the questions which had arisen and posed in the older, pre-modern 
framework, but which were to be solved only at the dimension facilitated by the 
newly emerging possibilities, namely, the questions concerning how to (re-)organise 
the global order in a peaceful and egalitarian way? 84  Globality as a differentia 
specifica of modern civil society that distinguishes it from previous and, then, other 
contemporary forms of society provided them with a way to tackle those questions.  
                                                
83	In	 a	 sense,	 this	 intellectual	 advance	 in	Germany	was	 a	 response	 to	 that	made	earlier	 in	
France,	 notably	 by	 Voltaire	 (1694-1778),	 Denis	 Diderot	 (1713-84),	 Abbé	 Raynal	 (1711-96),	
etc.;	see	Mah	(2002;	2003)	and	Muthu	(2003).	For	Enlightenment	historiography	in	general,	
Wright	 (2002)	 is	 useful.	Muthu	 (2003),	 K.	 O’Brien	 (1997)	 and	 Pitts	 (2005)	 deal	with	 some	
individual	thinkers	of	the	late-18th	and	early-19th	centuries	focusing	upon	their	thoughts	on	
the	global.		
84	It	is	worth	remembering	here	that	Kant	was	living	in	a	Germany	severely	devastated	by	a	
series	of	wars;	amongst	others,	the	miseries	of	the	Thirty	Years’	War	in	1618-48	which	had	
swept	30%	of	the	population	away	were	still	around,	and	the	Seven	Years’	War	in	1754-63	
whose	main	battlefields	in	Europe	had	been	on	German	soil	just	came	to	an	end.	
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Second, it would be interesting to notice Kant, the philosopher who spent his whole 
life in a small German town Königsberg,85 finds the ground for the above argument in 
the development of commerce, if not entirely:86 
It	is	the	spirit	of	commerce,	which	cannot	coexist	with	war	and	which	sooner	or	later	
takes	hold	of	every	nation.	 In	other	words,	since	the	power	of	money	may	well	be	
the	most	reliable	of	all	the	powers	(means)	subordinate	to	that	of	a	state,	states	find	
themselves	 compelled	 (admittedly	 not	 through	 incentives	 of	morality)	 to	 promote	
honourable	peace	.	.	.	(336-7)	
Indeed, it appears that commerce was quite generally thought of as the driving force 
to make the world global and reorganise it on the basis of peace, not war, amongst 
many of prominent late-18th century thinkers. Istvan Hont identifies David Hume 
(1711-76) as one who ‘supplied clear analytical and historical clues for’ such an 
understanding:  
Like	a	number	of	other	leading	thinkers	in	the	eighteenth	century,	Hume	argued	that	
trade	and	war	followed	fundamentally	different	logics.	Prospectively,	war	was	a	one-
way	affair,	with	a	winner	and	a	loser;	trade,	on	the	other	hand,	was	inherently	based	
on	 reciprocity.	Though	not	altruistic,	 it	 could	only	 continue	on	 the	basis	of	mutual	
benefit.	(Hont	2005:	6)	
In the same vein argued Hume’s contemporary Sir James Steuart (1712-80), being 
also Adam Smith’s Scottish predecessor and ‘the first Briton to expound a general 
system of bourgeois political economy’ (CW29: 297):87  
The	great	alteration	in	the	affairs	of	Europe	.	.	.	by	the	discovery	of	America	and	the	
Indies,	 the	springing	up	of	 industry	and	 learning,	 the	 introduction	of	trade	and	the	
                                                
85	Stephen	 Toulmin	 argues	 this	 geographical	 condition	 was	 advantageous	 to	 people	 like	
Kant:	 ‘Away	 from	 active	 centers	 of	 politics	 and	 religion,	 undisturbed	 by	 the	 pressures	 of	
nationalism,	 an	 Immanuel	Kant	 could	 go	his	own	way	at	home	more	easily	 than	 in	Rome,	
London,	or	Berlin’	(1992:	145).	
86	Of	 course,	 Kant’s	 debate	 on	 peace	 can	 be	 contextualised	 otherwise;	 e.g.,	 Otfried	 Höffe	
(2000).	
87	Marx	pays	extra	attention	to	this	aspect	of	Steuart	when	he	deals	with	‘world	money’;	see	
Steuart	(1767(III):	216)	and	Marx	(CW29:	397-98;	CW35:	155).		
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luxurious	arts,	the	establishment	of	public	credit,	and	a	general	system	of	taxation,	
have	entirely	altered	the	plan	of	government	every	where.88	
From	 feudal	 and	military,	 it	 is	 become	 free	 and	 commercial.	 I	 oppose	 freedom	 in	
government	to	the	feudal	system	.	.	 .	 I	oppose	commercial	to	military;	because	the	
military	governments	now	are	made	to	subsist	from	the	consequences	and	effects	of	
commerce	 only,	 that	 is,	 from	 the	 revenue	 of	 the	 state,	 proceeding	 from	 taxes.	
Formerly,	every	thing	was	brought	about	by	numbers;	now,	numbers	of	men	cannot	
be	kept	together	without	money.	(1767(I):	13-4)	
At last, Adam Smith declares in his Wealth of Nations (1776: 412):89 
[C]ommerce	 and	manufactures	 gradually	 introduced	 order	 and	 good	 government,	
and	with	them,	the	liberty	and	security	of	individuals,	among	the	inhabitants	of	the	
country,	 who	 had	 before	 lived	 almost	 in	 a	 continual	 state	 of	 war	 with	 their	
neighbours,	and	of	servile	dependency	upon	their	superiors.	
Third, given the two points made above, it appears even natural that Marx employed 
the rather misleading term ‘world market’ to denote the globality of modern society 
(cf. Fine et al. 2010). Indeed, such was quite a general term amongst political 
economists of the 17th~early-19th centuries: ‘the whole Commercial World’ (Petty 
1676: 295, 297, 311, 312), ‘the universal commercial republic extending over 
different countries’ [la république commerçante universelle répandue dans les 
différents pays] (Quesnay 1766: 76), ‘the market of the universe’ [le marché de tout 
l’univers] (Sismondi 1819: 205, 276, 304, 562) etc. were used by leading political 
economists, though in different contexts.90 To them, it might have appeared obvious 
that globality was being realised in the form of the market whose scale and 
complexity had never been known. 
 
                                                
88	This	bears	resemblance	with	what	Marx	calls	elements	of	‘primitive	accumulation’.	For	full	
discussion,	see	Perelman	(1983a;	1983b).		
89	‘In	 the	 eighteenth	 century	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 civilising	 role	 for	 commerce—the	 idea	 of	doux	
commerce—dominated	 over	 the	 pessimistic	 thesis	 of	 commerce	 having	 a	 destructive	
influence	on	social	cohesion’	(Roncaglia	2005:	86).	On	the	other	hand,	John	Stuart	Mill	also	
mentions	this	beneficial	 role	 for	commerce	of	 ‘the	principal	guarantee	of	 the	peace	of	 the	
world’	(1987[1871]:	582).	
90	For	 full	 discussion	 and	 excerpts	 from	 classical	 political	 economists,	 see	 Nobuyoshi	
Nakagawa’s	series	of	articles	(Nakagawa	1999-2003).		
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4.1.3. The ‘Nationalisation’ of the Global: Globality in 19th Century Europe 
The fourth characteristic feature of the development of the West European thinking of 
the global is that, as hinted above, the radical and critical engagement with globality 
in the late-18th and early-19th centuries, as well as the sheer wonder about it, died out 
as time went on. The more fully this feature developed, the more did it appear to even 
the most ordinary eyes to be a concrete material power that nobody can deny or 
escape from; the more people were drawn into the global network in some way or 
another or, put differently, the more practical interests—both in quantity and 
quality—people got to have in the global network they somehow belonged to, the 
more difficult did it become for even the most scientifically inspired minds to deal 
with globality as critically and radically as their predecessors used to. In this process, 
globality appeared more and more impersonal and alienated power outside them as if 
it had been there from the beginning of history, and people began to simply assume it, 
rather than critically confront it. This is exactly what Marx called ‘vulgarisation’ of a 
science [Wissenschaft]. In the ‘Afterword to the Second German Edition’ (1873) of 
Capital, Volume I, he said: 
In	 so	 far	as	Political	Economy	remains	within	 that	 [bourgeois]	horizon	 .	 .	 .	political	
economy	can	remain	science	only	so	long	as	the	class	struggle	is	latent	or	manifests	
itself	only	in	isolated	and	sporadic	phenomena.	(CW35:	14.	My	italics.)	
According to Marx, the character of political economy decisively changed around 
1830. While, before that, the class struggle in England was not yet matured enough 
and, thanks to this, debates in political economy could remain ‘unprejudiced’, ‘[w]ith 
the year 1830 came the decisive crisis’, and the escalating class struggle at last 
‘sounded the knell of scientific bourgeois economy’: 
In	 France	 and	 in	 England	 the	 bourgeoisie	 had	 conquered	 political	 power.	 It	 was	
thenceforth	 no	 longer	 a	 question,	 whether	 this	 theorem	 or	 that	 was	 true,	 but	
whether	 it	 was	 useful	 to	 capital	 or	 harmful,	 expedient	 or	 inexpedient,	 politically	
dangerous	or	not.	(CW35:	15)	
[Vulgar	 economy]	 deals	with	 appearances	 only,	 ruminates	without	 ceasing	 on	 the	
materials	 long	 since	 provided	 by	 scientific	 economy,	 and	 there	 seeks	 plausible	
explanations	of	the	most	obtrusive	phenomena,	for	bourgeois	daily	use,	but	for	the	
rest,	 confines	 itself	 to	 systematising	 in	 a	 pedantic	 way,	 and	 proclaiming	 for	
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everlasting	 truths,	 the	 trite	 ideas	 held	 by	 the	 self-complacent	 bourgeoisie	 with	
regard	to	their	own	world,	to	them	the	best	of	all	possible	worlds.	(CW35:	92n)	
Just as Marx ascribed the root of the ‘vulgarisation’ of the scientists of domestic 
society to their blindness caused by the increasing influence of ‘class interests’ on the 
formation of the social relation, it might well be said by the same token that similar 
‘vulgarisation’ in the global dimension was brought about by the advancement of the 
so-called national interest almost at the same time. This appears inevitable, 
considering in modern times the state was (re-)formed at the ‘national’ level, not only 
internally but externally. Indeed, the development of globality and the formation of 
the modern nation state were in fact two opposite sides of the same coin for a long 
time. This is why Adam Smith appears ambivalent on the effect of commerce, 
recognising that ‘although commercial reciprocity might prevent the use of war as an 
instrument of economic aggrandizement, world markets would still continue to 
exhibit warlike ruthlessness’ (Hont 2005: 7).91  
It seems that the nationalism of commerce—imperialism, colonialism and 
monopoly—has taken the upper hand by the early-1830s, notably in Britain (and 
France). In parallel, a radical transformation of the way to approach the global took 
place, namely, the domestication and the politicisation of the discourses on the global. 
Amongst others, the changing way that the idea of free trade was deployed over time 
is remarkable. In Adam Smith’s system of the 1760s and 1770s, this idea was 
proposed as an instrument for realising more generic values like civil liberty and, 
therefore, as the executor of ‘a civilising role for commerce’. This was also how it 
was received by his contemporaries (Roncaglia 2005: 150).92 After a few decades, 
however, it came to be employed not only as a means to justify imperialism (Pitt 
2005), as the expression ‘free-trade imperialism’ plainly reveals (Gallagher and 
                                                
91	‘Mercantile	jealousy	is	excited,	and	both	inflames,	and	is	itself	inflamed	by,	the	violence	of	
national	animosity’	(Smith	1776:	496).		
92	For	 an	 explanation	 of	 how	 Adam	 Smith’s	 ‘real	 sentiments’	 were	 misunderstood,	 see	
Rothschild	(2002:	66-71).	‘Smith’s	support	for	free	trade	in	corn	was	of	great	importance	to	
his	 nineteenth-century	 renown	 as	 an	 enemy	of	 the	 poor.	 But	 his	 own	 argument	was	 that	
free	 trade	would	 prevent	 famine	 and	 palliate	 scarcity.	 He	 was	 not	 concerned,	 here,	 with	
exceptions	 to	 a	 supposedly	 cruel	 “system	 of	 freedom”;	 he	 believed,	 as	 did	 Turgot	 and	
Condorcet,	that	freedom	is	much	less	cruel	for	the	poor	than	the	policies	of	oppressive	and	
ill-informed	governments’	(69-70).	
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Robinson 1953), but also as a political slogan for arguably the first national 
movement in Britain, the Anti-Corn Laws Movement (Howe 2007), contributing 
enormously to the formation of British nation and nationalism. In was in this context 
of the nationalisation of the discourses on free trade that Marx, charting the various 
ways the free trade discourses in the 1830s and 1840s were exploited by a specific 
social class, the capitalist, demonstrated in his address ‘On the Question of Free 
Trade’ in early 1848 how badly the idea of free trade was captivated by the domestic 
class and ‘national’ interests (CW6: 450-65).93 
Of course, such a transformation in the realm of ideas is an expression of more 
fundamental changes in reality. Jennifer Pitt enumerates a few key factors in relation 
to liberalism’s ‘turn to empire’ in the early-nineteenth century. According to her, the 
abolition of slavery in Britain and France by the first half of the century removed the 
main moral obstacle to liberal thinkers’ embracing empire, and endowed Europeans 
with ‘civilizational confidence’ and a feeling of their national superiority over other 
cultures; and the stabilisation of domestic politics—in Marx’s term, the bourgeoisie’s 
‘conquer’ of political power—and economic development gave them institutional and 
material grounds for insisting the so-called civilising effect of their imperialism over 
the rest of the world (Pitt 2005: 11-21; see also Stedman Jones 2007: 186-96).94 
Sixth, while these changes must have made it easier for intellectuals to come to terms 
with empire, they did transform how people interacted with one another, and how the 
whole system worked. This is what the Cambridge historian C.A. Bayly (2002; 2004; 
2005) would call ‘the nationalization of interactions across the emerging modern 
world’ (2005: 14. My italics).95 Basically, he periodises the history of globalisation 
                                                
93	The	 concluding	words	 of	Marx’s	 address	well	 remind	 us	 of	 the	 original	meaning	 of	 free	
trade—in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 ‘civilising	 role	 for	 commerce’—and	 the	way	 how	 it	 has	 been	
degraded	in	the	capitalist	social	formation:	‘But,	in	general,	the	protective	system	of	our	day	
is	conservative,	while	the	free	trade	system	is	destructive.	It	breaks	up	old	nationalities	and	
pushes	 the	 antagonism	 of	 the	 proletariat	 and	 the	 bourgeoisie	 to	 the	 extreme	 point.	 In	 a	
word,	 the	 free	 trade	 system	hastens	 the	 social	 revolution.	 It	 is	 in	 this	 revolutionary	 sense	
alone,	gentlemen,	that	I	vote	in	favor	of	free	trade’	(CW06:	465).		
94	Observe	that	these	are	the	same	circumstances	in	which	Marx	thought	the	class	struggle	
between	capital	and	labour	came	to	the	fore	around	the	year	of	1830.		
95	On	this	theme,	see	also	Viaene	(2008).	
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into three phases which, however, are not discretely separable from one another: 
‘archaic’ globalisation whose origins might be traced back to the tenth or even earlier 
centuries, ‘proto-capitalist’ globalisation which ‘began in the Atlantic system in the 
seventeenth century and spread to much of the rest of the world by 1830’ (2005: 17) 
and, ‘European-dominated internationalism’96 which began to emerge circa 1815. 
Insisting the core elements of the earlier globalisation(s) do remain in the later one(s) 
in specific forms, he especially stresses that, with the transition from the second phase 
to the third, the initial ‘global’ connections amongst various peoples were 
‘reconstructed by the system of nation-states’ into ‘international’ connections by the 
first half of the nineteenth century (2005: 22). Of course, this reconstruction 
manifested itself in a number of ways. For instance,  
[O]lder	 and	 looser	 links	 of	 global	 trading	 [eventually]	 gave	 way	 to	 more	 formal	
commercial	 conventions	between	nations.	 .	 .	But	as	political	and	 industrial	 leaders	
sought	to	protect	their	economies	by	tariff	agreements,	 the	nation-state	 inevitably	
became	 the	 key	actor	 in	 an	 international	 economy.	 This	 led	 to	 increasingly	 formal	
trading	arrangements.	The	old	system	of	honorary	consuls	or	consultation	by	 local	
rulers	 with	 the	 headmen	 of	 “guest”	 merchant	 communities	 was	 replaced	 by	
networks	of	commercial	consulates	and	international	economic	treaties.	The	growth	
of	the	Western-dominated	world	economy	in	the	course	of	the	nineteenth	century,	
therefore,	produced	a	paradox.97	On	the	one	hand,	the	movement	of	capital	became	
more	 complex.	 Long-range	 direct	 investment	meant	 that	 businessmen	 from	many	
different	countries	worked	together	to	form	and	invest	capital.	On	the	other	hand,	
states	 became	 increasingly	 worried	 by	 such	 flows	 of	 capital	 and	 attempted	 to	
control	the	firms	and	their	capital.	During	the	Anglo-Boer	crisis,	for	instance,	British	
politicians	 panicked	 over	 the	 way	 in	 which	 international	 firms	 were	 supposedly	
perverting	 the	 course	 of	 international	 stock	 markets	 and	 capital	 flows	 were	
strengthening.	At	the	same	time,	national	controls	on	the	location	and	use	of	capital	
became	stronger	with	 the	development	of	 the	national	patent	and	the	 idea	of	 the	
national	head	office.	(Bayly	2004:	238)	
In the end, this newly constructed ‘nationalised internationalism’, as opposed to 
‘cosmopolitan globalism’ championed by the early thinkers of the global, may well be 
said to be the real nature of the capitalist international relation, not least given Marx’s 
discussion that follows. On the other hand, the trajectory of the West European 
                                                
96	This	is	Jerry	H.	Bentley’s	expression	(2005:	5).	
97	Nikolai	 Bukharin	 (1917)	 identifies	 preventing	 this	 paradox	 as	 one	 of	 the	 main	 driving	
forces	for	great	powers	to	form	their	own	autarky-like	imperialist	block	economy.	
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thinking of the global expounded thus far can be extended to include recent debate 
over ‘globalisation’ (§ 4.3). 
 
4.2.	 THE	 WORLD	 MARKET	 IN	 MARX:	 BEFORE	 AND	 AFTER	 ‘METHODOLOGICAL	
SOPHISTICATION’	
In this section all the previous discussions will be put together: Marx’s early 
intellectual development which eventually led him to political economy, the discovery 
of the world market as the real entity that he thought epitomised the material 
development up until then and, lastly, Marx’s deepening engagement with political 
economy that resulted in ‘methodological sophistication’. In this sense, this section is 
not merely an example of ‘methodological sophistication’ exposed in the previous 
chapter, but, more importantly, the conclusion of the first half of this thesis. 
 
4.2.1. The Historical Significance of the World Market 
Not to mention, Marx’s concept of the world market, or his ideas on the global in 
general can and should be better understood against the broader background 
occasioned by his predecessors such as the French Enlightenment philosophes, Kant, 
Herder and, more than anyone else, Hegel. Admittedly, Marx’s way of succeeding 
them was not by directly engaging himself with them but by sharing what may be 
called the Zeitgeist with them. Given the discussion in the previous section, one can 
justly conclude that West European thinkers of the global before the ‘vulgarisation’ 
centred on highlighting its historical significance. As briefly mentioned above, in 
Germany, the debate on the global of modern world was performed by Kant, Herder 
and, then, Hegel. Indeed, Hegel may well be called the philosopher of the world; by 
constructing his philosophical system with the ‘world’ categories such as world 
history, world constitution, etc. at the ‘world’ horizon, he did show one of the peak 
points of the understanding of the world in his time. He concluded that it was only at 
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the ‘world’ level that the full realisation of reason, or the full development of human 
history was possible.  
It was in the course of criticising Hegel that Marx first came to be involved in the 
debate on the global. As seen in Chapter 2, although having begun his intellectual 
life under the strong influence of a group of Young Hegelian intellectuals in the late-
1830s, Marx soon became fed up with Hegelian way of representing reality, and 
impotence and opportunism in tackling real issues. In principle, Marx’s discontent 
with Hegel came from his ideal and transcendental conceptualisation of man and his 
existence in society. Thus, Marx alternatively went on to devise a different way of 
understanding man—understanding him in the ensemble of the material conditions 
and relations around him with no a priori definition. However, when his criticism of 
Hegelianism in general reached its apogee in the mid-1840s, his dissent against 
(Hegelian idealist) philosophy was so strong that he came to dismiss all kinds of 
conceptualised results of the thinking mind altogether. Instead, he sought to substitute 
them with anything real and, at last, even thinking itself was replaced—by practice 
(CW5: 50-4). It was in this context that Marx drew his attention to the world market 
and employed it in a meaningful way for the first time in his life in the German 
Ideology of 1845-46: 
In	 history	 up	 to	 the	 present	 it	 is	 certainly	 .	 .	 .	 an	 empirical	 fact	 that	 separate	
individuals	have,	with	 the	broadening	of	 their	activity	 into	world-historical	activity,	
become	more	 and	more	enslaved	under	 a	 power	 alien	 to	 them	 (a	pressure	which	
they	 have	 conceived	 of	 as	 a	 dirty	 trick	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 so-called	 world	 spirit	
[Weltgeist],	etc.),	a	power	which	has	become	more	and	more	enormous	and,	in	the	
last	 instance,	 turns	 out	 to	 be	 the	 world	 market.	 But	 it	 is	 just	 as	 empirically	
established	that,	by	the	overthrow	of	the	existing	state	of	society	by	the	communist	
revolution	 (of	 which	 more	 below)	 and	 the	 abolition	 of	 private	 property	 which	 is	
identical	 with	 it,	 this	 power,	 which	 so	 baffles	 the	 German	 theoreticians,	 will	 be	
dissolved;	and	that	then	the	liberation	of	each	single	individual	will	be	accomplished	
in	the	measure	in	which	history	becomes	transformed	into	world	history.	From	the	
above	 it	 is	clear	 that	 the	real	 intellectual	wealth	of	 the	 individual	depends	entirely	
on	the	wealth	of	his	real	connections.	Only	this	will	liberate	the	separate	individuals	
from	 the	 various	 national	 and	 local	 barriers,	 bring	 them	 into	 practical	 connection	
with	the	production	(including	intellectual	production)	of	the	whole	world	and	make	
it	possible	for	them	to	acquire	the	capacity	to	enjoy	this	all-sided	production	of	the	
whole	earth	(the	creations	of	man).	All-round	dependence,	this	primary	natural	form	
of	 the	 world-historical	 co-operation	 of	 individuals,	 will	 be	 transformed	 by	 this	
communist	 revolution	 into	 the	 control	 and	 conscious	 mastery	 of	 these	 powers,	
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which,	born	of	the	action	of	men	on	one	another,	have	till	now	overawed	and	ruled	
men	as	powers	completely	alien	to	them.	Now	this	view	can	be	expressed	again	in	a	
speculative-idealistic,	i.e.,	fantastic,	way	as	“self-generation	of	the	species”	(“society	
as	 the	subject”),	and	 thereby	 the	consecutive	 series	of	 interrelated	 individuals	 can	
be	 regarded	 as	 a	 single	 individual,	 which	 accomplishes	 the	mystery	 of	 generating	
itself.	 In	 this	 context	 it	 is	 evident	 that	 individuals	 undoubtedly	make	one	 another,	
physically	and	mentally,	but	do	not	make	themselves	.	.	.	(CW5:	51-2)	
From the above excerpt, all the main features of Marx’s theoretical ‘correction’ of 
Hegel can be found; (i) the replacement of Hegelian ideas by its real equivalents, (ii) 
Marx’s own explanation of how the real historical processes are idealised and 
fantasised into ‘self-generation of the species’ in the brains of the Hegelians, (iii) 
Marx’s attempt not to conceptualise real development but to accept it simply as it is, 
etc. To sum up, the Hegelian idea, ‘the world spirit’, is replaced by its real equivalent, 
the real emergence of the world market as understood ‘an empirical fact’.98 
Firstly, since Marx equates man’s development with ‘the wealth of his real 
connections’, and since the establishment of the world market denotes the latest stage 
in the development of human society, man can have an opportunity to be elevated to a 
higher, ‘world historical’ being with ‘all-round dependence’ in the world market. 
However, secondly, man’s suffering in modern capitalist conditions is also heightened 
only in the world market: ‘[S]eparate individuals have . . . become more and more 
enslaved under a power alien to them . . . a power which has become more and more 
enormous and, in the last instance, turns out to be the world market’. Then, the world 
market for Marx at this time is a space similar to biblical purgatory that sinful man 
has to pass through before being allowed to go to Heaven.  
What the real formation of the world market can tell us is simply that the development 
of human beings has reached a certain limit point and, thus, that they are given a 
possibility to be emancipated. To appreciate the conditions for the realisation of this 
                                                
98	‘[T]his	transformation	of	history	into	world	history	is	by	no	means	a	mere	abstract	act	on	
the	part	of	the	“self-consciousness”,	the	world	spirit,	or	of	any	other	metaphysical	spectre,	
but	 a	 quite	material,	 empirically	 verifiable	 act,	 an	 act	 the	 proof	 of	which	 every	 individual	
furnishes	 as	 he	 comes	 and	 goes,	 eats,	 drinks	 and	 clothes	 himself’	 (CW05:	 50-1).	 ‘[T]he	
extension	of	markets	 into	a	world	market,	which	had	now	become	possible	and	was	daily	
becoming	more	and	more	a	fact,	called	forth	a	new	phase	of	historical	development’	(CW05:	
69).	
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possibility, however, we have to go back to the world market again. Hence the third 
significance of the world market; the world market is viewed as the only field where 
the totality of modern society can be fully grasped. It is only at the dimension of the 
world market that the most wretched social class in capitalist society, namely the 
proletariat, can be observed and, therefore, that not only the meaning of its formation 
but also of its most important practice, the communist revolution, is properly tested:99  
This	“estrangement”	[“Entfremdung”]	(to	use	a	term	which	will	be	comprehensible	
to	the	philosophers)	can,	of	course,	only	be	abolished	given	two	practical	premises.	
In	order	to	become	an	“unendurable”	power,	i.e.,	a	power	against	which	men	make	
a	 revolution,	 it	 must	 necessarily	 have	 rendered	 the	 great	 mass	 of	 humanity	
“propertyless,”	 and	moreover	 in	 contradiction	 to	 an	 existing	world	 of	 wealth	 and	
culture;	both	 these	conditions	presuppose	a	great	 increase	 in	productive	power,	a	
high	 degree	 of	 its	 development.	 And,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 this	 development	 of	
productive	forces	(which	at	the	same	time	implies	the	actual	empirical	existence	of	
men	 in	 their	 world-historical,	 instead	 of	 local,	 being)	 is	 an	 absolutely	 necessary	
practical	 premise,	 because	 without	 it	 prevation,	 want	 [Mangel]	 is	 merely	 made	
general,	 and	 with	want	 [Notdurft]	 the	 struggle	 for	 necessities	 would	 begin	 again,	
and	 all	 the	 old	 filthy	 business	 would	 necessarily	 be	 restored;	 and	 furthermore,	
because	 only	 with	 this	 universal	 development	 of	 productive	 forces	 is	 a	 universal	
intercourse	between	men	established,	which	on	the	one	side	produces	in	all	nations	
simultaneously	the	phenomenon	of	the	“propertyless”	mass	(universal	competition),	
making	 each	 nation	 dependent	 on	 the	 revolutions	 of	 the	 others,	 and	 finally	 puts	
world-historical,	 empirically	 universal	 individuals	 in	 place	 of	 local	 ones.	 .	 .	
Empirically,	communism	 is	only	possible	as	the	act	of	 the	dominant	peoples	“all	at	
once”	and	simultaneously.	.	.	
Moreover,	[the	emergence	of]	the	mass	of	workers	who	are	nothing	but	workers—
labour-power	on	a	mass	scale	cut	off	from	capital	or	from	even	a	limited	satisfaction	
[of	 their	 needs]	 and,	 hence,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 competition	 their	 utterly	 precarious	
position,	 the	no	 longer	merely	 temporary	 loss	of	work	as	a	 secure	source	of	 life—
presupposes	the	world	market.	The	proletariat	can	thus	only	exist	world-historically,	
just	as	communism,	its	activity	can	only	have	a	“world-historical”	existence.	World-
historical	 existence	 of	 individuals,	 i.e.,	 existence	 of	 individuals	 which	 is	 directly	
linked	up	with	world	history.		(CW5:	48-9)	
In the end, the world market in Marx’s early works signifies not merely the most 
developed—historically and empirically—form of the capitalist economy, but rather 
the best measure of the latter’s development itself; this is also how he subscribed to 
                                                
99	See	 also	 Engels’s	 ‘The	 Constitutional	 Questions	 in	 Germany’	 (CW06:	 75-91)	 and	 ‘The	
Principles	of	Communism’	(WC6:	341-57)	written	in	1847.		
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his preceding thinkers of the global. Appearing first in the German Ideology of 1845-
46, the world market of this sense is employed up until the late-1850s a number of 
times in Marx’s and Engels’s various writings; newspaper columns, personal 
correspondences, theoretical polemics, public addresses, and notebooks for economic 
studies. To take a typical example from the Communist Manifesto: 
The	need	of	a	constantly	expanding	market	for	 its	products	chases	the	bourgeoisie	
over	the	entire	surface	of	the	globe.	It	must	nestle	everywhere,	settle	everywhere,	
establish	connexions	everywhere.	
The	 bourgeoisie	 has	 through	 its	 exploitation	 of	 the	 world	 market	 given	 a	
cosmopolitan	 character	 to	 production	 and	 consumption	 in	 every	 country.	 To	 the	
great	 chagrin	 of	 Reactionists,	 it	 has	 drawn	 from	 under	 the	 feet	 of	 industry	 the	
national	ground	on	which	it	stood.	All	old-established	national	industries	have	been	
destroyed	or	are	daily	being	destroyed.	They	are	dislodged	by	new	industries,	whose	
introduction	becomes	a	life	and	death	question	for	all	civilised	nations,	by	industries	
that	no	 longer	work	up	 indigenous	raw	material,	but	raw	material	drawn	from	the	
remotest	zones;	industries	whose	products	are	consumed,	not	only	at	home,	but	in	
every	quarter	of	the	globe.	In	place	of	the	old	wants,	satisfied	by	the	production	of	
the	 country,	 we	 find	 new	 wants,	 requiring	 for	 their	 satisfaction	 the	 products	 of	
distant	 lands	 and	 climes.	 In	 place	 of	 the	 old	 local	 and	 national	 seclusion	 and	 self-
sufficiency,	 we	 have	 intercourse	 in	 every	 direction,	 universal	 inter-dependence	 of	
nations.	 And	 as	 in	 material,	 so	 also	 in	 intellectual	 production.	 The	 intellectual	
creations	 of	 individual	 nations	 become	 common	 property.	 National	 one-sidedness	
and	 narrow-mindedness	 become	 more	 and	 more	 impossible,	 and	 from	 the	
numerous	national	and	local	 literatures,	there	arises	a	world	literature.	(CW6:	487-
88)	
Fourthly, it is also possible to evaluate the meaning of the world market in terms of 
the state/civil society duality discussed earlier in § 2.2. Opposing Hegelian 
supersession of civil society by the ideal state, Marx juxtaposes the two in such a way 
that both denote the two fragmented spheres of modern life, private/economic and 
public/political. According to him, while civil society constitutes the material basis of 
the modern world, the state is merely a, essentially illusory, reflection of it. Therefore, 
it is not possible to resort to the state, as does Hegel, to solve the modern problem—
what Hegel calls ‘alienation’. Instead, Marx’s strategy is quite straightforward; he 
looks for the solution in the very place where the problem has arisen, i.e., civil 
society. From this perspective, whilst in Hegel the realisation of the (rational) state is 
the solution of the problem, in Marx the problem can be solved only when the state is 
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abolished; he tries to find in the development of alienation the emergence of the 
conditions for overcoming it, which will eventually overcome the state:  
Civil	society	embraces	the	whole	material	intercourse	of	individuals	within	a	definite	
stage	of	 the	development	of	productive	 forces.	 It	embraces	 the	whole	commercial	
and	industrial	life	of	a	given	stage	and,	insofar,	transcends	the	state	and	the	nation,	
though,	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 again,	 it	 must	 assert	 itself	 in	 its	 external	 relations	 as	
nationality	and	internally	must	organise	itself	as	state.	(CW5:	89.	My	italics.)	
Civil society, whilst tentatively asserting itself in the form of the state or the nation, 
eventually has the potentiality to transcend such a confinement: 
The	 arrangement	 has	 evidently	 to	 be	 made	 as	 follows:	 (1)	 The	 general	 abstract	
determinations,	which	therefore	appertain	more	or	less	to	all	forms	of	society	.	.	.	(2)	
The	categories	which	constitute	 the	 internal	 structure	of	bourgeois	 society	and	on	
which	the	principal	classes	are	based.	Capital,	wage	 labour,	 landed	property.	 .	 .	 (3)	
The	 State	 as	 the	 epitome	 of	 bourgeois	 society.	 Analysed	 in	 relation	 to	 itself.	 The	
“unproductive”	 classes.	 Taxes.	 National	 debt.	 Public	 credit.	 Population.	 Colonies.	
Emigration.	 (4)	 International	 character	 of	 production.	 International	 division	 of	
labour.	 International	 exchange.	 Export	 and	 import.	 Rate	 of	 exchange.	 (5)	 World	
market	and	crises.	(CW28:	45)	
It is interesting to observe the exact correspondence between the last two excerpts. 
Civil society which ‘embraces the whole material intercourses of individuals’ at first 
organises itself as the national states inwardly (3) and, as such, they relate with each 
other outwardly (4). In this process, however, since civil society by nature ‘transcends 
the state and the nation’, it tends to create a body of connections that cannot be 
reduced to a national framework; the world market (5)! This sense of the world 
market can be found clearer in the following:  
I.	(1)	General	concept	of	capital.—(2)	Particularity	of	capital.	.	.	(3)	Capital	as	money.	
II.	(1)	Quantity	of	capital.	Accumulation.	(2)	Capital	measured	in	terms	of	itself.	.	.	(3)	
The	 circulation	 of	 capitals.	 .	 .	 III.	 Capital	 as	 credit.	 IV.	 Capital	 as	 share	 capital.	 V.	
Capital	as	money	market.	VI.	Capital	as	source	of	wealth.	The	capitalist.	After	capital,	
landed	 property	 would	 have	 to	 be	 dealt	 with.	 After	 that	 wage	 labour.	 Then,	
assuming	 all	 three,	 the	movement	 of	 prices	 as	 circulation	now	defined	 in	 its	 inner	
totality.	On	the	other	hand,	the	three	classes	as	production	posited	in	its	three	basic	
forms	 and	 presuppositions	 of	 circulation.	 Then	 the	 State.	 (State	 and	 bourgeois	
society.—Taxation,	 or	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 unproductive	 classes.—The	 national	
debt.—Population.—The	state	in	its	external	relations:	Colonies.	Foreign	trade.	Rate	
of	exchange.	Money	as	international	coin.—Finally	the	world	market.	Encroachment	
of	bourgeois	society	on	the	state.	Crises.	Dissolution	of	the	mode	of	production	and	
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form	of	society	based	upon	exchange	value.	The	real	positing	of	individual	labour	as	
social	and	vice	versa.)	(CW28:	194-5.	Original	italics	and	my	underline.)	
Then, it would not be an exaggeration to say that what the world market is to Marx is 
what the state is to Hegel. It is such a crucial concept to the Young Marx, so to speak.  
Lastly, it is worth mentioning here that the development of the concept of the world 
market in Marx was a product of his deepening economic studies from early-1840s; it 
partly explains why he used an economists’ term—the world market—to denote the 
globality of modern society. In spite of his strong disillusionment with philosophy, 
however, he still remained a philosopher to a large extent rather than a political 
economist by the mid-1840s when he was writing the German Ideology and the 
Poverty of Philosophy. That is probably why he employed the ambiguous term 
‘intercourse’ [Verkehr] where a political economist would have put ‘commerce’ 
[Handel] instead, although his choice of ‘intercourse’ does suggest something more 
that economists would fail to think of. 
However, it is also true that, as his studies in political economy evolve, his concept of 
the world market becomes more and more ‘economic’ both in appearance and 
content. In this respect, we may well have another look at the last two excerpts. While 
we can see the fully ‘economified’ version of the world market there, we need to 
recognise they are two different versions of the so-called ‘Six Book Plan’, the first of 
which was outlined in 1857. Apparently these schemes reflect what Marx then 
thought was the inner structure of civil society, but we can also observe that they are 
ordered in such a way that they necessarily point to the dissolution of this society. 
What all this suggests is that, whilst the Grundrisse and the ‘Plan’ have generally 
been regarded in relation to Marx’s mature political economy, Capital, they might be 
viewed otherwise, i.e., in relation to his earlier problématique. This issue will be 
revisited in the concluding section of this chapter. 
 
4.2.2. Marx’s World Market after ‘Methodological Sophistication’ 
The development of Marx’s political economy is not a linear evolutionary process, 
but an overarching theoretical transition divides it into two qualitatively different 
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phases; this is what we called ‘methodological sophistication’ in the previous chapter. 
Two different meanings of ‘method’ are involved here; the method of investigation of 
the object of study, i.e., society, and of its representation in a certain formal way. 
Regarding the former, what ‘methodological sophistication’ tells us is the transition 
from a historical to a logical/structural perspective on society; as a result of the 
‘sophistication’, Marx now regards society not as a historical entity that experiences 
its own life-cycle, but as a given structure, an organic whole which reproduces itself. 
Such a transformation, on the other hand, led to a parallel transformation in Marx’s 
approach to political economy. Accordingly, essential theoretical problems to be 
asked and answered are reformulated: (i) to identify core elements that constitute civil 
society as an organic whole, and to lay bare the inner connections between them, and 
(ii) to represent in a formal way how such a logically reconstructed totality reproduces 
itself—both the whole and individual elements of it—regularly. 
Then, we can say it was from the earlier historical perspective on society that Marx 
portrayed the world market both as the culmination of the (material) development of 
modern society as a historical entity, and as the deciding moment of its dissolution. 
On the contrary, as long as capital(-ism), the object of study, is viewed as an organic 
whole which reproduces itself, every single element that constitutes it is regarded both 
as an essential presupposition for it to exist, and as a result of its reproductive 
process.  
These	presuppositions	which	originally	appeared	as	prerequisites	of	its	becoming	.	.	.	
now	 appear	 as	 results	 of	 its	 own	 realisation,	 reality,	 as	 posited	 by	 it—not	 as	
conditions	 of	 its	 emergence,	 but	 as	 results	 of	 its	 being.	 It	 no	 longer	 sets	 out	 from	
presuppositions	in	order	to	become,	but	is	itself	presupposed,	and,	setting	out	from	
itself,	 it	 itself	 creates	 the	presuppositions	 for	 its	maintenance	and	growth.	 (CW28:	
388)	
The world market is not an exception. Now it is reduced to one of the normal 
elements that constitute the capitalist economy as a self-reproductive organism; a 
determination of its reproductive metabolism:  
The	 world	 market	 itself	 forms	 the	 basis	 for	 this	 [capitalist]	 mode	 of	 production.	
(CW37:	331)	
The	 tendency	 to	 create	 the	 world	 market	 is	 inherent	 directly	 in	 the	 concept	 of	
capital	itself.	Every	limit	appears	as	a	barrier	to	be	overcome.	At	first	[capital	strives]	
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to	 subject	 each	 moment	 of	 production	 itself	 to	 exchange,	 and	 to	 transcend	 the	
production	 of	 immediate	 use	 values	 which	 do	 not	 enter	 into	 exchange,	 i.e.	 to	
replace	the	earlier	and	from	its	standpoint	naturally	evolved	modes	of	production	by	
production	 based	 on	 capital.	 Trade	 appears	 no	 longer	 as	 an	 activity	 carried	 on	
between	independent	productions	for	the	exchange	of	their	surplus	product,	but	as	
the	 essential,	 all-embracing	 prerequisite	 for	 and	 moment	 of	 production	 itself.	
(CW28:	335)	
It was in Capital that Marx takes the above theoretical premise most seriously. 
Although the world market lays the basis for capitalism and figures as its normal 
constituent, it also forms the ultimate field where capitalist competition takes place. 
Thus, it is natural that in the presentation of the capitalist economy the world market 
should come after all the simpler and more abstract categories have been properly 
situated. This is why Marx assumes the whole world to be ‘one nation’ in Capital, 
rendering the world market simply the market:  
We	here	take	no	account	of	export	trade	.	.	.	In	order	to	examine	the	object	of	our	
investigation	 in	 its	 integrity,	 free	 from	 all	 disturbing	 subsidiary	 circumstances,	 we	
must	treat	the	whole	world	as	one	nation,	and	assume	that	capitalist	production	is	
everywhere	established	and	has	possessed	itself	of	every	branch	of	industry.	(CW35:	
580n)	
At the level of the world market, however, ‘export trade’ is not ‘disturbing subsidiary 
circumstances’ but one of the representative activities to be explained. Therefore, to 
introduce the world market in the presentation is nothing but relaxing the above one-
capitalist-nation assumption to allow more realistic feature of the world to figure in 
the theory. Accordingly, the existence of the world market that, so far, has only hung 
its shadow over the whole landscape is made explicit and, on this basis, the existing 
body of theory would be pushed further (see Part II). 
 
4.2.3. Theoretical Innovations of Marx’s Conceptualisation of the World Market 
So far, two senses of the world market to be found in Marx’s writings have been 
identified in distinction from each other. But more important is that the transition 
from its first sense as a historical entity to the second as an essential category of 
political economy is not arbitrary but a necessary result of the more fundamental 
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transformation in his thought, namely ‘methodological sophistication’. In other 
words, the distinction of the two world markets in Marx serves as the best illustration 
of the ‘sophistication’, and points to Marx’s break from the conventional West 
European thinking of the global outlined in § 4.1 as the ‘sophistication’ in general 
does with respect to (conventional) political economy (see § 3.2). With the renewed 
concept of the world market, Marx is now able to problematise the global in a more 
formal and complex way in his elaborate value theory (see, for details, Chapter 6).  
Secondly, it is of prime importance to appreciate that it is not a simple logical 
hypothesis concerning the reconstruction of the capitalist economy as a totality in 
thought that a category is regarded as both a presupposition and a result. Rather, by 
this premise, Marx also suggests capital sprang from nowhere but was historically 
developed on the material bases ready to be exploited by it: ‘the modern mode of 
production developed only where the conditions for it had taken shape within the 
Middle Ages’ (CW37: 331). Further, this methodological premise, as such, 
emphasises the fact that capital historically transforms the nature of, and reorganises 
the interrelations between those existing material bases in the way it most prefers, 
which of necessity entails the historical specificities of capitalism vis-à-vis other 
forms of production; indeed, this is a way the former historical problématique 
survives in the logical/structural framework. 
[C]apital	did	not	create	the	world	afresh,	but	rather	found	production	and	products	
already	 in	 existence	 before	 it	 subjugated	 them	 to	 its	 process.	 Once	 in	 motion,	
setting	 out	 from	 itself,	 it	 continuously	 presupposes	 itself	 in	 its	 different	 forms	 as	
consumable	 product,	 raw	 material	 and	 instrument	 of	 labour,	 in	 order	 to	
continuously	 reproduce	 itself	 in	 these	 forms.	 They	 appear	 first	 as	 the	 conditions	
presupposed	by	capital	itself,	and	then	as	its	result.	In	reproducing	itself	it	produces	
its	own	conditions.	(CW29:	65)	
The world market as a category was not an exception. He characterised the 
presuppositional world market as one whose formation was driven by trade or 
merchant’s capital which was an ‘antediluvian form of capital’. But, whilst 
‘Merchant’s capital appropriates an overwhelming portion of the surplus-product 
partly as a mediator between communities which still substantially produce for use-
value’, it ‘will subordinate production more and more to exchange-value by making 
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luxuries and subsistence more dependent on sale than on the immediate use of the 
products’ (CW37: 329, 328).  
[W]hen	 in	 the	 16th,	 and	partially	 still	 in	 the	 17th,	 century	 the	 sudden	expansion	of	
commerce	 and	 emergence	 of	 a	 new	world	market	 overwhelmingly	 contributed	 to	
the	fall	of	the	old	mode	of	production	and	the	rise	of	capitalist	production,	this	was	
accomplished	 conversely	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 already	 existing	 capitalist	 mode	 of	
production.	The	world	market	itself	forms	the	basis	for	this	mode	of	production.	On	
the	other	hand,	the	 immanent	necessity	of	this	mode	of	production	to	produce	on	
an	ever-enlarged	scale	tends	to	extend	the	world	market	continually,	so	that	it	is	not	
commerce	in	this	case	which	revolutionises	 industry,	but	 industry	which	constantly	
revolutionises	commerce	(CW37:	331.	See	also	CW35:	742).	
As the above excerpt shows, unlike his late-18th and early-19th century predecessors 
who largely hovered around the speculative and cosmopolitan thinking about the 
human-historical or world-historical implication of the emergence of the global, and 
unlike his mid-19th century contemporaries who simply took the existence of the 
global for granted, Marx exerted himself to illuminating how such an unprecedented 
development at the global level was to be transformed in a certain way by the 
workings of capital; hence, the world market as a result. 
Third, more specifically, by concentrating on the ‘presupposition’ aspect of the world 
market, it is possible to problematise the historical formation of the capitalist global 
economy positively. This is also done by Marx himself, but not satisfactorily. As he 
has painfully shown in the last Part of the first Volume of Capital, ‘the colonies, the 
national debt, the modern mode of taxation, and the protectionist system’ in the world 
market were amongst the main ‘momenta of primitive accumulation’ (CW35: 739). 
As They are historical examples which suggest the global dynamics of capitalist 
development was already at work from as early as its preparatory and formative 
stages, but not only in the sense that, as Marx intends to show, they contributed to the 
capitalistic reorganisation of what he calls the first ‘classic’ capitalist society, the 
English. They also played much more active roles; as Pomeranz and Topik 
emphatically argue (2005: 226-8), for instance, ‘the first industrial factories were the 
sugar mills of the [colonial] Americas’ in the 17th centuries, not those Manchester 
cotton mills! According to this view, even if the embryonic elements of capitalism 
had been born out of the Western European leading social formations, it was only in 
their colonies outside their boundaries that such elements were first put in practice. 
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The colonial factories involved not only a huge amount of money raised in the 
‘mother’ country, guaranteeing the owners of the money an opportunity of 
speculation in return, but involved ‘some of the most sophisticated technology of the 
era, and a large workforce’, too. Further, Sidney W. Mintz enumerates three human as 
well as technical elements that made modern industrial (factory) production first 
appear in the 17th century Caribbean sugar plantations based upon slavery, not free 
labour: discipline, the specifically efficiency-maximising organisation of the labour 
force, and time-consciousness—all are essential features of capitalist labour 
organisation (Mintz 1985: 51).  In the end, if capital is a social relation rather than a 
bunch of tools, it should have been much easier to transform ‘after its own image’ 
displaced coerced slaves than relatively free feudal peasants with all their history, 
traditions, customs, values, etc. If it is an exaggeration to say ‘the factories of the 
Caribbean were holding a mirror in which Europe could see its industrial future’ 
(Pomeranz and Topik 2005: 228), certainly it was only after such periods of 
‘experimentation’ and trial-and-error that the factory system saw its full-scale 
implementation back in its mother country. 
Fourth, then, the above point necessarily leads to the following question: how is the 
initial global reproduced by the inner logic of the capitalist economy? This is exactly 
the same question that above-mentioned C.A. Bayly had when he presented the 
proposition ‘the nationalization of interactions across the emerging modern world’. 
While he focuses upon the growing influence of the nation state, Marx is more 
interested in capital; these are, however, two opposite sides of a coin. Marx gives 
some examples of how capital transforms the feature of the world market in Capital:  
In	a	society	whose	pivot,	to	use	an	expression	of	Fourier,	was	agriculture	on	a	small	
scale,	with	its	subsidiary	domestic	industries,	and	the	urban	handicrafts,	the	means	
of	 communication	 and	 transport	 were	 so	 utterly	 inadequate	 to	 the	 productive	
requirements	 of	 the	 manufacturing	 period,	 with	 its	 extended	 division	 of	 social	
labour,	its	concentration	of	the	instruments	of	labour,	and	of	the	workmen,	and	its	
colonial	 markets,	 that	 they	 became	 in	 fact	 revolutionised.	 In	 the	 same	 way	 the	
means	 of	 communication	 and	 transport	 handed	 down	 from	 the	 manufacturing	
period	 soon	 became	 unbearable	 trammels	 on	 Modern	 Industry,	 with	 its	 feverish	
haste	of	production,	its	enormous	extent,	its	constant	flinging	of	capital	and	labour	
from	one	sphere	of	production	into	another,	and	its	newly-created	connexions	with	
the	markets	of	the	whole	world.	Hence,	apart	from	the	radical	changes	introduced	in	
the	 construction	 of	 sailing	 vessels,	 the	 means	 of	 communication	 and	 transport	
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became	gradually	 adapted	 to	 the	modes	of	 production	of	mechanical	 industry,	 by	
the	creation	of	a	system	of	river	steamers,	railways,	ocean	steamers,	and	telegraphs.	
But	the	huge	masses	of	iron	that	had	now	to	be	forged,	to	be	welded,	to	be	cut,	to	
be	bored,	and	to	be	shaped,	demanded,	on	their	part,	cyclopean	machines,	for	the	
construction	 of	 which	 the	 methods	 of	 the	 manufacturing	 period	 were	 utterly	
inadequate.	(CW35:	386)	
On	the	one	hand,	the	immediate	effect	of	machinery	is	to	increase	the	supply	of	raw	
material	in	the	same	way,	for	example,	as	the	cotton	gin	augmented	the	production	
of	cotton.	On	the	other	hand,	the	cheapness	of	the	articles	produced	by	machinery,	
and	the	 improved	means	of	transport	and	communication	furnish	the	weapons	for	
conquering	 foreign	 markets.	 By	 ruining	 handicraft	 production	 in	 other	 countries,	
machinery	forcibly	converts	them	into	fields	for	the	supply	of	its	raw	material.	.	.	By	
constantly	 making	 a	 part	 of	 the	 hands	 “supernumerary,”	 modern	 industry,	 in	 all	
countries	where	it	has	taken	root,	gives	a	spur	to	emigration	and	to	the	colonisation	
of	foreign	lands,	which	are	thereby	converted	into	settlements	for	growing	the	raw	
material	of	the	mother	country;	just	as	Australia,	for	example,	was	converted	into	a	
colony	for	growing	wool.	A	new	and	international	division	of	labour,	a	division	suited	
to	 the	 requirements	 of	 the	 chief	 centres	 of	 modern	 industry	 springs	 up,	 and	
converts	 one	 part	 of	 the	 globe	 into	 a	 chiefly	 agricultural	 field	 of	 production,	 for	
supplying	the	other	part	which	remains	a	chiefly	industrial	field.	.	.	(CW35:	455)	
It is essential to have the question ‘how is the initial global reproduced by the inner 
logic of the capitalist economy?’, not least because we are living in a world where 
most people believe that Brazil is the home of coffee, which is however a product of 
capital’s restructuring of the world (see, for more similar examples, Pomeranz and 
Topik 2005: Ch. 4), and not least because what Marx calls ‘fetishism’ is so prevalent 
in economic science since his time. ‘Fetishism’ in economics is nothing but 
economists’ taking for granted economic categories which in capitalist society take 
deceptive forms, and portraying these mere forms as eternal and non-problematic as 
they are. To see the real content, the relations between human beings, behind those 
forms, suggests Marx, we need to look at history, the historical formation of the 
categories.  
Fifth, aside from the historical aspect, as long as the global forms a constituent part of 
the capitalist economy, another crucial question arises: what role does it play in the 
overall reproduction of the capitalist economy? From the theoretical point of view, 
this question is translated into: how to incorporate the global into the existing body of 
theory? Of course, in the case of Marx, this is a question of loosening the one-
capitalist-nation assumption, which is nothing but extending his value theory with 
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respect to the world market. In tackling this question, again, the importance of the 
world market as presupposition/result stands out. For, if this character is not only a 
logical premise but also concerned with the historically peculiar reproduction of the 
global in capitalist society, the reintroduction of the global into theory—or the 
loosening of the one-capitalist-nation assumption—should be performed in such a 
way that the historical peculiarity remains undamaged. 
His gradual indulgence in a study of the non-European, non- or pre-capitalist societies 
needs to be assessed in this respect. And it offers quite different a perspective than 
Gareth Stedman Jones holds on this matter; according to him, Capital was written in 
‘the universal and unilinear terms’ largely shared by the aforementioned 
Enlightenment thinkers and Marx and, consequently, a close study of the non-
European world necessarily entailed his ‘abandonment of Capital’ (Stedman Jones 
2007: 198). But this conclusion is too hasty, and lacks in evidence. By contrast, in 
view of the broader intellectual project to which Marx was committed, it is much 
more plausible to regard such a study as an attempt at sharpening his long-standing 
‘global’ standpoint by considering more determinations. Instead of predicting the 
inevitability of the conquest and destruction of the extra-European societies by the 
European civilisation, he now pays more attention to what transformation those 
societies experience once they are drawn into the world market where the capitalist 
relation of production prevails (cf. CW35: 244). In Marx’s refined framework in 
Capital and later, these societies, or national economies in general are viewed as 
particular moments in the reproduction of capitalism on a global scale; this is a point 
Stedman Jones fails to appreciate. Further, the very existence, and persistence of such 
different societies in the world market will only require the theory on the capitalist 
economy to become more complicated (see Chapter 5). 
In the end, we can fairly conclude that it was to make up an important part of Marx’s 
value theory to deal with how the world market as a presupposition was reconstituted 
in the confinement of the capitalist economy, and how the inclusion of the world 
market category would modify and drive the existing theory further ahead. By doing 
so, we would be able to grasp how the capitalist mode of production has been 
developed into a specifically global economy over time, with creating new 
contradictions and limitations as well as modifying and transcending existing ones. 
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What such a project would look like when properly performed — to exemplify it is 
the main purpose of Part II of this thesis. 
 
4.3.	SUMMARY	OF	PART	I	
The aim of this thesis as a whole is to reconstruct Marx’s concept of the world 
market. To perform this research properly, it was suggested at the outset, the 
following three questions would be necessarily posed and needed to be answered: (i) 
how and against what background Marx conceptualised the world market; (ii) whether 
its place in his whole theory changed and, if it did, how; and lastly (iii) how it can fit 
into Marx’s elaborate value theory, and what additional critical/analytical vantage 
points it can provide with respect to dealing with contemporary global capitalism. In 
Part I, the first two issues has been dealt with.  
In Chapter 2, an examination was performed of how Marx arrived at political 
economy after a much-troubled intellectual journey. Having started his intellectual 
life under a strong influence of Hegelian idealist philosophy, which was quite 
inevitable for him, Marx complained of its not being real and material, and finally 
managed to discover a way out from Hegelian problématique of alienation with an 
encounter with political economy. Suggestive here was that this discovery coincided 
with another important discovery — the world market.  
However, his attitude toward political economy was never fixed; neither was his view 
on the world market. Firstly, in Chapter 3, the evolution of Marx’s political economy 
was traced. When Marx could escape from Hegelian problématique of alienation in 
the mid-1840s by developing what we now call ‘historical materialism’, his historical 
perspective on society reached at its highest point; society was regarded as a historical 
entity experiencing its own life-cycle (emergence-development-dissolution). Here, 
political economy served (at best) as a fair tool for understanding the material reality 
of modern society. But as Marx’s political economy study progressed he gradually 
learned to appreciate the real significance of political economy that had been forged 
from the 16th century onwards, namely as the ‘anatomy’ of modern society. In 
parallel, his focus in social research also changed; society was now looked upon as an 
 
 
105 
organic totality reproducing itself by its own logic. Political economy was, realised 
Marx, the special science for modern society with which to identify the basic material 
elements of modern society, to reconstruct the whole system in thought as an 
ensemble of those elements, and to lay bare the (sometimes deceptive) mechanism of 
the reproduction of the whole as well as its parts. The evolution in Marx’s perspective 
on political economy (science) and society (the former’s object) was in this chapter 
termed ‘methodological sophistication’.  
Corresponding to the ‘sophistication’ at the most fundamental level, the meaning of 
the world market also changed over time; in Chapter 4, two different senses of the 
world market in Marx, together with their differing places in his evolving theoretical 
project, were identified. Attention was also paid to the broader intellectual context of 
the West European thinking of globality in general, which proved to be instrumental 
in making clearer the significance of Marx’s conceptualisation of the world market. 
The world market in Marx first appeared the ultimate—therefore the latest—field of 
the capitalist material development. It was here, argued Marx, that both the suffering 
and the development of man obtained their most advanced forms, and that the whole 
significance of the development of modern society, and its limitations would be 
grasped most fully. Therefore, communist revolution or the crisis, which would 
abolish this form of social organisation, was to be prospective only at the ‘world’ 
level. Indeed, this is the world market we in § 2.2.3 observed Marx discovering first 
in the German Ideology. Such a ‘historical’ view of the world market, however, 
gradually sublated. As what we earlier called ‘methodological sophistication’ was 
under way at the fundamental level of thought, the world market was to be seen not 
only one of the essential presuppositions necessary for capitalism to come into being, 
but also something reproduced capitalistically by the workings of capitalism. Indeed, 
it was a basic premise — at least for Hegel in Logic and Marx ‘sophisticated’ — in 
dealing with an organic totality to consider its basic elements both as presuppositions 
and results of the totality’s reproductive metabolism.  
Having established the world market as a normal constituent part of the capitalist 
economy in this way, we were faced with a specific set of questions that were 
inevitably posed in the process of acquiring that renewed concept. While they are 
indeed the questions arising generally as a result of ‘methodological sophistication’, 
 
 
106 
we have seen that they, when asked of the concept of the world market, did highlight 
several innovative features of Marx’s specific conceptualisation of the world market. 
As hinted in § 4.2.3, such innovative features could only be satisfactorily addressed 
and developed in Marx’s value theory, which will be attempted — if not fully — in 
Part II.  
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PART II 
 
THE WORLD MARKET IN VALUE THEORY 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS ON MARX’S 
VALUE THEORY: ITS ‘METHOD’ 
In this Part, an attempt will be made to incorporate Marx’s concept of the world 
market expounded earlier into his elaborate value theory. Basically, any extension of 
a theory has to be carried out in compliance with the principles by which the existing 
body of theory is constructed. To perform this task properly, therefore, it is necessary 
to expose some important characteristics of Marx’s value theory to a certain degree, 
which is the subject matter of this chapter.  
In the history of Marxist political economy, such principles have been dealt with 
under the heading of ‘method’. And it appears that most commentators have generally 
assumed Marx’s method to be one of presentation. We will challenge this 
‘convention’ by developing an alternative interpretation in this chapter. This will be 
done partly by developing at length the significance of Marx’s value theory as a 
critique of political economy in the first section, and partly by examining Marx’s 
attitude to dialectics in the second. However, the aim is not so much offering a 
comprehensive explanation, but debate will be limited within the scope of our more 
fundamental purpose of extending the existing value theory onto the sphere of the 
world market. 
 
5.1.	MARX’S	VALUE	THEORY	AS	A	CRITIQUE	OF	POLITICAL	ECONOMY	
There may be a number of different ways to characterise Marx’s value theory, but let 
us start by paying attention to the fact that it was presented as a ‘critique of political 
economy’. ‘Critique’ may well be the most representative and overarching catchword 
that symbolises Marx’s life-long intellectual as well as practical journey. Indeed, it 
was a commonplace for not only Marx but also his German pre- or post-Hegelian 
compatriots to present their theoretical treatises in the form of critique. Even in the 
‘Preface’ to his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, the first main 
work since he had embarked on the study of political economy around the beginning 
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of that year, he took the critique of political economy as part of his rather ambitious 
intellectual project (CW3: 231), and after 23 years since, his most mature economic 
work Capital was published with the subtitle ‘Critique of Political Economy’. Here, 
critique is not a mere rhetoric but a theoretical concept that conveys some specific 
connotations. As such, it characterises Marx’s value theory in a specific way.  
Nevertheless, what he meant by the word ‘critique’ was not explained enough by 
Marx himself, partly because he took it simply for granted. Of course, this does not 
mean that it is impossible to extract the meaning of critique either from his own 
works, or from the broader intellectual context to which he belonged. It is in this way 
that such prominent researchers as Reinhart Koselleck and Sheila Benhabib, amongst 
others, have accounted for what is meant by the term critique in detail. 
 
5.1.1. Three Dimensions of Critique 
Critique, more than anything else, concerns the personal judgement of the critic 
regarding the state of affairs of the object of the critique. To understand the unique 
nature of this judgement, it is necessary to remind that the term critique has the same 
etymological origin with the term crisis (Koselleck 1988[1959]: 103-04 n15). Briefly 
speaking, ‘critique’ presupposes a judgement that the object of critique is in crisis, 
that is, in a critical state, which is most clearly illustrated in Marx’s early writings.100 
Especially, observe the energetically composed sentences from a letter Marx sent to 
his co-editor, Arnold Ruge in September 1843 when they were preparing the 
publication of the journal Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher:  
Hitherto	philosophers	have	had	the	solution	of	all	riddles	lying	in	their	writing-desks,	
and	the	stupid,	exoteric	world	had	only	to	open	 its	mouth	for	the	roast	pigeons	of	
absolute	 knowledge	 to	 fly	 into	 it.	Now	philosophy	has	 become	mundane,	 and	 the	
most	striking	proof	of	this	is	that	philosophical	consciousness	itself	has	been	drawn	
into	 the	 torment	 of	 the	 struggle,	 not	 only	 externally	 but	 also	 internally.	 But,	 if	
constructing	the	future	and	settling	everything	for	all	times	are	not	our	affair,	it	is	all	
                                                
100	Here,	 the	 meaning	 of	 crisis	 may	 be	 understood	 in	 a	 casual	 way.	 On	 the	 etymological	
investigation	of	the	term	and	its	development,	it	is	worthwhile	to	have	a	look	at	Koselleck’s	
Begriffsgeschichte	of	the	term	‘crisis’	(Koselleck	2002:	236-47).	
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the	more	 clear	what	we	 have	 to	 accomplish	 at	 present:	 I	 am	 referring	 to	 ruthless	
criticism	of	all	that	exists,	ruthless	both	in	the	sense	of	not	being	afraid	of	the	results	
it	arrives	at	and	in	the	sense	of	being	just	as	little	afraid	of	conflict	with	the	powers	
that	be	(CW3:	142).	
When Marx talks of the ‘critique of political economy’, by the same token, he 
presupposes a subjective judgement that political economy is in crisis. It is based upon 
this judgement that he distinguishes the scientific and rational aspect of what he calls 
‘classical’ political economy from its ‘vulgar’ offspring: ‘With the year 1830 came 
the decisive crisis [in political economy]’ (CW35: 15. Emphasis added. Cf. Balibar 
1982: 306-07).  
On the other hand, critique is as objective as it is subjective, in the sense that it also 
presupposes a ‘connection between subjective judgement and objective process’ 
(Benhabib 1986: 19), accompanying the analysis of that objective process. Regarding 
this, it would be useful to remember that Koselleck, in tracing back the origin and the 
ensuing development of the term ‘critique’ in the West European intellectual 
tradition, has demonstrated that it had come to mean the use of reason per se by the 
early-18th century: ‘Criticism [Kritik] . . . became . . . the art of arriving at proper 
insights and conclusions via rational thought’ (Koselleck 1988[1959]: 108). It is in 
this sense that Marx characterised his economic work under way in his letter to 
Ferdinand Lassalle of 22 February 1858 as ‘at once an exposé [Darstellung] and, 
through that exposé, a critique of the system [of bourgeois economy]’ (CW40: 270. 
Translation modified with reference to the original). This is why those who 
overemphasise the negative aspect of Marx’s value theory in the name of its being a 
‘critique’ are as one-sided and dangerous as those who aspire to portray it as a 
positive science. 
It would be absurd to assume that, when Marx judges that political economy is in 
crisis, and performs its critique, his diagnose and prescription will remain unchanged, 
say, from the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 all the way to Capital 
of 1867. And what is more important is that his ‘critique of political economy’ 
becomes more sophisticated with more theoretical dimensions as his study in political 
economy deepens. In her brilliant book on critical theory, Critique, Norm, and 
Utopia: A Study of the Foundations of Critical Theory, Sheila Benhabib tries to 
characterise the ‘critique’ in Marx’s Capital, by identifying three dimensions from it. 
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She basically distinguishes ‘immanent critique’ and ‘defetishizing critique’. The 
former seeks ‘to criticize the opponents’ arguments by showing their internal 
inconsistencies and contradictoriness’ (Benhabib 1986: 9), which according to her 
appears in Capital in two different ‘aspects’ which she calls categorial and normative 
critique. Firstly, categorial critique is a critical project which proceeds ‘from the 
accepted definitions and significations of the categories of political economy’ to 
demonstrate ‘how these definitions and significations turn into their opposites’ (105).  
In	 this	procedure,	Marx	does	not	 juxtapose	his	own	categorial	discourse	to	 that	of	
political	economy,	but	through	an	internal	exposition,	elaboration,	and	deepening	of	
the	 already	 available	 results	 of	 classical	 political	 economy,	 he	 shows	 that	 these	
concepts	are	self-contradictory	(106).	
On the other hand, normative critique in Marx’s ‘critique of political economy’ is 
performed by means of the juxtaposition of the norms of bourgeois society and the 
reality of the social relations in which they are embodied. ‘Marx contrasts the 
normative self-understanding of this society to the actual relations prevailing in it, 
without appealing to a different [socialist] set of norms from the ones immanent in 
bourgeois society’ (107-08). Here, Benhabib takes the following passage from 
Capital as an example:   
This	sphere	[of	circulation]	.	.	.	is	.	.	.	a	very	Eden	of	the	innate	rights	of	man.	There	
alone	rule	Freedom,	Equality,	Property	and	Bentham.	Freedom,	because	both	buyer	
and	seller	of	a	commodity,	say	of	 labour	power,	are	constrained	only	by	their	 free	
will.	They	contract	as	free	agents,	and	the	agreement	they	come	to,	is	but	the	form	
in	 which	 they	 give	 legal	 expression	 to	 their	 common	 will.	 Equality,	 because	 each	
enters	into	relation	with	the	other,	as	with	a	simple	owner	of	commodities,	and	they	
exchange	equivalent	for	equivalent.	.	.	On	leaving	this	sphere	of	simple	circulation	or	
of	exchange	of	commodities	.	.	.	[h]e,	who	before	was	the	money	owner,	now	strides	
in	front	as	capitalist;	the	possessor	of	 labour	power	follows	as	his	 labourer	(CW35:	
186.	Cf.	Benhabib	1986:	107).	
Lastly, ‘defetishizing critique’ refers to a procedure of showing that what appears as a 
given is in fact not a natural fact but a historically and socially formed reality’ 
(Benhabib 1986: 21). While this kind of critique does appear in Marx’s works from as 
early as the early-1840s (see Chapter 2), it is only in Capital that he establishes it on 
the basis of what he calls fetishism, that is, the phenomenon that ‘a definite social 
relation between men . . . assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation 
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between things’ (CW35: 83). In principle, as Marx demonstrates in the section on 
‘Fetishism’ in Capital, this is a form of social consciousness that uniquely appears in 
a society where the labour product dominantly assumes the form of commodity; in 
terms of critique of political economy, however, it also points to the distinctive 
character of the categories of political economy, namely their inability to 
problematise the real content of the social relations with which they are concerned 
and, therefore, their deception of presenting ‘economic reality as if it were an 
objective, law-governed reality encompassing various abstract quantities and entities’ 
(Benhabib 1986: 108). 
 
5.1.2. The Inner Structure of Marx’s Critique of Political Economy 
Benhabib’s sophistication of the concept of critique in Marx’s Capital thus far 
summarised casts enormous light on our discussion, but we need to be careful in 
receiving it. First of all, whilst she interprets the significance of Marx’s critique of 
political economy in the intellectual tradition from Kant and Hegel to the Frankfurt 
School of critical theory, we are more concerned with the fact that his critique, 
notably in Capital, was the outcome of his thorough and assiduous confrontation with 
political economy. That is, we would argue that his scientific contributions can be 
most properly assessed in terms of the development of political economy, the 
intellectual engagement with the understanding of the material mechanism of modern 
society (see Chapter 3). It is in this respect, as will be shown below, that we propose 
to understand the three dimensions of critique synthetically (but differently from the 
way Benhabib does), and such an understanding will to a significant degree determine 
the character of Marx’s value theory as the outcome of that critique. 
Then, in what way are the three kinds of critique related internally? To answer this, 
Benhabib begins by stressing rightly that ‘Marx’s categorial critique of political 
economy is also a critique of a mode of social production, the self-understanding of 
which is reflected in this discourse’ (Benhabib 1986: 109). Regarding the fact that 
such a critique of an immanent quality became possible as a modern phenomenon, she 
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links it with a critique of the normative foundations for the modern mode of social 
production: 
Civil	society	is	the	first	social	formation	in	history	which	derives	its	legitimation	from	
immanent	as	opposed	to	transcendental	norms	(110).	
Political	domination	 is	 legitimized	“from	below,”	with	reference	to	 the	activities	of	
individuals	 in	 civil	 society,	 and	 not	 with	 reference	 to	 a	 transcendent	 norm	 from	
above.	Since	capitalist	civil	society	does	away	with	the	transcendent	point	of	view,	
and	since	the	 legitimizing	norms	of	this	society,	 like	equality,	 liberty,	and	property,	
are	embodied	in	activities	of	exchange,	the	critique	of	political	economy	becomes	a	
critique	of	the	normative	self-understanding	of	this	society.	
In	 criticizing	 political	 economy,	 Marx	 is	 also	 criticizing	 its	 normative	 force	 of	
legitimation	(111).	
Further, arguing that Marx’s critique, when it reaches its ‘defetishizing’ moment, 
becomes ‘a critique of the social reality articulated by the discourse of political 
economy, as well as a critique of this discourse itself’ (108. My ltalics), Benhabib 
insists that he needed to develop an ‘emancipatory’ or ‘utopian’ vision of his own, 
and to fall back upon it to perform such a critique properly. In this way, she exposes 
and problematises the normative dimension of Marx’s critique. 
It would be fair to acknowledge that Benhabib’s structuring of the concept of Marx’s 
critique in Capital is suggestive in that it indicates the limit point to which his critique 
eventually amounts, or the point where, to borrow Etienne Balibar’s expression, no 
more ‘logical’ political economy is possible in the face of the ‘illogic’ of its 
fundamental principles (Balibar 1982: 304, 305) and, thus, the point where one needs 
to refer to the effective visions for emancipation together with political practice to 
realise these visions. However, it is at once true that hers fails to address the points 
where Marx’s value theory as a critique of political economy is substantially 
developed in abundance.101 
                                                
101	We	made	 efforts	 to	 show	 in	 Chapter	 2	 and	 part	 of	 Chapter	 3	 that	Marx’s	 intellectual	
interest	moved	 from	the	 former	 to	 the	 latter,	 i.e.,	 from	outside	 to	 inside	of	 the	possibility	
frontier	of	 the	 theory	of	modern	 society,	or	 from	 the	 critique	of	 the	deceptiveness	of	 the	
theory	(hence	abandoning	it)	to	a	call	for	a	more	sophisticated	theory	(hence	developing	it).	
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It is in this sense that we want to lay more emphasis upon the significance of the 
categorial aspect of Marx’s critique than Benhabib does. As she rightly says, Marx’s 
categorial critique seeks to show that the immanent demand of the categories of 
political economy, when pushed to the limit, necessarily reaches at a certain impasse, 
rather than to show their inner contradictions immediately (Benhabib 1986: 106). This 
needs to be supplemented by stressing that for Marx such a process was never 
hypothetical or heuristic. In other words, it was not simply to prove the 
contradictoriness of the categories that Marx initially accepted them; by contrast, he 
had actually carried out a thorough study of the existing literature of political 
economy, and selected out what he thought was rational and acceptable from it. 
Consequently, he reveals on the one hand the inner contradictions of the categories of 
political economy but, on the other, what is now the same thing, their insufficient 
conceptualisation. What is of prime importance is that here Marx’s value theory 
acquires a momentum of positive/constructive development. Rather than proceeding 
directly to the conclusions that the self-understanding of civil society reflected in 
political economy is not sufficient for realising the normative or utopian ideals—
‘Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham’—to which it is avowedly committed and, 
thus, that the revolution is necessary to appropriate the human-historical achievements 
of bourgeois society fully, Marx stays more in the realm of political economy to 
sophisticate and radicalise such a ‘self-understanding’; thereby engaging himself with 
detailing what and how to ‘re-appropriate’.102 At last, we can now justly assert that 
the categorial moment which bears the possibility of the above development acquires 
primacy amongst the three moments in Marx’s concept of critique that Benhabib 
                                                
102	In	this	sense,	although	Etienne	Balibar	was	right	when	he	remarked	‘if	there	is	a	“logical”	
critique	of	political	economy,	 it	 is	 that	 there	 is	a	 logic	of	political	economy,	expressing	 the	
presence	in	its	bottom	of	necessary	development’	(Balibar	1982:	304),	his	verdict	as	follows	
is	hasty:	
If	 the	 errors	 are	 on	 the	 side	 of	 the	 principles	 themselves,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 treat	 its	
[political	 economy’s]	 contradictions	 and	 confusions	which	 it	 comprises	 as	 the	 index	of	
the	impossibility	of	a	scientific	political	economy,	freed	from	the	bourgeois	illusions	and	
politico-legal	 idealism.	 Consequently	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 constitute	 in	 theory	 a	 non-
economic	point	of	view.	(305)	
Rather,	what	Marx	does	is,	by	radicalising	the	insufficient	concepts,	or	‘principles’	as	Balibar	
calls	 them,	 to	 produce	 the	 truthful	 knowledge	 of	 the	 capitalist	 economy	 even	 though	 its	
validity	is	only	confined	to	the	capitalist	economy.	
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suggests. Indeed, that is exactly why many authors, as we did earlier in Chapter 3, 
regard Marx’s renewal of economic study in London in the beginning of the 1850s as 
the threshold from the early (as in the 1844 Manuscripts) to the mature stage (as in 
Capital) of the critique of political economy (Rosdolsky 1977[1968]: 5; Oakley 1983: 
42-43 and 44-45; Rubel 1981[1968]: 133; Krätke 2004: 3; Heinrich 1989: 64); by 
then Marx’s critical engagement with political economy was so advanced that he 
began to scrutinise specific economic categories such as ground rent, money, etc., 
departing meaningfully from Ricardo.103  
On the other hand, whilst the categories of political economy are always expressed as 
logical concepts, they are in the end mere objectifications of the historically definite 
social relations between humans. Therefore, the critique of the categories cannot be 
completed by the inner scrutiny of them, but of necessity requires the critique of the 
way they reflect the social relations which form their bases. Here exists the 
defetishising moment of Marx’s critique, which means, briefly speaking, that political 
economy simply forgets the social contents its categories mirror, and absolutises their 
objective [sachlich] forms. Further, as long as the social contents are disregarded, 
organic links between categories are easy to remain unquestioned. As shown in the 
first two sections of the ‘1857 Introduction’ to the Grundrisse, Marx regards the 
capitalist economy as an organic totality, and the economic categories, each of which 
would conceptualise a particular element of the whole, as organically linked with each 
other and, eventually, as composing an organic whole on its own in correspondence to 
the real whole. It is impossible, however, to reach such an understanding only by 
means of the fetishised categories of political economy; it is necessary to draw 
attention to the social relations that those categories hide behind themselves. The 
defetishising critique in Capital reveals such a limitation of political economy. In that 
the fetishised understanding of individual categories necessarily entails a fetishised 
understanding of the relationships of the categories, Marx’s defetishising critique 
remains two-fold.  
Lastly, now that the two kinds of critique in Capital are characterised and related to 
each other as above, the last form of critique Benhabib suggests, the normative, does 
not seem to be able to maintain its original status. Normative critique does appear 
                                                
103	See	especially	Marx’s	letters	to	Engels	dated	7	January,	and	3	February,	1851.	
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very radical, for it puts into question the fundamental norms of modern society 
reflected in its theory. However, whereas this critique is possible according to 
Benhabib simply by juxtaposing the ideal and reality, it is now obvious Marx’s 
interest in his mature critique of political economy is not confined to indicating the 
discrepancy between the two, but goes further as to try to lay bare the material 
mechanism peculiar to bourgeois society of producing the discrepancy systematically.  
Hence	equality	and	freedom	are	not	only	respected	in	exchange	which	is	based	on	
exchange	values,	but	the	exchange	of	exchange	values	is	the	real	productive	basis	of	
all	equality	and	 freedom.	As	pure	 ideas,	equality	and	freedom	are	merely	 idealized	
expressions	of	this	exchange	(CW28:	176).	.	.	[However]	exchange	value	itself	is	here	
taken	in	its	simple	character	as	against	its	more	developed	antagonistic	forms.	.	.	In	
the	totality	of	existing	bourgeois	society,	this	postulation	as	price	and	its	circulation,	
etc.,	 appears	 as	 the	 superficial	 process,	 below	 which,	 in	 the	 depth,	 quite	 other	
processes	occur	in	which	the	apparent	equality	and	freedom	of	individuals	disappear	
(179).	
Moreover, as long as such discrepancy is not simply a matter of logic, something 
‘falling . . . outside the economic form-determination [ökonomischen 
Formbestimmung]’ (CW28: 174. Translation modified), its clarification will 
immediately demand something like a historical approach. Hence the historical part of 
Capital, that is, its last part on the ‘Primitive Accumulation’. 
 
5.1.3. The Constitution of Marx’s Value Theory as a Critique of Political Economy 
Once the meaning of the critique in Marx is defined through his close study of 
political economy as above, it should necessarily determine the content, task, and 
process of his value theory, which is again ‘at once an exposé and, through that 
exposé, a critique of the system’ of political economy. 
To begin with, as long as Marx’s value theory is presented in the form of a critique of 
political economy, it is reasonable, from the above discussion of the meaning of 
‘critique’, to suppose that it should be subject to the way he characterises the existing 
body of political economy, which itself is of course a result of his enduring critical 
confrontation with it. Two mutually related points are to be remembered. Firstly that, 
in the ‘Introduction’ of mid-1857 to his Grundrisse, he derives two distinct methods 
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of political economy, methods not only of thinking but of presentation, from its own 
history of development from the early-17th century onwards: one concerns proceeding 
from the apparent complex phenomena ‘to arrive analytically at increasingly simple 
concepts’, and the other takes the opposite course, i.e., from the simple and abstract to 
the complex and concrete.104 Championing the latter, which was employed by such 
political economists as Adam Smith and David Ricardo, as ‘the correct scientific 
method’ for reproducing the concrete in thought as ‘a rich totality of many [simpler] 
determinations and relations’, Marx alludes to the shape his future reconstruction of 
political economy would take (CW28: 37-38).  
The second point to make here is that, also after a careful investigation into the 
tendency of the development of political economy, he distinguishes ‘classical’ from 
‘vulgar’ versions of political economy. 105  This distinction is important, for the 
differing criticisms directed to each of them indicate the way and process of Marx’s 
actual engagement with political economy.106 According to him, the two alike were 
victims of obsession, for which they are to blame: while ‘classical’ political economy 
was obsessed with ‘the inner connection of bourgeois relations of production’, 
‘vulgar’ political economy was haunted by ‘the most obtrusive phenomena’ (CW35: 
92n. Translation modified). However, says Marx, while both reflected ‘bourgeois’ 
point of view in the end, the former could remain ‘scientific’ to a degree because the 
bourgeoisie was not yet at the centre of the class struggle while it had flourished 
before the 1830s (CW35: 14-15). The result is: the former could manage to produce 
some truthful knowledge about the very core of the capitalist economy with which it 
was concerned, failing however to establish the relationship between such core 
                                                
104	Of	course,	one	may	detect	a	Hegelian	influence	here;	see	§	5.2.2	for	details.		
105	It	 is	 in	‘Bastiat	and	Carey’	(CW28:	6)	that	Marx	first	expresses	this	distinction	clearly	(Cf.	
CW28:	 XIV).	 This	 unfinished	 piece	 was	 written	 around	 July	 1857,	 which	 is	 a	month	 or	 so	
before	he	wrote	the	‘1857	Introduction’.	
106	Regarding	the	first	point	made	above,	Marx	points	out	that	 ‘vulgar’	political	economists	
violates	 the	 ‘correct	 scientific	method’	 that	 their	 predecessors	 discovered,	 the	method	 of	
proceeding	from	the	simple/abstract	to	the	complex/concrete,	and	proceed	in	the	opposite	
direction.	 That	 is,	 they	 reduce	 the	 complex,	 what	 needs	 to	 be	 explained	 by	 the	 simpler	
determinations,	to	those	simples	themselves.	See	his	criticism	of	Bastiat	(‘vapid	arguments	
of	 the	degenerate	political	economy	of	 the	most	recent	times’,	 ‘infantile	abstraction,	etc.),	
CW28:	180-81.	
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relations and the various forms they take, but on the other hand the latter, faced with 
the inextricable contradictions between the core (whose knowledge was passed upon 
to them from the classical) and its appearances, strived their way to denying, rather 
than securing, the correct knowledge to come to terms with the phenomena.107 
In the end, whereas the insufficiently scientific propositions of the ‘classical’ that the 
substance of the value of a commodity is nothing but the human labour contained in 
it, and that the mass of this value is determined by the labour time required to produce 
it were to be accepted after serious scrutiny, the ‘vulgar’ which took for granted the 
deceptive forms of manifestation of the above propositions, but which dominated the 
academic scene when Marx took to his critique of political economy would be 
criticised with the help of those well-reflected concepts. Needless to say, the above 
reflection of the ‘classical’ achievements by Marx must have been their radicalisation; 
in that process, however, he was also enabled to ‘extract’, as Althusser (Althusser and 
Balibar 1970[1968]) would put it, what the ‘classical’ failed to discover while they 
were more or less unconsciously seeing them. Amongst others, Marx discovered the 
concepts of labour power to denote the specific and irrational form labour takes in the 
capitalist economy, and of surplus-value which was essential in Marx’s critique not 
only because it was the key concept in understanding ‘exploitation’ whose inclusion 
made Marx’s value theory outstanding vis-à-vis the others, but also because the 
political economists simply had been unconsciously taking its forms of appearance—
profit, interest and wages—for granted.108 This is how the contributions of political 
                                                
107	According	 to	Marx,	David	Ricardo,	 the	 last	 representative	of	classical	political	economy,	
acted	in	the	opposite	way;	he	denied	phenomena	for	his	principle:		
Ricardo	confuses	value	and	cost	price.	He	therefore	believes	that,	 if	 there	were	such	a	
thing	as	absolute	rent	 .	 .	 .	agricultural	produce,	etc.,	would	be	constantly	sold	for	more	
than	 its	 value,	 because	 at	 more	 than	 cost	 price	 (the	 advanced	 capital	 +	 the	 average	
profit).	That	would	demolish	 the	 fundamental	 law.	Hence	he	denies	absolute	 rent	and	
assumes	only	differential	rent	(CW41:	396).	
As	for	the	opposition	of	‘classical’	and	‘vulgar’	political	economy,	see	CW31:	389-99,	CW32:	
499-503,	CW35:	91-2,	and	CW37:	817.	
108	See	Engels’s	‘Preface’	to	the	Second	Volume	of	Capital	(CW36:	15-23).	In	a	letter	to	Engels	
of	 8	 January	 1868,	 Marx	 himself	 enumerates	 ‘three	 fundamentally	 new	 elements’	 of	 his	
theory:		
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economy to the understanding of the capitalist mode of production was at once 
appreciated and relativised by Marx. 
On the other hand, it follows from the second point made above that it was a common 
mistake both in the ‘classical’ and the ‘vulgar’ to base themselves upon the wrong 
assumption that there is an inevitable unity between the essence of the economic 
relations in capitalist society, and its appearance. For Marx, however, the disunity 
between their essence and appearance in the capitalist economy is the raison d’etre of 
political economy as a science: ‘all science would be superfluous if the outward 
appearance and the essence of things directly coincided’ (CW37: 804). 
Natural	 laws	 cannot	 be	 abolished	 at	 all.109	The	 only	 thing	 that	 can	 change,	 under	
historically	differing	conditions,	is	the	form	in	which	those	laws	assert	themselves.	.	.	
Where	 science	 comes	 in	 is	 to	 show	how	 the	 law	of	 value	asserts	 itself	 (CW43:	68.	
Underline	added).	
Therefore, it will constitute the main content of Marx’s value theory as a critique of 
political economy to establish the connection between the essence and the 
appearance, which, as informed by the first point made above, will follow the general 
order according to ‘the correct scientific method’. Observe here that, whilst the 
                                                                                                                                      
1.	that	 in	contrast	to	all	previous	political	economy,	which	from	the	outset	 treated	the	
particular	fragments	of	surplus	value	with	their	fixed	forms	of	rent,	profit	and	interest	as	
already	 given,	 I	 begin	 by	 dealing	 with	 the	 general	 form	 of	 surplus	 value,	 in	 which	 all	
these	elements	are	still	undifferentiated,	in	solution	as	it	were;		
2.	 that	 the	 economists,	 without	 exception,	 have	 missed	 the	 simple	 fact	 that,	 if	 the	
commodity	has	the	double	character	of	use	value	and	exchange	value,	then	the	labour	
represented	in	the	commodity	must	also	have	a	double	character;	thus	the	bare	analysis	
of	 labour	 sans	 phrase,	 as	 in	 Smith,	 Ricardo,	 etc.,	 is	 bound	 to	 come	 up	 against	 the	
inexplicable	everywhere.	This	is,	in	fact,	the	whole	secret	of	the	critical	conception;		
3.	 that	 for	 the	 first	 time	wages	 are	 shown	as	 the	 irrational	 outward	 form	of	 a	 hidden	
relationship,	and	this	 is	demonstrated	exactly	 in	both	forms	of	wages:	 time	wages	and	
price	 wages.	 (It	 was	 a	 help	 to	 me	 that	 similar	 formulae	 are	 often	 found	 in	 higher	
mathematics.)	(CW42:	514-15)	
109	Nature/natural	 is	 one	 of	 the	 most	 controversial	 terms	 in	 Marx.	 Here,	 ‘natural’	 means	
‘impersonal’,	and	the	‘natural	law’	refers	to	the	law	that	asserts	itself	regardless	of	the	wills	
of	 individuals	 in	 a	 society.	 But,	 in	 other	 places,	Marx	 also	 blames	 political	 economists	 for	
regarding	the	capitalist	order	as	‘natural’;	here	the	term	‘natural’	 is	opposed	to	‘historical’,	
and	the	‘natural	order’	implies	the	order	that	is	not	subject	to	historical	changes.		
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‘classical’ contributions belong to the simple and abstract area which makes up the 
starting point according to this method, the finishing point should be the most 
complex and concrete phenomena that, mystified, are however taken by the ‘vulgar’ 
as the starting point (CW37: Ch. 48). Thus concludes Marx his briefing to Engels of 
his main line of argument of his third volume: 
At	 last	 we	 have	 arrived	 at	 the	forms	 of	 manifestation	which	 serve	 as	 the	 starting	
point	 in	 the	 vulgar	 conception:	 rent,	 coming	 from	 the	 land;	 profit	 (interest),	 from	
capital;	wages,	from	labour	(CW43:	25).110	
‘The apparent movement is explained’ (Ibid.) now as the manifestation of the core 
relations. 
So, we now have both the starting and the finishing points, together with the method 
of procession from the one to the other. Nevertheless, it does not mean that we also 
know the actual route the critique would take; it cannot be determined in advance. On 
the contrary, the specific route and every step to be taken therein will again have to be 
mostly determined by the specific critical points Marx wants to make against existing 
political economy based upon his ‘judgement’. Besides, it goes without saying that 
the determination of these points are also subject to the contingencies in the historical 
development of political economy as well as the contemporary social and political 
situation in which Marx’s theory is put forward.111  
Whatever the actual route of procession might be, on the other hand, it is crucial to 
note the procession of presentation from the simple and abstract to the complex and 
                                                
110	Marx	continues:	‘The	entire	movement	in	this	apparent	form.	Finally,	since	those	3	items	
(wages,	 rent,	 profit	 (interest))	 constitute	 the	 sources	 of	 income	 of	 the	 3	 classes	 of	
landowners,	capitalists	and	wage	labourers,	we	have	the	class	struggle,	as	the	conclusion	in	
which	 the	 movement	 and	 disintegration	 of	 the	 whole	 shit	 resolves	 itself’	 (Ibid.).	 Again,	
observe	that	this	is	only	the	‘conclusion’	when	a	single	social	formation	is	assumed.	
111	For	instance,	Marx’s	emphasis	on	money	cannot	be	fully	understood	without	recognising	
his	 polemic	 against	 Proudhonist	 and	 left-Ricardian	 variants	 of	 socialism	 (‘polemical	 aims’,	
CW40:	 377),	 and	he	 says	he	didn’t	 include	 the	 initially	 proposed	 chapter	on	 capital	 in	 the	
Contribution	of	1859	for	political	grounds:		
You	will	see	that	the	first	section	does	not	comprise	the	principal	chapter,	 i.e.	the	3rd,	
on	capital.	I	thought	this	advisable	on	political	grounds,	for	it’s	in	III	that	the	battle	really	
begins	and	 it	 seemed	to	me	better	not	 to	 frighten	people	de	prime	abord	 [at	 the	very	
outset]	(CW40:	408).	
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concrete takes place successively, step by step. For the fallacies of the political 
economists are not confined to either the most abstract or the most superficial area, 
but prevails at every moment of their exposition of the capitalist economy, and thus at 
all the categories they use. Therefore, Marx’s critique will necessarily entail a whole 
of systematic explanation on its own; in other words, it is a constructive, as well as 
destructive, process: ‘an exposé of the system’.  
In conclusion, we can now summarise the main question around which Marx’s value 
theory is constituted: for what reason, and in what way is the false notion justified that 
material wealth is distributed amongst the social classes and their members according 
to the property each has, when the real process is such that those revenues are the 
outcome of the exploitation of labour by capital, and then distributed through such 
social processes that are peculiar to capitalism?112 This is also the question which 
overrides the three volumes of Capital in which Marx’s value theory is deployed in 
the most mature form. In answering this broad question step by step, Marx also shows 
political economy errs at every moment of its exposition of the workings of the 
capitalist economy and, therefore, stands at odds with, and systematically denies what 
the meagre (insufficiently) scientific achievements it has made. To name a few main 
fallacies, in the order they appear in the three volumes of Capital: the false notions 
that the productivity of combined labour appears what from the outset belongs to 
capital; that wages appear to be the reward for labour, not the price of the commodity 
peculiar to capitalism, labour power; that profits are generated from the methods of 
the operation of capital such as the turnover time, the number of turnover within a 
given period of time, the ratio between fixed and circulating capital, etc., not from the 
exploitation of the labourer; that the mass of profit is determined according to that of 
capital employed; that capital itself produces profit without any intermediary 
processes; and, lastly, that the revenues of the members of the social classes earned at 
the end of their economic activities originate from the economic properties they have! 
Last but not least, the limitation of the categories of political economy so far 
discussed is not simply a logical one; it really exists in the history of political 
economy as a science as Marx’s distinction of ‘classical’ and ‘vulgar’ political 
                                                
112	For	our	purpose,	 it	must	be	recognised	that	this	question	is	posed	under	the	one-nation	
assumption,	that	is,	within	a	single	capitalist	social	formation.	
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economy suggests. This makes it imperative to include the investigation of the 
discourse’s history itself in the critique of political economy (Cf. CW41: 488). Hence 
the fourth volume on the ‘History of Political Economy’! 
 
5.1.4. Concluding Remarks 
We have so far tried to establish a way of understanding Marx’s value theory, taking 
seriously on the fact that he presented it as a critique (of political economy). In 
retrospect, this very important fact has not attracted its due attention. Maybe, a group 
of researchers gathered under the label ‘Open Marxism’ probably remains the only 
current of Marxist political economy in the English-speaking world who have paid 
any serious attention to it. However, even these people do not seem to have been so 
interested in developing the exact meaning of critique in Marx; based upon a very 
casual understanding of it, i.e., as something negative as opposed to positive 
‘analysis’, they have been simply enthusiastic in criticising the existing theories in 
Marxist political economy for being too positive and analytical (Bonefeld 2001). This 
‘negative’ criticism often leads to a blind rejection to any theory that has any positive 
connotation, and is sometimes reduced to the level of subjective negative feeling 
against everything (‘scream’ as in Holloway 2002).  
Instead, we have tried in the discussion so far to show that Marx’s critique is 
something more than is often thought of. It is a positive as well as negative project, 
and both moments are inherent in Marx’s concept of critique. Further, as any critique 
is performed against a certain object, so Marx’s value theory as a critique of political 
economy necessarily reflects, in its process of formation, the inner logic and the 
historical development of its object in a way or other. 
 
5.2.	MARX	ON	METHOD	AND	DIALECTICS	
To extend Marx’s value theory properly, we tried in the previous section to identify 
and describe some basic rules and principles by which the existing theory is 
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constructed. Whilst discussion was there performed by means of developing the 
concept of critique, this might admittedly appear a rather peculiar approach. For, 
conventionally, those rules and principles have been discussed under the heading of 
‘method’ in Marxist tradition. One is often told that, to Marx, method refers to 
dialectics, and that his dialectical method is one of presentation. Consequently, a lot 
of effort has been invested in laying out the various manners in which the presentation 
in Capital proceeds dialectically; main issues include the selection of the starting and 
finishing points of presentation, the logic of transition from one category to another as 
well as their order of appearance, etc.  
This is why Hegelian-influenced Marxists have especially been productive in this 
area, for Hegel is indeed a real expert on dialectics. Although this tendency by no 
means constitutes any form of a ‘school’, we have recently witnessed a number of 
such works published, not only individually but collectively.113 Chris Arthur termed 
this tendency ‘the new dialectic’ or ‘systematic dialectic’ in his recent seminal work, 
briefing main differences between individual authors over some important issues 
(Arthur 2002: 1, 4-12). 
Against this background, we will begin by raising a very simple question: what did 
dialectics or dialectical method actually mean to Marx? To answer this, firstly, we 
will chronicle Marx’s varying attitude towards dialectics briefly; from negation to 
affirmation, so to speak. Then we will proceed to describe what was the real problem 
Marx faced concerning (dialectical) presentation. However, this discussion will not 
amount to, nor be designed as, a clear repudiation of the above, Hegelian-biased 
approach. Instead, most effort will be devoted to showing that the Hegelian-
influenced interpreters, while being too concerned with discovering the consistent 
logic of presentation, tend to miss some very basic and important points. 
 
                                                
113	Notable	collections	 include	Moseley	(1993),	Moseley	and	Campbell	 (1997)	and	Albritton	
and	Simoulidis	(2003)	even	though	all	the	participating	authors	do	not	necessarily	belong	to	
the	tendency.	
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5.2.1. Marx on Dialectics: A Brief Chronology 
Marx’s attitude to dialectics was not fixed through his life at all. Basically, from as 
early as the 1844 Manuscripts he appeared to regard dialectics as the core element of 
Hegelian philosophy, recognising both its significance and limitation, but sometimes 
ambiguously. At the same time, his attitude to dialectics delicately varied according to 
the character of his opponents at hand as his attitude to political economy does 
(Chapter 3). Firstly in the Holy Family or the German Ideology where he was dealing 
with his former colleagues, the Young Hegelians who were largely experts on 
German philosophy, Hegelian dialectics, ‘the mother of Young Hegelianism’ (CW3: 
328), would be denounced for producing distorted reflections of reality, and being 
reduced to their logical play-thing. On the other hand, however, when criticising 
Joseph Proudhon, who had produced ‘an absurd philosophy’ (CW38: 95), Marx 
pointed out the limitation of dialectics as before but, at the same time, insisted that it 
was he who was really suitable for realising the ambitious project Proudhon dared to 
carry out, i.e., the integration of political economy and dialectics since he himself was 
‘both German and economist at the same time’ (Foreword to the Poverty of 
Philosophy, CW6: 109).114  
It was in a letter to Engels dated 16 January 1858, when he was in the midst of filling 
the notebooks later to be known as the Grundrisse, that his ambiguous but largely 
negative attitude towards dialectics showed an abrupt turn:  
I	 am,	 by	 the	 way,	 discovering	 some	 nice	 arguments.	 E.g.	 I	 have	 completely	
demolished	the	theory	of	profit	as	hitherto	propounded.	What	was	of	great	use	to	
me	as	regards	method	of	treatment	was	Hegel’s	Logic	at	which	I	had	taken	another	
look	by	mere	accident	.	.	.	If	ever	the	time	comes	when	such	work	is	again	possible,	I	
should	 very	 much	 like	 to	 write	 2	 or	 3	 sheets	 making	 accessible	 to	 the	 common	
reader	the	rational	aspect	of	the	method	which	Hegel	not	only	discovered	but	also	
mystified.	(CW40:	249)	
                                                
114	See	 also	 a	 letter	 to	 Engels	 of	 24	November	 1851:	 ‘And	 you	 should	 see	 how	 the	 fellow	
[Proudhon]	 flaunts	 his	 dialectique	 hégelienne’	 (CW38:	 492).	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	
expression	 ‘German’	 is	obviously	a	mere	rhetoric	seeing	that	Marx	also	criticises	his	 fellow	
German,	Ferdinand	Lassalle,	who	had	a	 similar	ambition	as	Proudhon,	 for	his	 ignorance	of	
Hegelian	philosophy.	
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After a while, Marx sent another letter to Engels containing a fairly detailed outline, 
based on the above realisation, of the economic work he had been planning (CW40: 
301-03).115 In this outline, abstraction—the method of excluding secondary influences 
in dealing with a specific object at a certain stage of presentation—and dialectical 
transition—between categories—Marx learned from Hegel were positively employed. 
This was a tremendous change, considering that Marx had so far reproached such 
elements of Hegelian philosophy for reflecting reality falsely, and replacing the real 
social relations between real subjects with empty relations of concepts. Upon 
receiving it, Engels must have been very surprised and embarrassed at this letter 
which was full of Hegelian expressions: 
The	study	of	your	abstract	of	the	first	half-instalment	has	greatly	exercised	me;	it	is	a	
very	abstract	abstract	indeed—inevitably	so,	in	view	of	its	brevity—and	I	often	had	
to	 search	 hard	 for	 the	 dialectical	 transitions,	 particularly	 since	all	 abstract	
reasoning	is	 now	 completely	 foreign	 to	me.	 The	 arrangement	 of	 the	whole	 into	 6	
books	 could	 hardly	 be	 better	 and	 seems	 to	 me	 an	 excellent	 idea,	 although	 the	
dialectical	 transition	 from	 landed	property	 to	wage	 labour	 is	not	yet	quite	clear	 to	
me.	 The	 development	 of	 the	 monetary	 business,	 too,	 is	 really	 excellent,	 though	
again	there	are	individual	bits	I	can’t	quite	make	out,	at	least	until	I	have	looked	up	
the	 historical	 background.	 However,	 I	 think	 that	 I	 shall	 get	 a	 better	 idea	 of	
the	drift	when	I've	had	the	last	part	of	capital	in	general,	and	shall	then	write	to	you	
at	 greater	 length	 about	 it.	 The	 abstract,	 dialectical	 tone	 of	 your	 synopsis	 will,	 of	
course,	disappear	in	the	development.	(CW40:	304)	
As Marx took Engels’s concern seriously of course, so Engels tried to get closer to the 
new understanding his best friend acquired of their old common antagonist. Probably 
the decisive moment was Marx’s visit for 2-3 weeks to Engel in Manchester from 6 
May 1858; one month after the latter had received the above letter. There must have 
been an extensive debate over Marx’s new understanding of dialectics, together with 
sort of a consensus to a degree; by July of the same year, Engels’s attitude towards 
dialectics had become quite positive, and he did show an extraordinary interest in 
Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature suddenly (CW40: 326).116 
                                                
115	It	was	dated	2	April	1858	and,	before	that,	Marx	sent	two	more	letters	with	similar	plans	
to	Ferdinand	Lassalle	(CW	40:	269-71,	287).		
116	Interestingly,	 Engels	 speaks	 of	 the	 cell	 in	 this	 letter,	 and	 it	 seems	 to	 envision	 Marx’s	
expression	‘economic	cell	form’	(CW35:	8).	
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The impressive change in the attitude of Marx and Engels to dialectics might be best 
represented in the two-piece unfinished review of Marx’s A Contribution to the 
Critique of Political Economy (1859). Although the review came out under Engels’s 
authorship, there is every reason to believe it was—virtually—jointly prepared by the 
two. When the Contribution was published in June, Marx appeared extremely nervous 
obviously because it was his first serious economic publication after a decade of hard 
working in London. Even if he did not expect it to be a huge success, he did hate his 
elaborate product to be misunderstood:  
Biskamp	wanted	 to	write	a	 short	 review	of	my	Critique	of	Political	Economy,	 etc.	 I	
dissuaded	him,	for	he	knows	nothing	about	the	subject.	But	since	he	has	undertaken	
(in	the	Volk)	to	say	something	about	it,	I	should	like	you	to	do	it	for	him	.	.	.	(CW40:	
471).	
This is the underlying reason he asked, repeatedly, Engels to write a review ‘[b]riefly 
on the method and what is new in the content’ (CW40: 471. See also CW40: 473). 
With hesitation due to lack of confidence, Engels did send a first instalment to Marx, 
which was immediately published in Das Volk, the London-based German periodical. 
However, there is no known evidence that Engels sent the second one which was 
more important, and largely about the ‘method’ as Marx had requested. This does 
encourage a suspicion that it might be Marx who wrote it. Even if this is not the case, 
and it was actually drafted by Engels, we can still argue that Marx made amendments 
to it extensively, not least considering his hysterical concern about the above-
mentioned ‘misunderstanding’,117 and his role of ‘virtual editorship’ of the periodical 
(Lattek 2006: 176). Therefore, we can say quite confidently that the views expressed 
in it were largely shared by Engels and Marx although it remains uncertain at what 
stage, and to what degree Marx was actually engaged in the making of this review.118  
Marx	was	and	is	the	only	one	who	could	undertake	the	work	of	extracting	from	the	
Hegelian	 logic	 the	 nucleus	 containing	 Hegel’s	 real	 discoveries	 in	 this	 field,	 and	 of	
                                                                                                                                      
Everything	 consists	 of	 cells.	 The	 cell	 is	 Hegelian	 ‘being	 in	 itself’	 and	 its	 development	
follows	the	Hegelian	process	step	by	step	right	up	to	the	final	emergence	of	the	‘idea’	.	.	
.	(CW40:	326.	See	also	CW41:	545-56.)	
117	Engels	was	very	well	aware	of	it:	‘if	you	don’t	like	it	in	toto,	tear	up	and	let	me	have	your	
opinion.	.	.	If	you	can	knock	it	into	shape,	do	so’	(CW40:	478).	
118	Arthur	(1996b)	makes	an	opposite	judgment.		
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establishing	the	dialectical	method,	divested	of	 its	 idealist	wrappings,	 in	the	simple	
form	 in	 which	 it	 becomes	 the	 only	 correct	 mode	 of	 conceptual	 evolution.	 The	
working	out	of	the	method	which	underlies	Marx’s	critique	of	political	economy	is,	
we	think,	a	result	hardly	less	significant	than	the	basic	materialist	conception	(CW16:	
474-75).	
But Marx’s dialectics in the Contribution turned out incomplete, and he continued to 
fight his way to forging it afterwards. And it was as late as 1873 that he could at last 
utter ‘my dialectic method’ avowedly, as opposed to Hegel’s (see below). 
 
5.2.2. Thinking and Presentation: Marx’s Real Problem Regarding His Dialectical 
Method 
Marx’s dialectical method is generally regarded as one of presentation, but this is not 
accurate. It is useful here to distinguish thinking and presentation; then it becomes 
obvious that dialectics, or dialectical method is more than anything else for thinking. 
This understanding persists in Marx from the outset in spite of his varying attitude 
towards dialectics.  
However, this does not mean that dialectics has nothing to do with presentation. It 
was Marx who, nearing the completion of Capital, said ‘my writings . . . are an 
artistic whole’ (CW42: 173), and boasted of its dialectical structure as a unique 
achievement only the Germans could make: ‘the composition, the structure, is a 
triumph of German scholarship’ (CW42: 232). Marx was very meticulous in 
enhancing the degree of perfection of his ‘dialectical presentation’, as much as to say 
to Engels who, after examining the proof sheets of Capital, had raised the necessity of 
preparing for possible objections: ‘if I wished to refute all such objections in advance, 
I should spoil the whole dialectical method of exposition’ (CW42: 390). 
Further, there is a unanimous consensus on the fact that Marx even followed Hegel’s 
way from time to time to improve the aesthetics of presentation (cf. Mattick 1993). 
However, this must not be exaggerated. For, apart from the fact that he expressly 
states that he ‘coquetted with the modes of expression peculiar to him’ (CW35: 19), it 
might not be difficult to detect Hegelian traces, especially for those who are 
passionate to do so, from the writings of Marx who from his intellectual adolescence 
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inhabited in the strong authority of Hegel and Hegelianism. Therefore, it should not 
be totally absurd in principle to compare, or even identify Marx’s presentation in 
Capital with Hegel’s in Logic, as many do to varying degrees. This is all the more so, 
for Hegel’s Logic is concerned with the general structure and process of logical 
thinking per se. 
However, the problem that really plagued Marx regarding presentation was 
somewhere else. It originated from two facts; one was that Marx regarded dialectics 
primarily as a way of thinking, and the other that he forged his own dialectics in 
contradistinction to Hegel’s. In other words, the problem was: how could Marx realise 
the essential superiority of his distinct dialectical thinking vis-à-vis Hegel’s at once at 
the level of presentation, and effectively show it to the readers of his work? By 
nature, this problem could only be solved by means of making the difference against 
Hegel’s method of presentation manifest, not mimicking it. This problem was never 
to be settled with ease, however, given the development of the matter from around 
1858 when it began to be taken seriously by Marx to the present. 
First of all, let us make sure in what sense Marx thought his dialectics—as a way of 
thinking, of course—was different from Hegel’s. To do this, it would be worth 
reminding the famous passage from the ‘1857 Introduction’ to the Grundrisse: 
(1)	 If	 one	were	 to	 start	 with	 population,	 it	 would	 be	 a	 chaotic	 conception	 of	 the	
whole,	 and	 through	 closer	 definition	 one	 would	 arrive	 analytically	 at	 increasingly	
simple	concepts;	 from	the	 imagined	concrete,	one	would	move	to	more	and	more	
tenuous	 abstractions	 until	 one	 arrived	 at	 the	 simplest	 determinations.	 (2)	 From	
there	it	would	be	necessary	to	make	a	return	journey	until	one	finally	arrived	once	
more	at	population,	which	this	time	would	be	not	a	chaotic	conception	of	a	whole,	
but	a	rich	totality	of	many	determinations	and	relations	(CW28:	37.	My	numbering).	
Here, Marx identifies two distinct ‘courses’ of research of opposite directions to each 
other. According to him, the first concerns ‘begin[ning] with the living whole . . . 
[and] conclud[ing] by discovering through analysis a small number of determinant, 
abstract, general relations’, and in the second ‘the abstract determinations lead 
towards a reproduction of the concrete by way of thought’. While, as pointed out 
earlier (§ 5.1.3), Marx finds these two appearing chronologically in the history of 
political economy from the seventeenth century onwards, and praises the latter as 
‘obviously the correct scientific method’, he at the same time authorises both of them 
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as valid, as two essential stages to pass through to arrive at scientific cognition of the 
object.  
What is interesting here is that Hegel also makes similar identification of two ways of 
cognition, calling them ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’, respectively, in the last part of his 
Science of Logic (Hegel 1969[1816]: 783-818). Actually, as Jindřich Zelený affirms, 
they have long been recognised as two distinct methods of getting to scientific 
knowledge in the West European intellectual tradition since the times of Aristotle, and 
such German philosophers as Kant, Fichte, and Hegel were those who developed their 
relationship to each other in the most sophisticated manner (Zelený 1980[1962]: Ch. 
10; Ilyenkov 2008[1960]: 164-65). In this sense, Marx should not be credited for 
making such a distinction between the ‘analytic’ and the ‘synthetic’.119 Where Marx 
really distances himself from his predecessors comes at the next step: whereas the 
second course, the synthetic method for thinking, is ‘simply the way in which 
thinking assimilates the concrete and reproduces it as a mental concrete’, Hegel 
according to Marx went too far as to having ‘arrived at the illusion that the real was 
the result of thinking synthesising itself within itself, delving ever deeper into itself 
and moving by its inner motivation’ (CW28: 38). Thus argues Marx:  
My	dialectic	method	is	not	only	different	from	the	Hegelian,	but	is	its	direct	opposite.	
To	Hegel,	 the	 life	process	of	 the	human	brain,	 i.e.,	 the	process	of	 thinking,	which,	
under	 the	name	of	“the	 Idea”,	he	even	 transforms	 into	an	 independent	 subject,	 is	
the	demiurgos	of	the	real	world,	and	the	real	world	is	only	the	external,	phenomenal	
form	 of	 “the	 Idea”.	With	 me,	 on	 the	 contrary,	 the	 ideal	 is	 nothing	 else	 than	 the	
material	world	reflected	by	the	human	mind,	and	translated	 into	forms	of	 thought	
(CW35:	19).	
Insofar as the essential difference is located in the domain of thinking, it cannot but be 
expressed in such a form of an aphorism as this:  
                                                
119	However,	things	appear	quite	different	if	Marx	is	compared	with	the	political	economists,	
whether	 ‘classical’	 or	 ‘vulgar’	 (See	§	 3.2).	 Partly	 because	 of	 the	 failure	 of	 establishing	 the	
relationship	 between	 analysis	 and	 synthesis	 properly,	 in	 bourgeois	 political	 economy,	
‘[s]ynthesis,	 a	 comprehension	 of	 the	 necessary	 connection	 between	 the	 abstractly	
considered	 constituent	 elements	 of	 the	 object	 (labour,	 capital,	 profit,	 etc.),	 proved	 to	 be	
impossible	exactly	because	analysis	that	singled	out	these	categories	was	one-sided	analysis’;	
in	short,	‘[a]nalysis	made	synthesis	impossible’	(Ilyenkov	2008[1960]:	227).	
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[I]t	 is	 always	 necessary	 to	 remember	 that	 the	 subject,	 in	 this	 context	 modern	
bourgeois	 society,	 is	given,	both	 in	 reality	and	 in	 the	mind,	and	 that	 therefore	 the	
categories	 express	 forms	 of	 being,	 determinations	 of	 existence—and	 sometimes	
only	individual	aspects—of	this	particular	society,	of	this	subject	.	.	.	(CW28:	43.	My	
italics).	
In the end, such a cryptic expression Marx (and Engels) liked to use as that ‘[Hegelian 
dialectics] is standing on its head’ (CW35: 19)120 has to be understood as pointing out 
the above conversion of subject and object in Hegel, not only in ‘presentation’ but, 
more fundamentally, in ‘thinking’. Then, how can the researcher express in 
presentation the fact that she/he is ‘remembering’ the above point? This is the real 
problem posed to Marx as to presentation.  
The first economic work Marx wrote based upon his new understanding of Hegel, 
struggling with the problem, was the Contribution of 1859. How then to spell out the 
decisive difference of his own way of thinking from Hegel’s? One may detect the 
modification of the order of presentation so that it began not with value but 
commodity, which had not appeared at all in the original plan.121 In other words, 
rather than beginning the presentation with the invisible concept of value which 
concerned the very core process of the capitalist economy, Marx chose to deploy to 
the fore what was the simplest and most concrete, the commodity, and made it speak 
for itself about value.122 Consequently, value could be posed as really existent in the 
exchange relations, not a mere concept that can claim its reality only in thought. 
                                                
120	Fuller	quotation:	‘With	him	[Hegel]	it	[dialectics]	is	standing	on	its	head.	It	must	be	turned	
right	 side	 up	 again’.	 Interestingly,	 Chris	 Arthur	 insists	 that	 the	 expression	 originates	 from	
Engels’s	 review	 of	 Marx’s	 Contribution	 of	 1859:	 ‘[Hegel’s	 mode	 of	 thinking]	 stood	 it	 [the	
actual	relation]	on	its	head’	(CW16:	474).	What	he	is	doing	in	saying	so	is	to	argue	that	‘the	
tradition	 that	 Marx’s	 work	 should	 be	 approached	 through	 a	 study	 of	 Hegel	 was	 first	
established	 in	 Engels’s	 review’	 (Arthur	 1996:	 181).	 However,	 aside	 from	 our	 suspicion	
concerning	the	real	authorship	of	the	review,	Marx	did	actually	employ	the	expression	well	
before	Engels	used	it,	as	early	as	in	the	Poverty	of	Philosophy	of	1847:	‘Impersonal	reason	...	
is	[in	Hegelianism]	forced	to	turn	head	over	heels’	(CW06:	162-63).		
121	See	Marx’s	 letters	 to	Engels	of	29	November	1858	and	13-15	 January	1859	 (CW40:	358	
and	368).	
122	In	this	sense,	 it	 is	not	accurate	to	say	that	the	original	order	‘value-money-capital’	Marx	
devised	 in	 the	 Grundrisse	 was	 replaced	 by	 the	 new	 one	 ‘commodity-money-capital’;	
commodity	here	plays	 the	 role	of	 introducing	value,	not	 substituting	 it:	 ‘when	considering	
value	as	such,	nothing	further	is	required’	than	the	commodity	(CW31:	393).	
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However, probably the most striking feature of the Contribution in terms of the mode 
of presentation would be that historical examples are amply associated with individual 
theoretical points, together with the independent sections for the history of the 
discussion of them. Engels (and Marx) tried to justify this method of presentation in 
his review as follows: 
We	see	that	with	this	method,	 logical	development	need	by	no	means	be	confined	
to	the	purely	abstract	sphere.	On	the	contrary,	it	requires	historical	illustration	and	
continuous	 contact	 with	 reality.	 A	 great	 variety	 of	 such	 evidence	 is	 therefore	
included,	 comprising	 references	 both	 to	 the	 actual	 course	 of	 history	 at	 various	
stages	 of	 social	 development	 and	 to	 the	 literature	 on	 economics,	 in	 which	 the	
working	out	of	 lucid	definitions	of	economic	relations	 is	 traced	from	the	beginning	
(CW16:	477).	
In spite of such efforts made, nonetheless, the Contribution was to be reduced to the 
object of criticism for its Hegelian appearance not only from others but from Marx 
and Engels themselves until the publication of the former’s Das Kapital in 1867; this 
must be partly why he wrote this book which had originally been planned as a sequel 
to the Contribution so that the former included the latter completely (CW41: 94, 333, 
437, 488; CW42: 329, 384-85).  
That is, it seemed to prove much more difficult than Marx had initially thought in 
writing the Contribution to articulate at the level of presentation the distinct features 
of his ‘rational dialectics’. This difficulty must have been felt by Marx most seriously 
when, after the publication of his magnum opus after long gestation in September 
1867, criticisms were heard that its presentation was also idealistic. It might not be 
sufficient to complain about the reviewers’ lack of understanding, saying ‘the method 
employed in Das Kapital has been little understood’ (CW35: 17). Indeed, it was 
probably the most important purpose Marx had in mind when he wrote the 
‘Afterword’ to the Second Edition of Capital in 1873 to deal with such accusations as 
directed to his ‘method’. The same was true of some major modifications he made in 
the body of the book, and especially the section on the value form was ‘completely 
revised’ (CW35: 12).123  
                                                
123	Examining	the	proof	sheets	of	the	First	Edition	upon	Marx’s	request,	Engels	advised	him	
to	make	the	book	more	readable	if	at	the	expense	of	the	dialectics	of	presentation,	and	to	
insert	 more	 historical	 evidence.	 Especially	 regarding	 the	 section	 on	 the	 value	 form,	 he	
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Marx’s distinction between the methods of ‘inquiry’ and ‘presentation’ in the ‘1873 
Afterword’ can be understood in the same context although it does not appear so 
effective.  
Of	course	the	method	of	presentation	must	differ	in	form	from	that	of	inquiry.	The	
latter	 has	 to	 appropriate	 the	 material	 in	 detail,	 to	 analyse	 its	 different	 forms	 of	
development,	to	trace	out	their	inner	connection.	Only	after	this	work	is	done,	can	
the	actual	movement	be	adequately	described.	If	this	is	done	successfully,	if	the	life	
of	the	subject-matter	is	ideally	reflected	as	in	a	mirror,	then	 it	may	appear	as	if	we	
had	before	us	a	mere	a	priori	construction	(CW35:	19.	My	italics).		
While this is sort of Marx’s own explanation why his Capital might appear to some 
people to be ‘ideal’,124 admittedly it is not a good one; here he is simply describing 
the problem he has been suffering from in relation to presentation, rather than 
providing an explanation of the confusion the readers might have. Again, the problem 
is: given that even the materialistically worked-out research might appear ideal when 
presented, how can the researcher make it appear as it is, distinct from the genuinely 
idealistically worked-out one? 
In spite of Marx’s endeavour, misunderstanding still abounded after the publication of 
the second German edition in 1873. Probably the last lengthy response of Marx was 
the marginal notes towards Adolph Wagner who, (mis-)understanding Marx’s value 
theory in ‘the traditional German professorial confusion’ (CW24: 534), criticised it 
for not being ideal enough(!):  
It	 is	 from	the	value-concept	 that	use-value	and	exchange-value	are	supposed	to	be	
derived	d’abord	[first	of	all]	by	Mr.	Wagner,	not	as	with	me	from	a	concretum,	the	
commodity	.	.	.	(CW24:	537-38).	
All	 this	 is	 “drivel”.	 .	 .	 I	 do	 not	 proceed	 from	 “concepts”,	 hence	 neither	 from	 the	
“concept	of	value”	.	.	.	What	I	proceed	from	is	the	simplest	social	form	in	which	the	
                                                                                                                                      
suggested	it	should	be	extensively	rewritten	although	Marx	in	the	end	followed	Kugelmann’s	
advice	to	keep	the	dialectical	expression	in	the	body	and,	instead,	to	attach	an	appendix.	In	
the	 Second	 Edition,	 however,	 Engels’s	 advice	 is	 now	 more	 valued,	 partly	 because	 of	 the	
criticisms	of	the	abstractness	of	expression	(CW42:	382-83;	CW35:	12).	
124	‘The	 European	 Messenger	 of	 St.	 Petersburg	 .	 .	 .	 finds	 my	 method	 of	 inquiry	 severely	
realistic,	 but	 my	 method	 of	 presentation,	 unfortunately,	 German-dialectical	 [i.e.,	 ideal]’	
(CW35:	17).		
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product	 of	 labour	 presents	 itself	 in	 contemporary	 society,	 and	 this	 is	 the	
“commodity”.	This	I	analyse,	initially	in	the	form	in	which	it	appears	(544).	
As is now manifest, the decisive difference for Marx between his rational/materialist 
dialectics and Hegel’s mystified one lies in whether the relations and movement of 
real objects, when translated into those of concepts, still remain as the subject or are 
degenerated into the product of the concepts. How can one effectively externalise 
such difference in thinking that is very crucial but hard to appear, but that has no other 
way to appear than by way of presentation in the end? This consists of Marx’s central 
problem concerning presentation and, to see how he tried to approach this problem, in 
the next subsection, we will examine the peculiar ways that the real and the historical 
is treated in Capital (Volume One) where Marx’s value theory is presented in the 
most mature form. 
 
5.2.3. Dialectics and History/Reality125 
The most prominent way in which the critical feature as above appears in Marx’s 
value theory would be through the economic categories so devised as to carry the 
historicity and reality of those relations they reflect for themselves. However, as long 
as the root of the problem is located in the conceptualisation of the categories in 
general, it will not be confined to their historicity/reality, but necessarily summon the 
more abstract issues raised in § 5.1 such as those concerning the completeness of 
conceptualisation, the inner connectivity between categories, etc. Such a problem of 
conceptualisation in general, then, will amount to the mental process of ‘abstraction’ 
and, as well-known, Marx forged his own way of abstraction by criticising those 
taken by others including Smith and Ricardo as shallow, idle, simple, infantile, trivial, 
arbitrary, simple formal, incomplete or wrong, forcible, forced/false, and violent 
(CW28: 13, 34, 80, 181; CW29: 476; CW30: 151, 395; CW31: 338, 487; CW32: 72; 
CW35: 311; CW37: 838). Generalising this criticism, and building upon the 
discussions led by his predecessors like Lenin (1976), Ilyenkov (2008[n.a.]; 
                                                
125	A	few	general	methods	to	highlight	the	above	difference	have	already	been	pointed	out;	
for	instance,	the	opening	up	of	presentation	with	the	commodity	which	is	a	physical	object	
in	reality,	instead	of	value	which	is	an	abstract	concept,	etc.	
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2008[1960]) and Zelený (1980[1962]), Alfredo Saad-Filho delivers a robust argument 
for Marx’s ‘real abstraction’ against ‘mental generalisation’ which is pervasive over 
social sciences (Saad-Filho 2002: 8-15). 
To turn back to the issue of the historicity/reality of categories, it simply indicates the 
very basic limitation that any research about modern society, as well as the researcher, 
is inevitably predicated within a historical social form, and reminds the above-
mentioned aphorism that the researcher has to remember that society as subject is 
always there outside the procession of thinking: ‘Thus when we speak of production, 
we always have in mind production at a definite stage of social development’ (CW28: 
23). For example, while arguing the value of a commodity is determined by the 
socially necessary labour time (SNLT) contained in it, succeeding the insights of 
Adam Smith and David Ricardo, Marx never forgets that such determination obtains 
validity only under a specific set of historical/real conditions; otherwise, it will be 
reduced to a mere abstraction. Indeed, even the idea ‘average’ as is presupposed in the 
determination of value by the SNLT is a modern product. To be a real force, it at least 
requires the population of the group upon which it is calculated to be of or over a 
certain size. For instance, we can talk about the average height of the human being on 
this planet. But what if there are only two people, Adam and Eve, on earth? It would 
be simply meaningless even to try to calculate the average height. By the same token, 
the appearance of large-scale production on a regular and persistent basis is an 
essential historical presupposition for the real establishment of the concept ‘value’.126 
Based upon this clear understanding Marx could avoid the kind of ‘delusion’ 
frequently observed to possess 18th century social thinkers (CW28: 17-18; CW29: 
464-66), including Adam Smith who, having developed the concept of value as 
labour-time based upon his study of modern society, tried to reconstruct the whole 
human history around this concept, from its full and pure fulfilment to gradual 
adulteration: ‘In his analysis of exchange value, Adam Smith still makes the mistake 
of accepting the undeveloped form of exchange value in which it still appears merely 
as a surplus over and above the use value turned out by the producer for his own 
                                                
126	Therefore,	 it	 is	not	surprising	the	modern	concept	of	average,	 introduced	 in	the	English	
language	 as	 last	 as	 the	 late-15th	 century,	 was	 first	 developed	 in	 the	 marine	 insurance	
industry	where	quite	a	lot	of	data	were	aggregated	and	processed	regularly	and	persistently.	
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subsistence, as its adequate form, whereas it is only a form of its historical 
manifestation within a system of production which it has not yet caught hold of as a 
universal form’ (CW29: 466).127 
In a sense, this is simply commonsensical—though very easy to forget—and, as 
Zelený aptly points out right after a close examination of corresponding pieces of 
Marx’s and Ricardo’s texts, there is not much to be called Marx’s ‘distinctive’ insight 
here (Zelený 1980[1962]: 17). Rather, it was simply that Marx unlike other political 
economists tried to pose and answer a set of questions that would bring effectively to 
light the historical/real limitedness of the objects at hand:  
The	main	point	of	the	Marxian	argument	is	the	answer	to	another	question,	namely:	
under	 what	 social	 conditions	 does	 labour	 turn	 into	 value,	 the	 sort	 of	 labour	 that	
creates	exchange-value?	How	 is	 the	money-form	of	value	 to	be	explained?	How	 is	
the	 principle,	 according	 to	 which	 labour	 is	 the	 substance	 of	 exchange-value,	
modified	by	the	development	of	capital?	(Zelený	1980[1962]:	17)	
Political	 economy	 has	 indeed	 analysed,	 however	 incompletely,	 value	 and	 its	
magnitude,	 and	 has	 discovered	 what	 lies	 beneath	 these	 forms.	 But	 it	 has	 never	
asked	the	question	why	labour	is	represented	by	the	value	of	its	product	and	labour	
time	by	the	magnitude	of	that	value	(CW35:	91).	
On the other hand, the reality of abstraction and the historicity of categories will also 
rely on various supplementary instruments without which they cannot be fully 
guaranteed. More than anything else, Marx differentiates his presentation by calling to 
mind those points repeatedly and explicitly; by inserting in it a tremendous number of 
historical illustrations. In this sense, they are not merely employed to facilitate the 
reader’s understanding of difficult concepts as is generally the case, but act as the 
mediator through which logical concepts keep in constant contact with reality within 
presentation. Through the illustrations they can exist as ‘living’ concepts in the given 
theoretical system and, at the same time, it appears obvious that it is reality which 
gives life to them. 
                                                
127	‘The	economic	 concept	of	 value	does	not	occur	among	 the	ancients.	 .	 .	 The	 concept	of	
value	 wholly	 belongs	 to	 the	 latest	 political	 economy’	 (CW29:	 159-60).	 See,	 for	 a	 full	
exposition	of	Smith’s	 ‘history’,	Skinner	(1976:	30-42).	On	the	other	hand,	Marx	gives	credit	
to	Sir	James	Steuart	for	recognising	the	historical	character	of	the	bourgeois	economic	forms	
(CW28:	18;	CW33:	320).		
 
 
136 
However, the converse is not always true; all the historical expositions in Capital are 
not taken as complements to neutralise the speculativeness of presentation. As Marx 
emphasised, ‘the dialectical form of presentation is right only when it knows its own 
limits’ (CW29: 505), and at those very limits—which Marx also called ‘outside the 
economic form-determination’ (CW28: 174)—are of necessity historical expositions 
summoned.128 What requires special attention here is that one of such limits exists in 
the passage from one category to another. That is why Marx adds the following note, 
right after dealing with a series of ‘transitions’: 
It	will	later	be	necessary,	before	leaving	this	question,	to	correct	the	idealist	manner	
of	 presentation	 which	 makes	 it	 appear	 as	 if	 it	 were	 merely	 a	 matter	 of	 the	
definitions	of	concepts	and	the	dialectic	of	these	concepts.	Above	all	the	phrase:	the	
product	 (or	 activity)	 becomes	 a	 commodity;	 the	 commodity	 becomes	 exchange	
value;	the	exchange	value	becomes	money.	(CW28:	89)	
In spite of Marx’s fairly clear comment as above, the interpretation of ‘categorial 
transition’ has been one of the most controversial issues in the debate on Marx’s 
‘method’. Those in the tradition of Hegelian interpretation would regard it as purely 
logical; Chris Arthur has recently termed the dialectical logic held by those within 
such a tendency ‘systematic dialectic’, as opposed to ‘historical dialectic’ which 
according to him has been dominant in Marxist political economy for decades in the 
20th century (Arthur 2002: Ch. 1). Arguing that Marx in Capital aimed at 
reconstructing the inner structure of capital systematically by, driven by its inner 
logic, moving from one category to another, Arthur severely criticises ‘historical 
dialectic’ for generalising the idea that such logical transition of categories in 
presentation corresponds to the step-by-step development of real history. One of 
Marx’s most important remarks that have prompted and justified the interpretation 
held by Arthur and his colleagues would be the famous sentences from the 
‘Introduction’ of 1857:  
It	would	 therefore	 be	 inexpedient	 and	wrong	 to	 present	 the	 economic	 categories	
successively	in	the	order	in	which	they	played	the	determining	role	in	history.	Their	
                                                
128	‘The	 theoretical	 exposition	 of	 a	 self-developing	 whole	 by	 the	 materialist,	 dialectical	
derivation	 must	 necessarily	 touch	 on	 factual	 historical	 reality	 as	 a	 set	 of	 established,	
dialectically	 non-derivative	 presuppositions	 from	 which	 materialist,	 dialectical	 derivation	
proceeds’	(Zelený	1980[1962]:	58).	
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order	 of	 succession	 is	 determined	 rather	 by	 their	 mutual	 relation	 in	 modern	
bourgeois	society	.	.	.	(CW28:	44.	Also	quoted	in	Arthur	2002:	4;	Smith	1990:	21).	
Admittedly, the above is also significant in the overall context of this thesis which 
tries to understand the development of Marx’s problématique in political economy 
with the idea ‘methodological sophistication’ (§ 3.2); for this sophistication refers to 
the dramatic transition from a historical to a logical/structural problématique 
concerning modern society. Despite, we have argued so far that the historical 
problématique is not completely superseded, but remains in the new framework 
playing specific roles. Now it is time to make it clearer.  
First of all, as Arthur rightly points out, and as we have argued so far, there is little 
doubt over the fact that Marx was primarily interested in laying bare the inner 
structure of capital as an organic totality, and must have thought that such a structure 
followed a logical, rather than historical, ‘order’. This is most lucidly expressed in 
some early versions of his notorious ‘Plan’ when, for example, Hegelian ‘substance-
quantity-form’ (CW28: 194-95), and ‘generality-particularity-singularity’ (CW28: 
205-06) were applied without sufficient explanation.  
However, it soon turns out to be impossible to proceed entirely relying upon the 
‘inner logic’ of capital.129 It is, on the one hand, because of the emptiness that ‘the 
dialectical form of presentation’ would inevitably beget, but also because what Marx 
seeks for will eventually prove something more than a mere conceptual reconstruction 
of a given totality; if it had been the only problem at stake, Marx could never have 
made a lot of difference from Hegel, and it would be more plausible and even 
necessary to make Marx’s somewhat disordered presentation more systematic with 
the help of Hegel’s much more sophisticated dialectics. But we know that was 
certainly what Marx most abhorred (§ 5.2.2).  
Arthur is still right when he states that, being a historical product, capital, once it has 
stood on its own, transforms all its historical preconditions in its own way, 
subordinates them to itself, and appears a self-reproducing ‘automatic subject’ (Arthur 
                                                
129	It	 was	 Engels	 who	 first	 expressed	 doubt	 about	 it	 when	 he	 first	 read	 the	 draft	 of	 A	
Contribution	 to	 the	 Critique	 of	 Political	 economy	 in	 April,	 1858:	 ‘the	 dialectical	 transition	
from	 landed	 property	 to	wage	 labour	 is	 not	 yet	 quite	 clear	 to	me’	 (CW40:	 304).	 See	 also	
CW28:	206-09).	
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2002: 73-75). All these ‘historical’ categories will therefore constitute in capital a 
specific structure, which Marx seeks to expose in Capital, logically if you like. 
However, unless it is a bourgeois positive science which, presupposing its object, is 
only interested in the functional relationships between its elements, this exposition is 
simply synonymous to one of the ‘becoming’ of capital; in a sense, this is what 
Hegel’s Logic tells us. But, again, as far as the ‘becoming’ of capital is concerned, it 
is to Marx obviously historical, and not, as in Hegel, to be thought nor presented 
idealistically as the self-realisation of capital: ‘This dialectical process of becoming is 
only the ideal expression of the real movement through which capital comes into 
being’ (CW28: 236). Hence, the resurgence of history. However, now that we have 
the specific problématique of examining the inner structure of capital rather than its 
place in history, ‘history’ must be re-employed in a more definite manner. In other 
words, now history is not history in general, but the history of capital, esp., the history 
of the formation of capital. In the end, it seems that Arthur fails to appreciate the 
difference between this and the general history as opposed to ‘logic’ by Marx in his 
above-quoted seminal comment in the ‘1857 Introduction’. 130  Thus, for instance, 
when Marx says that money is precedent to capital historically (as well as logically), 
what he really means is it is so not chronologically—even if it is the case—but from 
the more definite perspective of the formation of modern capital. Then, the way 
Arthur problematises the relationship between history and logic proves either too 
simplistic for the above reason, or too rigid probably because he was too conscious of 
the ‘evils’ that ‘historical dialectic’ has produced in the understanding of Marx. 
However, here, it suffices to stick to Marx’s basic attitude that logic is a conceptual 
expression of historical/real development. 
Such a return to history, i.e., the history of the formation of capital plays its own 
original critical role and, to that extent, is essential in Marx’s critique of political 
economy. He says:  
                                                
130	To	maintain	his	 rigid	opposition	of	history	and	 logic,	Arthur	distorts	 the	actuality	of	 the	
former	 history:	 ‘The	 history	 here	 is	 a	 ‘virtual’	 one’	 (Arthur	 2002:	 120).	 However,	what	 he	
does	 here	 is	 confusing	 two	 distinct	 ‘histories’,	 simply	 identifying	 them.	 The	 histories	 in	
Chapters	24	and	32,	 respectively,	are	not	 identical.	While,	as	we	have	argued,	 the	 latter	 is	
the	 real	history	partly	 concerning	 the	 formation	of	 capital,	 the	 former	 is,	 as	Arthur	 rightly	
puts	 it,	 the	history	 ‘as	 it	must	be	written	from	the	vantage-point	of	capitalism’	 (Ibid.).	This	
history	is	the	one	held	by	those	‘bourgeois’	social	thinkers	and	political	economists.		
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The	bourgeois	 economists,	who	 consider	 capital	 to	be	an	eternal	 and	natural	 (not	
historical)	 form	 of	 production,	 nevertheless	 try	 to	 justify	 it	 by	 declaring	 the	
conditions	 of	 its	 becoming	 as	 the	 conditions	 of	 its	 present	 realisation,	 i.e.	 they	
present	the	moments	in	which	the	capitalist	still	appropriates	as	non-capitalist	.	.	.	as	
the	 very	 conditions	 in	 which	 he	 appropriates	 as	 capitalist.	 These	 attempts	 at	
apologetics	 demonstrate	 a	 bad	 conscience	 and	 the	 inability	 to	 bring	 the	mode	 of	
appropriation	of	 capital	 as	 capital	 into	harmony	with	 the	general	 laws	of	property	
proclaimed	by	capitalist	society	itself	(CW28:	388).131	
Here, the close examination of the history of capital formation is plainly seen to be 
essential in criticising the above ‘apologetic’ attempts on which the legitimacy of 
political economy is partly but significantly based. Lastly, it is notable that Marx 
stresses this critical point is posed and processed spontaneously by his own method: 
‘our method indicates the points at which historical analysis must be introduced, or at 
which bourgeois economy as a mere historical form of the production process points 
beyond itself towards earlier historical modes of production’ (CW28: 388-89). 
In short, we can conclude this discussion by making sure the basic but frequently 
understated proposition that the presentation in Marx’s value theory is driven not by 
the self-development of the Idea, but by the development of reality, and that it is 
confirmed in his presentation over and over again. The references to history/reality in 
Marx’s value theory are made not only to vitalise highly abstract concepts, but 
whenever those concepts need to advance. They are by no means a mere instrument 
that is to be, if ever, introduced to lessen the difficulty in the logical expansion of 
concepts, and so might be deleted without causing any problem at all: ‘the argument 
of Capital is generally logical with historical material indicating how certain 
tendencies inherent to the concept were played out in reality’ (Arthur 2002: 76).132 
                                                
131	See	also	CW29:	461-64.	Especially:	‘That	would	produce	the	strange	result	that	the	truth	
about	 the	bourgeois	 society’s	 law	of	appropriation	would	have	 to	be	 transferred	 to	a	 time	
when	 this	 society	 itself	 did	 not	 as	 yet	 exist,	 and	 the	 basic	 law	 of	 property,	 to	 the	 time	 of	
propertylessness’	(CW29:	463).	In	passing,	it	is	apparent	that	this	sort	of	argument	has	much	
to	do	with,	amongst	others,	‘normative’	moment	of	critique.	See	§	5.1.2.		
132	Unlike	Arthur	to	whom	the	lengthy	historical	exposition	in	Chapter	10	of	Capital	appears	
‘strictly	illustrative	and	does	not	advance	the	argument’	(Arthur	2002:	75),	Marx	does	make	
it	explicit	why	he	gave	 ‘so	 large	a	 space	 in	 this	volume	 to	 the	history,	 the	details,	and	 the	
results	of	English	factory	legislation’	(CW35:	10).	In	the	end,	the	immediate	main	audience	of	
Capital	 Marx	 had	 in	 mind	 were	 the	 German	 progressives	 including	 the	 working	 class	 for	
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5.3.	CONCLUSION	
The immediate purpose of this chapter has been examining and paving the theoretical 
basis for introducing a new category into the existing body of theory which will be 
performed in the following chapter. For this, we have produced a distinct 
interpretation about the construction of Marx’s value theory. Whilst positively 
drawing on the fact that it was deployed as a critique of political economy, we have 
made effort, regarding its relationship with Hegelian dialectics, to demonstrate 
exactly where and how Marx tried to draw distinction from it. In consequence, a 
result has been generated which looks quite different from the conventional 
interpretation of his dialectics and method.  
This might arguably be a general account of the construction of Marx’s value theory, 
but it can in no way answer all the issues raised in the history of Marxist political 
economy with regard to his method. Despite, at the same time, it does make some 
modifications in the priorities of those issues. For example, while the issue of the 
beginning/procession/finishing of presentation has been recognised to be central for 
Hegelian Marxists who have been most enthusiastic in the research area concerned, 
the status of this problem according to our interpretation proves to be secondary; at 
least, one cannot but admit that it is less important than (i) Marx’s critical judgment 
which is again subject to the specific, and sometimes contingent, way of the 
development of its object, political economy, and (ii) his emphasis upon the real and 
the historical which is partly the outcome of his ‘distancing’ strategy from Hegel. 
From this perspective, the conventional way in which Marx’s ‘dialectical method’ has 
been problematised appears distorted: firstly, the matter is restricted to one of 
presentation without sufficient evidence whatsoever and, as a result, Marx’s 
                                                                                                                                      
whom	the	English	case	would	certainly	show	a	vision	for	their	future	struggle	even	if,	on	the	
other	 hand,	 it	 is	 also	 true	 that	 such	 a	 long	 illustration	 was	 not	 what	Marx	 had	 originally	
planned	 (CW42:	223-34.	But	Arthur	does	not	 acknowledge	 it	 in	his	book).	 In	 South	Korea,	
interestingly,	it	has	long	been	a	convention	to	start	reading	Capital	from	Chapter	10,	and	go	
back	to	the	first.	The	meaning	of	the	historical	as	an	‘exemplar’	will	be	more	developed	at	a	
general	level	in	the	next	chapter.	
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presentation is simply assumed to be problematic, mystical, something to be 
explained (cf. Fine and Saad-Filho 2008: esp. 170). And so it was explained in a 
number of ways, leaving what we referred to as Marx’s ‘real problem’ largely 
untouched.  
As we have tried to show, Marx’s value theory as a logical construct does include 
some emptiness in it. This emptiness, however, does not represent its incompleteness, 
so much as points to the inevitable limitations any social theory would have. Then, it 
would be a futile job to try to fill the emptiness with more logic; on the contrary, it is 
one of the advantages Marx’s value theory has that it ‘knows its own limits’, as he 
himself emphasised. To that extent, it is ‘determinate’ emptiness, to use Hegelian 
term, which is necessarily to be complemented either by historical accounts as is 
amply done by Marx, or by the class struggle and human collective practice in the 
future which often requires Utopian visions as Sheyla Benhabib shows. 
In retrospect, Marx’s reservation of dealing at length with the world market has 
tended to be interpreted by some, if not all, commentators in such a way that the 
discussion of capitalist international economic relations should be an instance of such 
emptiness; in other words, this is where logic stops, and where only historical 
analyses can fill the gap.133 Indeed, the twentieth century saw the most dynamic 
historical developments in the international arena, and in an unprecedented manner. 
Surely, this has helped foster the idea that international economic relations are an area 
of study to be approached empirically rather than theoretically. 
This is true in the general sense that any theoretical category has in it the lacuna 
which can only be filled with empirical studies. However, it is still very important to 
lay the theoretical basis upon which such studies can properly be placed. It is all the 
more so, for Marx’s value theory has the definite theoretical purpose as a critique of 
political economy. On the other hand, the introduction of a new category always gives 
rise to two sets of problems. The first is how the existing body of theory constructed 
right before the introduction would be further developed on the new basis. In the 
history of economic thought, for instance, John Stuart Mill sought to further develop 
                                                
133	The	theory	proposed	by	the	Japanese	Uno	School	is	a	striking	example,	but	this	is	not	the	
only	one.	
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the theory of value under the title of ‘international value’ (see § 6.1.1). Secondly, new 
elements, which could not be touched upon so far, can now be properly addressed in 
the expanded body of theory: in the case of the world market, those themes such as 
the exchange rates between national currencies, the varieties of capitalist development, 
the transition of the so-called ‘hegemony’ in the world economy, etc. In this thesis, 
our main interest lies in the former issue, and we try to outline in the next chapter how 
Marx’s value theory as a critique of political economy would be modified, and further 
developed by the introduction of the new category, the world market. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE WORLD MARKET 
In the Preface of the Volume One of Capital, the most developed but unfinished 
crystallisation of his project of the ‘critique of political economy’, Marx said his 
object of study was ‘the capitalist mode of production, and the relations of production 
and exchange corresponding to that mode’, and that his ‘ultimate aim’ in this work 
was ‘to lay bare the economic law of motion of modern society’ (CW35: 8, 10). 
Therefore, it is obvious that IERs (international economic relations), into which Marx 
did not have a chance to delve, have to be approached under such premises. Hence the 
question: now that economic relations in general have already been dealt with in 
Capital but very abstractly, how can a theory of international economic relations be 
developed from the more general theory? 
More specifically, since Marx’s value theory is always forged in contradistinction 
with existing theories of political economy, it is crucial to highlight the critical points 
Marx was to make vis-à-vis those theories of Smith, Ricardo, etc. Also, since it is 
established in Chapter 5 that Marx’s concept of critique has both positive (analytical) 
and negative aspects, the introduction of the new category of the world market into 
the existing corpus of his value theory will develop it in two ways. This task is 
indispensible both in terms of the structure of his theory of the capitalist economy 
and, more generally, of his whole intellectual journey whose necessary outcome is the 
development of value theory (see Part I).134  
This chapter directly builds upon the debates covered in Chapters 4 and 5. The 
former was about the concept of the world market per se in the broader intellectual 
tradition of Western Europe. Here, the world market itself was regarded as coming 
into existence with the advent of the modern economy, and as the ultimate sphere 
where the modern economy was put into full action, and grasped as such. However, 
what makes matters very complicated is that Marx following his French Physiocratic 
                                                
134	Especially,	in	relation	to	the	second	point,	considering	the	tremendous	significance	of	the	
problématique	of	the	‘globality’	of	the	modern	world	in	Marx’s	early	intellectual	stages,	the	
task	 to	 be	 undertaken	 in	 this	 chapter	 proves	 inevitable	 in	 establishing	 the	 relationship	
between	the	young	and	the	mature	Marxes.	
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predecessors deals with capitalism as if it were a single national economy while 
abstracting it from its globality in which the existence of multiple national entities is 
necessarily implied (§ 4.2.2). This assumption was to be loosened and finally lifted 
away as the analysis matures: this is necessary not just for the introduction of the new 
category, but also for developing the existing ones further, especially to make them 
practicable in today’s ‘globalised’ world. Then we will have the more complicated 
and analytically empowered value theory constructed upon the more realistic world of 
what Marx and his predecessors called the world market. 
On the other hand, what is suggested by the fact that Capital is written from the 
beginning under what we call ‘one-national-economy’ assumption is not that Marx 
was uninterested in the character of the capitalist economy abstracted from by that 
assumption; it simply tells us that he was extraordinarily conscious of the order and 
the logic of his theory-building. These have so far been discussed in Marxist political 
economy under the theme of ‘method’, which we dealt with in Chapter 5 at a general 
level. As we insisted there, order and logic in Marx’s critique of political economy are 
significant not because they represent the inner structure of capital as Hegelian ‘Idea’ 
that otherwise cannot be grasped properly (cf. Chris Arthur), but because which order 
and logic to take determines the character of the problems to be posed, and the 
answers to be sought. It is in this sense that it is legitimate to say the introduction of a 
new category and, thereby, the expansion of the whole theory, is in itself a step 
forward in Marx’s project of the critique of political economy. 
 
6.1.	A	CRITICAL	REVIEW	OF	THE	ECONOMIC	THEORIES	OF	THE	GLOBAL	
As discussed in § 4.1, Marx’s take on the world market was heavily inspired by his 
predecessors, but it is not sufficiently certain exactly what elements he wanted to 
inherit from existing theories, how he criticised or supplemented them, and in what 
direction he wanted to develop them.  
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6.1.1. From Mercantile to Neoclassical: ‘Gains from Trade,’ or Lack of 
Systematicity 
(a) In the globalisation debate since the early- or mid-1990s, a mythical premise 
became dominant that before ‘globalisation’ took place the world economy was 
merely a collection of multiple national economies deemed to be more or less self-
contained, and that it had been forged as a natural result of the development, gradual 
or sudden, of those national entities; in other words, it was assumed that the world has 
evolved from the ‘local’ to the ‘national’, and to the ‘global’ stage. But, in time, such 
thinking was severely challenged, and proved to be a sheer myth based upon 
superficial observation, partly as a result of historians joining the debate (Hopkins 
1999: Introduction). Earlier instances of global intercourse between distant peoples 
were discovered and, consequently, the origin of globalisation was pushed back to as 
early as the twelfth or thirteenth century when Genghis Khan conquered Eurasia. 
Furthermore, some of those historians of globalisations, together with some ‘sceptics’ 
of globalisation, have sought to show that the pre-1970s globalisations were greater 
than the one witnessed since the late-1970s. 
It is no surprise, therefore, that economic relations between distant nations remained 
firmly at the centre of attention of the English political economists of the pre-classical 
era.135 It was in the international arena about which the political economic phenomena 
they were concerned were mostly taking place: ‘in a real sense there was an 
international “economy” (integrated and interdependent economic relations) before 
there were national economies. In the seventeenth century London was more 
economically integrated with Amsterdam than it was with large parts of England’ 
(Aspromourgos 1995: 124. Original italics). However, it needs stressing that what this 
suggests is not so much the greatness of international trade as the un(der)development 
of internal trade and markets. Anyway, it is natural for most 17th and 18th century 
                                                
135	Yet,	 there	 is	 an	 issue	 of	 determining	 the	 borders	 of	 ‘classical’	 political	 economy.	While	
Marx	 who	 is	 arguably	 the	 first	 to	 make	 such	 a	 definition	 includes	 some	 pre-Smithian	
economists	 such	 as	William	 Petty	 in	 that	 category	 (CW35:	 92n),	 it	 is	 not	 conventional	 by	
today’s	 standard.	 See,	 for	 discussion,	 Milonakis	 and	 Fine	 (2009:	 Ch.	 2).	 We	 follow	 their	
definition,	 unless	 otherwise	 indicated:	 ‘Classical	 political	 economy	will	 be	 defined	 here	 to	
include	the	writers	from	Adam	Smith	to	John	Stuart	Mill,	including	Bentham,	Ricardo,	Senior,	
Malthus,	Mill	and	Cairnes’	(Milonakis	and	Fine	2009:	13).	
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political economists to regard the international as a normal field against which they 
commented on economic matters, and it is understandable for Sir James Steuart, the 
last representative of the Mercantile School, to enumerate what was largely if not 
necessarily acquired from trade with distant nations, the so-called ‘profit upon 
alienation’, as constituting a normal part of the price of a commodity: ‘In the price of 
goods, I consider two things as really existing . . . the real value of the commodity, 
and the profit upon alienation’ (Steuart 1765: 159-61). According to Ronald Meek, 
The	 gains	 from	 foreign	 trade	 were	 so	 manifest	 and	 so	 considerable,	 and	 their	
importance	 as	 a	 source	 of	 capital	 accumulation	 so	 obvious,	 that	 the	 commercial	
classes	inevitably	regarded	the	prosperity	of	the	country	as	being	largely	dependent	
upon	the	size	of	their	own	profits.	[.	.	.]	If,	therefore,	the	revenue	from	the	sale	of	a	
commodity	exceeded	the	cost	of	producing	or	acquiring	it,	the	excess	was	regarded	
as	 originating,	 not	 in	 the	 process	 of	 production,	 but	 in	 the	 act	 of	 exchange.	 All	
industrial	and	commercial	profit,	in	other	words,	was	‘profit	upon	alienation’	(Meek	
1962:	349.	My	italics).	
Interestingly, however, the same superficiality as displayed by modern economists of 
globalisation overwhelms the mercantilist discourse: both take what comes first to 
their senses as their respective points of departure. Further, partly because mercantile 
economists took the international for granted, they do not seem to have cared much 
about presenting their theory of international economic relations as a special case of a 
more general theory of economic relations per se, or as one opposed to its counterpart 
concerning domestic relations. To put it differently, the conceptual as well as practical 
differentiation between the national and the international did not advance enough, and 
the idea of a more general theoretical field capable of embracing both as distinct 
categories did not yet occur to the mercantilist’s mind clearly. 
Such a general approach was taken by French Physiocrats. According to François 
Quesnay in whose ‘workshop’ the school was forged (Théré and Charles 2008), to 
deal with foreign trade properly, ‘it is necessary to make a few fundamental 
observations about trade in general’ (Quesnay 1757: 197. My italics). Moreover, 
while recognising the importance of foreign trade for stimulating the (internal) 
economy (Charles 2000: 7), Quesnay in principle thought wealth could not originate 
from commerce since it is simply an exchange of things of equal value (Vaggi and 
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Groenewegen 2003: 60).136 It can be argued that such an attitude of the Physiocrats 
reflected the reality faced by them: France in the eighteenth century was basically a 
lagging-behind agricultural state with lots of feudal restrictions, for which ‘the gains 
from foreign trade were of little economic importance’ (Meek 1962: 349-50). 
Consequently, they were more interested in how to organise the internal economy, 
and tried to formulate a theoretical model of the economy abstracted from relatively 
unimportant factors like foreign trade (Ibid.: 370, 377). This happened to lead Marx 
and Engels to lavish exceptional praise on the Physiocrats, for example (cf. Malle 
1979 and Gehrke and Kurz 1995): 
Political	economy	[.	 .	 .]	acquires	 its	true	content	among	the	Physiocrats,	since	they	
were	 the	 first	 to	 treat	 political	 economy	 systematically.	 [.	 .	 .]	 Thanks	 to	 the	
Physiocrats,	political	economy	for	 the	first	 time	was	raised	to	the	rank	of	a	special	
science	and	has	been	treated	as	such	ever	since	(CW5:	409,	412.	My	italics).	
In the end, Marx’s ‘one-national-economy assumption’ which is so essential to the 
present discussion was a methodological premise he explicitly inherited from the 
Physiocrats: ‘leaving foreign trade out of account—as the Physiocrats rightly did and 
had to do in an abstract study of bourgeois society’ (CW30: 357). Unavoidably, it is a 
regrettable irony that such a methodological advantage left the French School lacking 
in any developed theory of international economic relations (cf. Bloomfield 1989). 
Then came Adam Smith. Whilst he appreciated the methodological prudence the 
Physiocrats had forged, namely, that of systematically analysing the capitalist 
economy as an internally organic whole, he unlike them could not ignore its 
international aspect, given its importance to the reproduction of the British economy. 
But, at the same time, it was also unthinkable for him to follow his mercantile 
predecessors of whom he was very critical. Indeed, the mercantilists whose ‘ultimate 
object’ was ‘to enrich the country by an advantageous balance of trade’ (Smith 1776: 
642) regarded inland trade as ‘subsidiary’ to foreign trade in so far as it indirectly 
influenced the state of foreign trade (435). Smith’s interest proceeded in the opposite 
direction: he was ‘chiefly’ interested in how foreign commercial policies affected the 
                                                
136	To	the	Physiocrats,	‘the	word	“gain”	[.	.	.]	meant	a	clear	surplus	of	value,	which	from	their	
point	of	view	trade	does	not	afford.	Quesnay,	Le	Trosne	and	Mercier	did,	however,	grasp	the	
concept	of	an	 increase	 in	utility	 resulting	 from	trade,	but	 they	did	not	 look	upon	 this	as	a	
“gain”’	(Bloomfield	1938:	722).	
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annual produce of a nation’s industry (451). Here, ‘inland or home trade’ was ‘the 
most important of all’ since it afforded the greatest revenue, and created the greatest 
employment to the nation (435). 
In the end, the theoretical ‘mission’ (self-)imposed upon Smith, from the vantage 
point of the history of economic thought, was the ‘dialectical synthesis’ of 
mercantilism and Physiocracy. Such a theoretical advance should be done side-by-
side with the establishment of political economy as ‘science’, i.e., as ‘the anatomy of 
civil society’ (see § 3.2.1). The most necessary condition for this would be 
overcoming the policy-orientation based upon the ‘national prejudice and animosity’ 
(Smith 1776: 474) peculiar to mercantilism. Of necessity, this character of the 
mercantilists was most prominent when they dealt with international economic 
matters: whether, where, and how much to import or export particular items to make a 
sovereign or a nation wealthier. In this sense, it is not an exaggeration to say that 
Smith’s success as synthesiser was dependent upon whether he neatly devised a 
systematic theory of international economic relations. 
From this perspective, how can Smith’s theory of IERs be assessed? First, it is true 
that Smith, against the mercantilists who ‘from national prejudice and animosity’ had 
regarded international trade as the beggar-thy-neighbour policy, stressed that free 
international trade should encourage the mutual benefit of the participating nations. 
This is obviously a more general, and theoretically more advanced, position. 
Nothing	…	can	be	more	absurd	than	this	whole	doctrine	of	 the	balance	of	 trade	…	
When	two	places	trade	with	one	another,	this	doctrine	supposes	that,	if	the	balance	
be	even,	neither	of	 them	either	 loses	or	gains;	but	 if	 it	 leans	 in	any	degree	to	one	
side,	that	one	of	them	loses,	and	the	other	gains	in	proportion	to	its	declension	from	
the	 exact	 equilibrium.	 Both	 suppositions	 are	 false.	 …	 [T]hat	 trade	 which,	 without	
force	or	constraint,	is	naturally	and	regularly	carried	on	between	any	two	places,	is	
always	advantageous,	though	not	always	equally	so,	to	both	(Smith	1776:	488-89).	
[N]ations	 have	 been	 taught	 that	 their	 interest	 consisted	 in	 beggaring	 all	 their	
neighbours.	 Each	 nation	 has	 been	 made	 to	 look	 with	 an	 invidious	 eye	 upon	 the	
prosperity	 of	 all	 the	nations	with	which	 it	 trades,	 and	 to	 consider	 their	 gain	 as	 its	
own	 loss.	 Commerce,	 which	 ought	 naturally	 to	 be,	 among	 nations,	 as	 among	
individuals,	a	bond	of	union	and	 friendship,	has	become	the	most	 fertile	source	of	
discord	and	animosity	(493).	
 
 
149 
[A]fter	all	the	vain	attempts	of	almost	all	trading	nations	to	turn	that	balance	in	their	
own	favour	and	against	their	neighbours,	it	does	not	appear	that	any	one	nation	in	
Europe	has	been	in	any	respect	impoverished	by	this	cause	(496-97).	
Second, it is important to note that Smith’s ‘mutual benefit’ thesis was still presented 
in the context of his exaltation of the ‘gains from trade’. But since the mercantilists’ 
policy-oriented tendency could never be seen more clearly than in their question ‘why 
does a nation embark on a trade with a foreign one?’, and all the discourses on the 
‘gains from trade’ were basically presented as answers to this question, Smith seems 
to have remained stuck in the mercantile shadow of policy-orientation. Here are two 
examples of the gains he enumerated: 
If	a	foreign	country	can	supply	us	with	a	commodity	cheaper	than	we	ourselves	can	
make	 it,	better	buy	 it	of	them	with	some	part	of	the	produce	of	our	own	industry,	
employed	 in	a	way	 in	which	we	have	some	advantage.	The	general	 industry	of	the	
country,	being	always	in	proportion	to	the	capital	which	employs	it,	will	not	thereby	
be	diminished	 [.	 .	 .]	but	only	 left	 to	 find	out	 the	way	 in	which	 it	 can	be	employed	
with	the	greatest	advantage.	It	is	certainly	not	employed	to	the	greatest	advantage,	
when	it	is	thus	directed	towards	an	object	which	it	can	buy	cheaper	than	it	can	make	
(Smith	1776:	457).	
Between	whatever	 places	 foreign	 trade	 is	 carried	 on,	 they	 all	 of	 them	 derive	 two	
distinct	benefits	from	it.	It	carries	out	that	surplus	part	of	the	produce	of	their	land	
and	labour	for	which	there	is	no	demand	among	them,	and	brings	back	in	return	for	
it	something	else	for	which	there	is	a	demand	(Smith	1776:	446).	
Rather than a systemisation of the mercantile ideas on IERs in light of the new 
insights learned from the Physiocrats, this is nothing but a restatement of the old 
doctrine, ‘gains from trade’. The mediocre advance Smith achieved vis-à-vis his 
mercantile predecessors was his relative universalism, i.e., mutual benefit through 
self-interest seeking. 
 
(b) To deal with IERs systematically is nothing but regarding IERs as part of the 
systematic presentation of the capitalist economy; for example, as a developed form 
from commerce in general, though IERs are not confined to commercial relations. In 
other words, it is to trace how the value theory constructed at the most abstract level 
would modify and assert itself at more concrete levels. Smith’s prominent successors, 
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David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill, were indeed conscious of this question but, 
eventually, they failed to make any decisive departure from their master. 
As for Ricardo, his primary interest lay not in demonstrating in what way foreign 
trade was beneficial to a nation, but whether it raised the general national rate of 
profit. According to him, whilst the individual capital involved in foreign trade might 
temporarily enjoy a profit rate higher than normal, it would not raise the general rate 
of profit unless, as a result of the trade, ‘the food and necessaries of the labourer can 
be brought to market at a reduced price’ (Ricardo 1821: 132). 
Foreign	trade,	then,	though	highly	beneficial	to	a	country,	as	it	increases	the	amount	
and	variety	of	the	objects	on	which	revenue	may	be	expended,	and	affords,	by	the	
abundance	 and	 cheapness	 of	 commodities,	 incentives	 to	 saving,	 and	 to	 the	
accumulation	 of	 capital,	 has	 no	 tendency	 to	 raise	 the	 profits	 of	 stock,	 unless	 the	
commodities	 imported	 be	 of	 that	 description	 on	 which	 the	 wages	 of	 labour	 are	
expended	(133). 
As demonstrated above, in developing his argument, it was also inevitable for Ricardo 
to deal with the ‘gains from trade’. Especially, he established that Smith’s doctrine 
held even when there was a participant that had no absolute ‘advantage’ in producing 
any of the commodities involved. 
To	produce	the	wine	 in	Portugal,	might	 require	only	 the	 labour	of	80	men	 for	one	
year,	and	to	produce	the	cloth	in	the	same	country,	might	require	the	labour	of	90	
men	for	the	same	time.	It	would	therefore	be	advantageous	for	her	to	export	wine	
in	 exchange	 for	 cloth.	 This	 exchange	might	 even	 take	 place,	 notwithstanding	 that	
the	commodity	imported	by	Portugal	could	be	produced	there	with	less	labour	than	
in	England.	Though	she	could	make	the	cloth	with	the	labour	of	90	men,	she	would	
import	 it	 from	 a	 country	 where	 it	 required	 the	 labour	 of	 100	men	 to	 produce	 it,	
because	 it	 would	 be	 advantageous	 to	 her	 rather	 to	 employ	 her	 capital	 in	 the	
production	of	wine,	for	which	she	would	obtain	more	cloth	from	England,	than	she	
could	produce	by	diverting	a	portion	of	her	capital	 from	the	cultivation	of	vines	to	
the	manufacture	of	cloth	(Ricardo	1821:	135).	
This is the doctrine of comparative advantage, and John Stuart Mill later appreciates 
its significance as follows: 
Of	the	truths	with	which	political	economy	has	been	enriched	by	Mr.	Ricardo,	none	
has	contributed	more	to	give	to	that	branch	of	knowledge	the	comparatively	precise	
and	 scientific	 character	which	 it	 at	present	bears,	 than	 the	more	accurate	analysis	
which	 he	 performed	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 advantage	which	 nations	 derive	 from	 a	
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mutual	 interchange	 of	 their	 productions.	 Previously	 to	 his	 time,	 the	 benefits	 of	
foreign	trade	were	deemed,	even	by	the	most	philosophical	enquirers,	to	consist	in	
affording	a	vent	for	surplus	produce,	or	in	enabling	a	portion	of	the	national	capital	
to	replace	itself	with	a	profit.	The	futility	of	the	theory	implied	in	these	and	similar	
phrases,	was	an	obvious	consequence	from	the	speculations	of	writers	even	anterior	
to	 Mr.	 Ricardo.	 But	 it	 was	 he	 who	 first,	 in	 the	 chapter	 on	 Foreign	 Trade,	 of	 his	
immortal	 Principles	 of	 Political	 Economy	 and	 Taxation,	 substituted	 for	 the	 former	
vague	 and	 unscientific,	 if	 not	 positively	 false,	 conceptions	 with	 regard	 to	 the	
advantage	of	trade,	a	philosophical	exposition	which	explains,	with	strict	precision,	
the	nature	of	 that	advantage,	and	affords	an	accurate	measure	of	 its	amount	 (Mill	
1844:	232-3).	
Upon such appreciation of Ricardo and his father James Mill, Mill builds his own 
contribution. Firstly, he summarises the real gains from foreign trade should be that, 
by rendering the use of the factors of production (labour and capital) in the 
participating countries more efficiently, it would increase total world production: ‘The 
addition thus made to the produce of the two combined, constitutes the advantage of 
the trade’ (Mill 1848: 591). It is here that Mill’s original contribution starts: ‘It is the 
purpose of the present essay to inquire, in what proportion the increase of produce, 
arising from the saving of labour, is divided between the two countries. This question 
was not entered into by Mr. Ricardo’ (Mill 1844: 235). 
Mill’s own answer to this question constitutes his theory of ‘international value’. 
Since the theory of value in general is about the determination of the value of a 
commodity, so the theory of international value is about the determination of the 
value of an imported commodity produced in a foreign country:  
The	 values	 of	 commodities	 produced	 at	 the	 same	 place,	 or	 in	 places	 sufficiently	
adjacent	 for	 capital	 to	move	 freely	 between	 them	—	 let	 us	 say,	 for	 simplicity,	 of	
commodities	 produced	 in	 the	 same	 country	 —	 depend	 (temporary	 fluctuations	
apart)	upon	their	cost	of	production.	But	the	value	of	a	commodity	brought	from	a	
distant	 place,	 especially	 from	 a	 foreign	 country,	 does	 not	 depend	 on	 its	 cost	 of	
production	in	the	place	from	whence	it	comes.	On	what,	then,	does	it	depend?	The	
value	 of	 a	 thing	 in	 any	 place,	 depends	 on	 the	 cost	 of	 its	 acquisition	 in	 that	 place;	
which	in	the	case	of	an	imported	article,	means	the	cost	of	production	of	the	thing	
which	is	exported	to	pay	for	it	(Mill	1848:	595).	
Then, it would be important to determine ‘the quantity of home produce which must 
be given to the foreign country in exchange’ for a foreign commodity. This ratio is 
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what Mill called the ‘terms of international exchange’ (ibid.). What determines this 
ratio?  
It	 may	 be	 considered,	 therefore,	 as	 established,	 that	 when	 two	 countries	 trade	
together	 in	 two	 commodities,	 the	 exchangeable	 value	 of	 these	 commodities	
relatively	to	each	other	will	adjust	itself	to	the	inclinations	and	circumstances	of	the	
consumers	 on	 both	 sides,	 in	 such	 manner	 that	 the	 quantities	 required	 by	 each	
country,	of	the	article	which	it	imports	from	its	neighbour,	shall	be	exactly	sufficient	
to	pay	for	one	another.	As	the	 inclinations	and	circumstances	of	consumers	cannot	
be	reduced	to	any	rule,	so	neither	can	the	proportions	in	which	the	two	commodities	
will	 be	 interchanged.	 We	 [only—GHG]	 know	 that	 the	 limits	 within	 which	 the	
variation	 is	 confined	 are	 the	 ratio	 between	 their	 costs	 of	 production	 in	 the	 one	
country,	 and	 the	 ratio	 between	 their	 costs	 of	 production	 in	 the	 other	 (Mill	 1844:	
239-40.	Italics	added).	
In other words, the international relative demand on the traded commodities 
determines both the terms of trade, and the ratio by which the whole ‘advantage of 
foreign trade’ is divided between the two trading nations: ‘The law . . . may be 
appropriately named, the Equation of International Demand. It may be concisely 
stated as follows. The produce of a country exchanges for the produce of other 
countries, at such values as are required in order that the whole of her exports may 
exactly pay for the whole of her imports’ (Mill 1848: 604). 
Ricardo’s and, more aptly, Mill’s problematisations are applaudable, not least for they 
at least tried to extend, not simply apply, the abstractly constructed value theory onto 
the international field. Especially for Mill, it is a great step forward that he explicitly 
distinguished the ‘general law’ of foreign trade from the (individual) ‘causes’ (Mill 
1848: 587); according to which the popular discussions on foreign trade—those on 
the ‘gains’ of trade—were generally concerning its ‘causes’, ‘a surviving relic of the 
Mercantile Theory’, and even Adam Smith were not free from it (591-2). 
However, their attempt at extension of value theory is not successful since both 
Ricardo and Mill ended up by confirming their own general and abstract principles at 
the more concrete level, respectively. Ricardo declared the introduction of foreign 
trade did not generally affect his argument on the formation of the average rate of 
profit (Ricardo 1821: 132), and Mill concluded that the ‘law of International Values is 
but an extension of the more general law of Value’ (Mill 1848: 604). This is why 
Marx judges, for instance, the chapters on external trade in Ricardo’s Principles—
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Chapter VII (‘On Foreign Trade’) and Chapter XXV (‘On Colonial Trade’)—are 
‘mere application of previously established principles’ (CW31: 392). 
More importantly, such frustrating conclusions reveal the more fundamental problem 
of Ricardo’s and Mill’s versions of value theory. 
Because	 of	 his	 completely	 wrong	 conception	 of	 the	 rate	 of	 profit,	 Ricardo	
misunderstands	 entirely	 the	 influence	 of	 foreign	 trade,	 when	 it	 does	 not	 directly	
lower	the	price	of	the	labourers’	food.		He	does	not	see	how	enormously	important	
it	is	for	England,	for	example,	to	secure	cheaper	raw	materials	for	industry,	and	that	
in	 this	 case	 .	 .	 .	 the	 rate	of	profit	 rises	although	prices	 fall,	whereas	 in	 the	 reverse	
case,	with	rising	prices,	the	rate	of	profit	can	fall,	even	if	wages	remain	the	same	in	
both	cases	(CW32:	72).	
As for Mill, what is at stake is his very concept of value. Whilst he vindicated the cost 
of production of a commodity reducible to a certain amount of labour as the 
‘necessary’ or ‘minimum’ basis for its (exchange) value (Mill 1848: 471-2), he placed 
value essentially under the category of exchange and, consequently, conceptualised it 
to be subject to the market situation of demand and supply. In other words, for Mill, 
the value of a commodity is nothing but its market price when its demand and supply 
are equated; already at this general level, value has little to do with the cost of 
production, or labour time! This concept of value ultimately can lead to the 
neoclassical utility theory of value. It is not our present concern to pursue this issue 
any further, but the next sub-section will be devoted to presenting an alternative based 
upon Marx’s critique of (classical) political economy of which Ricardo and Mill are 
the main representatives. 
 
6.1.2. The Ricardian Framework: A Critique 
(a) As already apparent from above, the Ricardian framework has the following 
characteristics. First, varied forms of IERs are reduced to a commodity exchange 
relation, a barter relation. This is obvious in modern textbooks on international 
economics; here, once the Ricardian comparative advantage is established based upon 
the famous two-country-two-commodity model, all the proceeding IERs are shown to 
be reduced to the most elementary form. Such a practice originates from Mill who, in 
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his Principles (1848), formulated the Ricardian two-country-two-commodity model 
and, then, extended it to many-country-many-commodity cases also easing the 
original strict assumptions such as the exclusion of transaction costs. 
Indeed, Mill’s sticking to the barter relation is understandable as such. Since the 
mercantilists used to found the gains from trade in monetary terms, he felt obliged to 
disprove it. However, it is not just a matter of whether money is neutral. We need to 
recognise that IERs are a totality of diverse relations with qualities that cannot be 
forced to merge together and, more importantly, that an economic theory is not about 
reducing the complexities of reality to a set of general rules, but about chasing how 
the core laws assert themselves in concrete reality.  
Secondly, in the Ricardian framework, IERs are viewed from the national perspective. 
It is true that Adam Smith transcended the mercantilists’ narrowness by suggesting 
international trade should be beneficial both to home and foreign countries. But such 
universality was not achieved by recognising the moment in the world economy 
which abstracted the particularity of the ‘national’ economy, but simply by accepting 
the multiplicity of such particular national economies, and their formal equality. 
Lastly, in the theories of IERs based upon the Ricardian framework, international 
intercourse between national entities is deemed to be beneficial to all the participating 
parties. In this analytical situation, a national economy is left with a very limited 
range of choices: whether to produce commodity A or commodity B, or both? In other 
words, the ‘gains’ are defined under a very strict set of conditions. Here, it is of 
another, secondary interest how such ‘gains’ are distributed amongst the social classes 
within a nation. It is inevitable, therefore, that it rises as the most important theoretical 
issue to prove in various ways whether the gains from trade exist, and how they are to 
be achieved. Of course, since Mill who established the gains from trade to be a matter 
of use-value, not (exchange-) value, any national differences that might produce any 
gains in use-value—from that of labour productivity to those of natural or artificial 
endowment, consumers’ taste, overall size of production and market, etc.—become 
the objects of study. Contemporary textbook theories of international economics are 
composed of exercises in reducing varied IERs based upon such national differences 
to a barter relation (e.g. Krugman, Obstfeld and Melitz 2012). 
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(b) Then, how can the Ricardian framework be assessed? More than anything else, a 
question should be raised over whether it is legitimate to reduce international trade, or 
more broadly IERs to a barter relation. Once upon a time, such a form of international 
exchange was indeed dominant. In pre-mercantile era, for instance, it was strictly 
banned for a private man to take gold out of the national borders and, therefore, 
foreign merchants who sold foreign commodities in a country were forced to buy 
back the country’s own commodities with the money they earned in that country 
(Einzig 1970). Also, for a very long time, it was conventional that ‘all transactions 
[for foreign trade] may be carried out by book payments, [and] at a certain point there 
is a balance to be paid’ (Vilar 1976: 74).  
As a result, international trade used to appear as if a barter relation. But this is only a 
form. It is not a scientific way of analysis to take the form of barter as something real, 
and to individualise and privilege the category of ‘exchange’. Rather, seen from the 
perspective developed by Marx in his Second Volume of Capital, the form can be 
regarded as a passing moment in the process of the self-valorisation of capital. From 
this point, the Marxist analysis of IERs begins (see next section). 
Second, the most fundamental problem of the Ricardian framework is that it is 
impossible or meaningless to determine if foreign trade is beneficial to a country 
theoretically, and generally. If the gains from trade are to be sought in terms of 
exchange value, it in effect assumes the violation of the basic presupposition of ‘equal 
exchange’ to which classical political economists and Marx firmly stuck. But, on the 
other hand, if the gains from trade are considered in the dimensions of use values, i.e., 
more productive use of the ‘factors’ of production and multiplication of commodities 
without necessarily increasing total value, then what the gains from trade actually 
refer to is something like what Marx called ‘the civilising effect’ of capitalism, or ‘the 
historical mission of the bourgeoisie’ (CW35: 591). Just like other factors such as the 
division of labour that increase the productive power under capitalism, the existence 
of the gains from trade is the ‘reality’ of modern capitalist society which one should 
accept as given before embarking on a serious analysis of it and, therefore, has no 
analytical meaning in and of itself. In this respect, of course, the trade in ‘the gains 
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from trade’ does not have to be foreign; it is trade in general, and one can normally 
enjoy some gains (in use values) out of it.137 
This leads to the third problem. If the gains from trade are deemed to be so general, 
why did the classical and pre-classical commentators ascribe it only to ‘foreign’ 
trade? This concerns their characteristically national perspective. On the one hand, 
such a perspective reflects one of the basic conditions of modern life, i.e., that most 
people live their lives within national boundaries. At the same time, however, 
capitalism is a global economy and, as such, has its historical uniqueness and 
character (see Chapter 4). The national perspective can hardly address the specific 
determinations at the level of the ‘world’. For instance, Marx always stresses that 
credit and the competition between individual capitals can only be fully grasped at the 
level of the world market, which makes him stand out amongst other classical 
economists. Further, it easily proves that, unless one subscribes to this ‘global’ 
perspective, it is liable for one to understand even the most elementary categories 
such as production and exchange only in limited and perverse ways. 
Last but not least, the national perspective of the political economists within the 
Ricardian framework tends to result in a confusion of the unit of analysis. At the very 
abstract levels of analysis, classical political economists including those 
commentators on IERs generally employ ‘class’ as the main analytical unit. This is 
why the mechanism of the capitalist economy from production to exchange and 
distribution actually takes place around the interplay between the main social classes 
of the capitalist, the labourer and the landowner. But, as soon as the political 
economists get to deal with IERs, ‘nation’ suddenly comes forth; now, the nation or 
the national economy present itself as the main, real economic subject. The problem 
here is that the critical problématique constructed based upon class is obscured and, 
further, what Marx called ‘fantasies’ of the bourgeois economy at the end of the Third 
                                                
137	This	is	the	basic	idea	underlying	Marx’s	account	of	the	gains	from	trade:	‘Let	us	take	the	
process	of	circulation	in	a	form	under	which	it	presents	itself	as	a	simple	and	direct	exchange	
of	commodities.	.	.	.	So	far	as	regards	use	values,	it	is	clear	that	both	parties	may	gain	some	
advantage.	 .	 .	 .	 With	 reference	 .	 .	 .	 to	 use	 value,	 there	 is	 good	 ground	 for	 saying	 that	
“exchange	 is	a	 transaction	by	which	both	 sides	gain”.	 It	 is	otherwise	with	exchange	value.	
“This	act	 [Exchange	of	commodities—GHG]	produces	no	 increase	of	exchange	value	either	
for	the	one	or	the	other”’	(CW35:	167-8).	
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Volume of Capital becomes a fait accompli at this stage of theorisation. But how is 
one to connect the dimensions represented by different units of analysis organically 
and dialectically? Or, how to extend the theoretical field constructed around the 
concept of class so that it should contain the new area which appears to be dominated 
by national entities? This is the question to be answered in the next section. 
 
6.1.3. Concluding Remarks: The Ricardian Framework in Marxist Political 
Economy 
It is commonplace that the Ricardian framework, if defined as above, is not confined 
to mainstream economics. Many Marxist and quasi-Marxist approaches to IERs, 
devised in response to the classical and neoclassical theories, can be regarded to share 
the same framework. They also tend to reduce differing forms of IERs to a barter 
relation, largely retaining the national perspective, and aspire to show that the 
core/imperial economies in the world market can structurally expropriate economic 
surpluses from the peripheral/colonial ones as a result of capitalist foreign trade. Here, 
‘gains from trade’ is simply replaced by ‘structural loss/inequality of trade’, and 
‘mutual benefit’ by ‘benefit for the stronger, and loss for the weaker’. 
Not all the Marxist theories of IERs are in the Ricardian framework. Take the 
‘classical’ theories of imperialism put forward by V.I. Lenin and his contemporaries. 
Despite minor differences, they were not interested in whether foreign trade was 
beneficial to a particular country but, rather, tried to investigate the structural 
consequences that the brutally rapid development of the capitalist world economy — 
the economic, political and military rivalry amongst the advanced capitalist powers — 
would bring about. So, for example, the violence exercised by the capital of the 
imperialist countries on the colonial peoples was not their immediate theoretical 
concern. It is true that such an attitude did invite some criticism from the theorists on 
Orientalism and (post-)colonialism, but it at least retained Marx’s critical and 
structural problématique reasonably well. 
It was after WWII that some Marxist political economists began positively to 
subscribe to the Ricardian framework, and even unconsciously. It was also when the 
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so-called ‘system of national states’ was consolidated as a result of the dissolution of 
the old colonial system. In the former colonial system, the international relationship 
between the imperial powers and their colonies was an object of political and military 
consideration, however fundamental the economic motivation might be. 
Consequently, from the economic point of view, it was inevitable that the inter-
imperial, rather than the core-periphery, relation stood out. However, now that the 
institutional integument ensuring the colonial system had been lifted, if only formally, 
its economic ‘base’ immediately became more transparent. International relations in 
general, that is, not just the one between the former imperialist powers and their 
colonies but also amongst the powers themselves, were reduced to quantitative ones 
where virtually all the national economies could be ranked in order of the degree of 
capitalist development. 138  In sum, as what is called the ‘international system of 
national states’ in the international relations discipline took root, new Marxist-
inspired theories of the world economy began to arise, including dependency theory, 
world-systems theory, theories of ‘unequal exchange’ (Brewer 1990, for a 
comprehensive overview). Opposing the ‘gains from trade’ thesis hailed by bourgeois 
economics, they focused upon the economic, not political, mechanism by which value 
was transferred from the less developed to the more developed country. However, 
whilst each of these approaches to the world economy did address specific aspects of 
contemporary capitalism, few were adequately embedded in Marx’s value theory, to 
say nothing of developing it. Indeed, being at best trapped in the rigid Ricardian 
framework, they were incapable of addressing the dynamics of capitalism fully. 
In the following section, one way of extending Marx’s value theory onto the ‘world 
market’ level will be developed based upon his characteristically dialectical method 
with an eye kept open in order not to get trapped in the Ricardian framework. This is 
not going to be an application of value theory; it is an extension. 
 
                                                
138	Marx,	 following	 Hegel,	 employs	 exactly	 the	 same	 logic	 to	 explain	 that	 the	 qualitative	
difference	between	people	from	different	statuses	of	the	pre-modern	times	is	reduced	to	a	
quantitative	 one	 in	 modern	 society.	 Thanks	 to	 this	 transformation,	 an	 individual	 can	 be	
compared	with	every	other	member	of	society	by	the	same	standard,	labour	(CW35:	54).	
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6.2.	TOWARDS	A	VALUE	THEORY	OF	THE	WORLD	MARKET	
This section is the conclusion of this whole thesis. It offers one possible way of 
conceptualising the world market, which Marx left unfinished.  
 
6.2.1. Critique: The Structure of Capital and Its Extension 
No doubt, an ultimate aim of Marx’s critique was to demolish existing political 
economy. But, to carry this out effectively, he needed to produce the ‘real’ political 
economy for himself. This is what he meant by ‘critique’, and it exactly coincided 
with the classical sense of the term (§ 5.1.1): ‘at once an exposé and, through that 
exposé, a critique of the system [of bourgeois economy]’ (CW40: 270). As a result, 
political economy would turn out to be shown to be superficial and deceptive. On the 
other hand, Marx built his theory by starting from the simplest categories and 
gradually introducing more complex ones. In this way, he tried to demonstrate that the 
fallacy of political economy was structural and multi-dimensional. 
Though unfinished, Marx’s three volume magnum opus, Capital, embodies the 
significance of his critique. In the first volume, the most fundamental structure of the 
capitalist economy is sketched with such concepts as value, money, capital, wage-
labour, and production and, based upon it, capital accumulation and its main 
consequences are explained. Volume Two introduces the process of circulation which 
is put aside in the previous volume. Most abstractly, this is equivalent to recognising 
the temporal and spatial gaps between production and realisation of value, and 
between sale and purchase of commodities, which necessarily invite additional 
analytical dimensions, also making the theoretical field composed in the previous 
volume more complex. The third volume, by dealing with how competition amongst 
capitals is produced and reproduced and gives out a uniform average rate of profit 
over the whole economy, at last makes manifest how the fundamental law of the 
determination of value as (normalised) labour established Volume One is reconciled 
with the reality that seemingly negates that law. The latter half of the last volume is 
devoted to showing how the total profit acquired by productive capital is distributed 
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to other branches of (unproductive) capital and propertied classes, though still very 
abstractly. 
If Marx stopped here, his value theory would become a most plausible account of the 
capitalist economy. But he elaborately emphasises, at every single moment in his 
account, that the capitalists’ profit is essentially the surplus labour taken from the 
labourers without paying anything in return. This is because political economy, 
especially the variant after 1830 which Marx labelled as ‘vulgar’, preaches that profit 
results from the capitalists’ abstinence, their efforts at technological innovation, 
economies in the process of circulation — in other words, from capital itself. By 
doing so, political economy conceals the antagonistic character of the capitalist 
system, championing it as the most suitable for the human race. It is also the case with 
the incomes which varied propertied classes acquire. While the political economists 
contend their incomes are the outcome of participating in, and contributing to, the 
production of profits, they are for Marx nothing but distributed parts from the total 
surplus value. In the end, Marx criticises that political economy is but a fairy tale 
which ideologically justifies the economic fantasies, not least those concerning the 
origin of profits, arising from everyday consciousness under capitalism. Thanks to 
this aspect, Marx’s theory becomes a ‘critique’, not just an ‘explanation’, of the 
capitalist economy.  
Table 6.1 summarises the main analytical points on which Marx focuses in each 
volume of Capital, together with the economic fantasies held by ‘bourgeois’ political 
economy, but negated by Marx’s analyses. If the process in Capital points to a 
gradual complexification, what we are going to do with the introduction of the new 
category of the world market is to fill out the blanks in the last row. For this, we have 
to relax the ‘one-national-economy’ assumption. From the outset, this is a tentative 
assumption for the convenience of analysis. In Figure 6.1, the real world (a) is 
regarded as a homogeneous space (b) under ‘one-national-economy’ assumption; 
there is no qualitative difference between the relationship between A and B, and A 
and C in (b). Both of them are just ‘relations’. This is the world assumed in Capital. 
But once that assumption is lifted away, and the existence of national borders between 
A and C is recognised, the relationship between A and B turns out to be 
‘international’ (c), which presents qualitatively new analytical challenges. At the 
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same time, the relationship between A and B is now identified, more concretely, as 
‘domestic’ in contradistinction to the A-C relationship. 
 
 
[Table 6.1] A Characterisation of Capital: Analysis and Critique 
 
 
[Figure 6.1] Abstraction and Complexification 
 
Now, there is in front of us not an abstracted one national economy but a collection of 
geographically divided national entities with differing racial, historical, cultural and 
social backgrounds. However, it is simply not possible to present in the theory the 
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whole of national differences. Since each of them has its own qualitatively specific 
power of determination, economic or non-economic, we can only consider them 
selectively, and in order. This is why we in the present thesis regard the differences 
amongst the national entities in the world as a matter of differing degrees of capitalist 
development. We can even rank them in that order. Of course, such consciousness 
presupposes that an equal relationship, if formally, should be in place amongst the 
national economies, a historical condition only achieved after World War II (§ 6.1.3). 
What changes are brought about? More than anything else, in the new framework of 
multiple national economies, it turns out that the social variables that Marx assumes 
are uniform in a given society at a given time are potentially plural in the world 
economy. There are many such variables: the socially necessary labour time in 
producing a commodity, normal intensity of labour, normal length of the working 
day, normal rate of surplus value, real average wage, and the average rate of profit, to 
name a few. In sum, we are now about to make it manifest in our theory that the 
world economy is fragmented and uneven, like capitalist development itself 
abstracting from the world economy as mode of production. 
As a result, the task at hand is to expand value theory over the fragmented and uneven 
world, and to identify and develop new critical points on that dimension. Of course, it 
has to be performed in the same spirit of Capital. In the following two sub-sections, 
the outcomes of the introduction of the new category, the world market, are to be 
expounded in two ways corresponding to the dual character of Marx’s concept of 
‘critique’: the positive analysis and the negative negation. It is hoped we would have a 
theory of IERs as an extension, not an application, of value theory at the end. 
 
6.2.2. The Positive/Analytical Dimension of Critical Extension 
(a) As an analytical exposition, Marx’s value theory is essentially about the (re-) 
production of capital, which is briefly summarised in the following ‘general formula 
of capital’: 
M — C(MP, LP) … P … Cʹ — Mʹ (=M+m). 
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Capital begins its life when the capitalist invests an amount of money (M) to buy the 
means of production (MP) and the labour power (LP) from their respective markets. 
He then organises the process of production, and it is here that valorisation takes place 
(P). Once the product containing more value than the capitalist expended (Cʹ) is sold 
at its value, he gets back his initial capital together with an amount of profit (m).  
In Capital, the above process is investigated under the ‘one-national-economy’ 
assumption. So the task is to demonstrate how the analysis in Capital is further 
developed when the process takes place over two or more national societies. Here, of 
course, national boundaries can be drawn at every node. The final product can be sold 
abroad; means of production or labour power may be provided from foreign 
countries; a factory itself may be built in a foreign country with people from differing 
national backgrounds employed; and it is also possible to make international loans to 
earn interest. In the tradition of Marxist political economy since Lenin, such 
international movement of capital has been viewed in terms of the movement of 
commodity capital, productive capital, and money capital, following Marx’s way of 
investigation of the circuit of capital in the second volume of Capital (Fine and Harris 
1979: 147-8). We will start from this point. 
 
(b) There is, however, a very important question to be dealt with before proceeding. 
Since we now have to compare commodities from different national societies with 
one another, we need to establish a standard for comparison beforehand. The question 
is: how should we compare national labours as the substance of value? The most 
fundamental principles are laid out by Marx in the first chapter of his Capital, of 
course, under the ‘one-national-economy assumption’. According to this, the value of 
a commodity is determined by the socially necessary labour time (SNLT) expended to 
make it. But since the length of the time spent by different labourers making the same 
kind of commodity would be varying, it is impossible to determine the SNLT for a 
commodity unless the conditions in which labour is performed are specified. Thus: 
‘Socially necessary labour time is the labour time required to produce any use value 
under the normal conditions of production in a given society and with the average 
degree of skill and intensity of labour prevalent in that society’ (CW35: 49. 
Translation modified). Once the labours within the same sector of production are 
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normalised and equalised, we would have a collection of within-sector average 
labours, which again should be equalised across sectors. Marx’s conceptual tool 
which captures the difference of the labours across sectors is the degree of 
complexity: 
More	complex	labour	counts	only	as	intensified,	or	rather	multiplied	simple	labour,	
so	 that	 a	 smaller	 quantity	 of	 complex	 labour	 is	 considered	 equal	 to	 a	 greater	
quantity	of	simple	 labour.	Experience	shows	that	this	reduction	 is	constantly	being	
made.	A	commodity	may	be	the	product	of	the	most	complex	labour,	but	its	value,	
by	 equating	 it	 to	 the	 product	 of	 simple	 labour,	 represents	 a	 definite	 quantity	 of	
simple	 labour.	 The	 different	 proportions	 in	 which	 different	 sorts	 of	 labour	 are	
reduced	to	simple	 labour	as	their	unit	of	measurement,	are	established	by	a	social	
process	that	goes	on	behind	the	backs	of	the	producers,	and,	consequently,	appear	
to	be	fixed	by	custom.	(CW35:	54.	Translation	modified.)	
This two-step reduction enables us to count each individual labour regardless of its 
sector as a multiplication of ‘simple average [abstract] labour’ (ibid.) and, based upon 
its length, to determine quantitatively the value of a commodity in which the labour is 
embodied.139 
Again, it has to be noted that such amount of value presupposes ‘the normal 
conditions of production in a given society,’ which include: ‘the workers' average 
degree of skill, the level of development of science and its technological application, 
the social organisation of the process of production, the extent and effectiveness of 
the means of production, and natural conditions’ (CW35: 50. Translation modified). 
These are the main elements which make up the concept of labour productivity. 
Productivity in itself does not affect value. For instance, if a capitalist has the 
productivity of labour doubled by improving his machine, he would produce twice the 
amount of use values as long as the amount of labour activated — measured in simple 
average labour, of course — and the labourers’ level of effort remain the same as 
before; consequently, the (exchange) value of a commodity thus produced is reduced 
by half. 
Similar to productivity, the intensity of labour also needs to be considered. The same 
capitalist may double the speed of his machine. Then, it is regarded that the 
                                                
139	For	a	comprehensive	discussion	on	the	equalisation	of	labour,	see	Saad-Filho	(2002),	Ch.	
5.	
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expenditure of labour over the same span of time is also doubled, or that the intensity 
of labour is doubled. This means that twice the amount of value is produced; if twice 
as many use values are accordingly produced, then the unit value of the commodities, 
unlike in the case of the enhancement of productivity, remain constant.  
Conceptually, the productivity of labour and its intensity are clearly distinguishable. 
But, in reality, the borderline between them is far from distinct. Indeed, it is a 
common practice that a capitalist when introducing a new, more efficient machine in 
the production also boosts up the speed of its operation (cf. CW35: 412-20). 
Nevertheless, why is it still possible to distinguish the two from each other? Assume 
that an average labourer shows better performance than before. In a community where 
its members share the same material, cultural and institutional circumstances, one can 
discern without much difficulty whether it is a result of the enhancement of working 
conditions, or simply because the labourer works harder. One can make this judgment 
based upon the sense of the social norms about working conditions and the level of 
effort. In other words, while labour productivity and labour intensity are essentially 
applicable to an individual field of production, each of them forms a social average 
over all fields of production through the social mechanism of the competition between 
capitalists and between labourers, the class struggle between capital and labour, the 
social degree of the application of scientific and technological knowledge to 
production, etc. 140  These averages, through competition, etc., act upon individual 
capitals as the social coercion by which to achieve them. 
However, in the world market which is fragmented and uneven, there are no material, 
socio-cultural and institutional backgrounds shared by all the nations that eventually 
form the ‘social averages’. Of course, it is always possible to calculate the ‘world 
average’ out of national averages (for productivity and intensity of labour); it is 
however only nominal and, as such, cannot regulate the behaviour of individual 
national economies. Therefore, in the world market, each of the national average 
                                                
140	‘It	is	clear	that	this	direct	dependence	of	the	operations,	and	therefore	of	the	labourers,	
on	each	other,	compels	each	one	of	them	to	spend	on	his	work	no	more	than	the	necessary	
time,	 and	 thus	 a	 continuity,	 uniformity,	 regularity,	 order,	 and	 even	 intensity	 of	 labour,	 of	
quite	a	different	kind,	is	begotten	than	is	to	be	found	in	an	independent	handicraft	or	even	
in	simple	co-operation’	(CW35:	350).	
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values for the productivity and intensity of labour just maintains itself, and the 
different values for different nations form a hierarchy. For example: 
In	 every	 country	 there	 is	 a	 certain	 average	 intensity	 of	 labour	 .	 .	 .	 The	 average	
intensity	 of	 labour	 changes	 from	 country	 to	 country;	 here	 it	 is	 greater,	 there	 less.	
These	national	averages	form	a	scale,	whose	unit	of	measure	is	the	average	unit	of	
universal	labour.	The	more	intense	national	labour,	therefore,	as	compared	with	the	
less	intense,	produces	in	the	same	time	more	value,	which	expresses	itself	 in	more	
money.	(CW35:	558,	559)	
Secondly, what is interesting in the world market is that, here, the difference between 
productivity and intensity is diluted. For, again, there are no socially shared standards 
by which people with different national backgrounds can tell productivity and 
intensity from each other in the world market. In this situation, the amount of 
(exchange) value can only be measured by the amount of the commodities produced, 
not by the amount of labour! Marx does make a very suggestive comment when he 
deals with piece-wages: ‘Piece wages do not, in fact, distinctly express any relation of 
value. It is not, therefore, a question of measuring the value of the piece by the 
working time incorporated in it, but on the contrary of measuring the working time 
the labourer has expended, by the number of pieces he has produced’ (CW35: 551-2). 
Commodities, when they are viewed with the world market in perspective, turn out to 
violate the very basic value determinations forged in the opening part of Capital 
based upon their social relations previously constructed on a hypothetically national 
level. Also, Marx makes it clear that piece wages ‘can only be a measure both of the 
productivity and intensity of labour’ (CW35: 558). If the ‘number of pieces’ becomes 
the standard for measuring value, the productivity of labour is no longer distinguished 
from the intensity of labour.141 Hence: 
But	the	law	of	value	in	its	international	application	is	yet	more	modified	by	this,	that	
on	the	world	market	the	more	productive	national	labour	reckons	also	as	the	more	
intense	.	.	.	(CW35:	559)	
                                                
141	Marx	makes	a	similar	judgment	in	another	context:	‘The	exceptionally	productive	labour	
operates	 as	 intensified	 labour;	 it	 creates	 in	 equal	 periods	 of	 time	 greater	 values	 than	
average	 social	 labour	 of	 the	 same	 kind’	 (CW35:	 323).	 In	 the	 end,	 ‘exceptionally’	 means	
‘beyond	the	shared	social	norms’.	
 
 
167 
In brief, labour productivity becomes functionally identical with labour intensity; 
indeed, virtually all the national differences that make each national average labour 
produce different amounts of a commodity in a given length of time are reduced to the 
difference in the intensity of labour. But, interestingly, these circumstances are 
generally called to form ‘national productivity’ (of labour) — not ‘national intensity’, 
and we take this expression since it appears more general. Ultimately, then, we have a 
hierarchical system of the national productivities of labour in the world market. 
To be noted lastly is that, in this hierarchy, the more ‘productive’ labour, as compared 
with the less, produces in the same time more value, which expresses itself in more 
gold, world money. In this sense, the hierarchical system of the national productivity 
would present itself as the international system of exchange rates.142 But they are not 
one and the same. For exchange rates in reality reflect a myriad of other 
circumstances. We simply abstract from those other factors, and assume in this thesis 
that exchange rates exactly reflect the differences in national productivity. Therefore, 
we get the following equations: 
[a hours of labour of country A] = [b hours of labour of country B], 
and  
[α units of currency of country A] = [β units of currency of country B]. 
In the world market where the movement of the social variable to form a single 
gravitational average is not working, it is possible that a commodity containing one 
hour of labour of country A has the same value with a commodity embodying four 
hours of labour of country B, for instance. Note that this is not the violation of the law 
of value; it is modification as Marx suggests in the previous excerpts. The modified 
law of value captures the various national differences in the world market which are 
summed up in their respective national productivity, and every national economy is 
                                                
142	‘In	proportion	as	capitalist	production	is	developed	in	a	country,	in	the	same	proportion	
do	the	national	intensity	and	productivity	of	labour	there	rise	above	the	international	level.	
The	different	quantities	of	commodities	of	the	same	kind,	produced	in	different	countries	in	
the	same	working	time,	have,	therefore,	unequal	international	values,	which	are	expressed	
in	different	prices,	 i.e.,	 in	sums	of	money	varying	according	to	international	values’	(CW35:	
559).	
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given a coefficient that would translate its national labour in the form in which it is 
possible to quantitatively compare it immediately with one another. Then, there is a 
hierarchy of the value producing power of labour in the world market; the more 
‘productive’ a national labour is regarded, the higher place it will take up. This is why 
virtually all the national governments are so much obsessed with the slogan ‘let’s 
enhance our national productivity’, especially in times of globalisation.  
 
(c) With this modified law of value, let us observe the international movement of 
capital. Interestingly, it is possible to get some important intuitions for the 
international movement of commodity, productive and money capital from each 
volume of Capital, respectively if not sequentially. Firstly, for the case of commodity 
capital, we can refer to the second volume where the existence of the temporal and 
spatial gaps between production and realisation of value, and between sale and 
purchase of commodities. Then, what would happen if those gaps lie across national 
borders? This is what is called international trade, the international movement of 
commodity capital. Although it is nothing unusual in capitalism for capital to move 
internationally, it was abstracted from by Marx, for analytical purposes, under the 
simplifying ‘one-national-economy’ assumption.  
Let us take an example. Assume, as above, that one hour of labour in country A is 
equivalent to four hours of labour in country B in the world market. But this ratio only 
reflects the overall difference in national productivity on average, and may not be 
maintained in every sector of production. So, for the production of a pair of shoes of 
the same kind, it is possible that one hour of labour is required in country A whereas 
five hours in country B. Now, if the shoes produced in A were exported to B, what 
would happen? 
This is normally dealt with under the heading of ‘international trade’ within the 
Ricardian framework as we defined it earlier. In this framework, a pair of shoes 
produced in A is directly exchanged with another kind of product from B. Here, the 
overall difference in national productivity is not considered; only the partial 
difference between the two sectors of production concerned matters. Especially for 
Mill, since value is the ratio by which a commodity is exchanged with another, the 
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formation of exchange itself always guarantees that it is ‘equal’. So, the only point 
that matters is whether such an exchange is beneficial to both the parties. If it is not, 
the trade will not be carried out. This is still the case with standard contemporary 
international economics. 
However, the real international commodity trade is not barter, even though it appears 
so at the aggregate level, say, in the national account. In reality, there only is the 
export/import of particular commodities. The normal situation is that the shoes of A 
(SA) compete with the shoes produced in B (SB) in the domestic shoe market of B.143 
The point is this: first, under the assumptions established above, it is legitimate to 
judge that the value of SA is four hours of the simple average labour of B; in spite of 
that, second, there is no problem in regarding it as objectifying five hours in the shoe 
market of B, for the socially necessary labour time in country B for a pair of shoes is 
five hours, and for the value of an alien commodity in a certain national market is 
evaluated by the value of the commodity that reflects the normal condition of 
production prevalent in the society concerned. 
 
 
[Figure 6.2] The international movement of commodity capital 
 
This is illustrated in Figure 6.2. Assume for simplicity that labour time = value = 
price within a national economy. Then, we can write the values of SA and SB are 1*LA 
and 5*LB, respectively. The exchange rate between the two countries is determined to 
be (4*LB / 1*LA) reflecting the productivity difference. According to this ratio, the 
value of SA has to be modified to be 4*LB in country B, but in the shoe market of B 
                                                
143	No	consideration	for	the	shoes	produced	in	other	countries,	for	simplicity.	
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the modification goes even further: SA is now regarded as of the value of 5*LB. 
Therefore, once it is sold, the exporter gets the amount of money of 5*LB in the 
currency of B, which is equivalent to 1.25*LA in A’s currency (transaction costs 
ignored). In the end, the shoe manufacturer of A can sell her commodity at the price 
25% higher than its normal domestic price through international trade, which is why 
she embarks on selling her commodities abroad. If the normal rate of profit for SA 
were 25%, that is, if the value (=price) of SA were composed of 0.80*LA as cost and 
0.20*LA as (normal) profit, then the total profit after international trade should be 
0.45*LA, resulting in the individual rate of profit, (0.45*LA / 0.80*LA)=56.25%. 
Such a high rate of profit will attract more capital from other sectors in country A to 
the shoe manufacture for export. Harsher competition amongst the capitals from A 
will lower the price for SA in the market in B; if it reaches as low as 4*LB, the 
additional profit from foreign trade will disappear, and there is no reason for trading 
in a foreign market. On the other hand, the introduction of the specialised capitalists 
in commodity dealings, whether they come from A or B, will not significantly change 
the situation; it only modifies the distribution of the total additional profit (0.25*LA 
per unit, in the above example). What matters is that, in whatever form international 
trade is carried out, real competition takes place amongst the capitals from both the 
country in a particular branch of production. The sectoral productivity gap between 
the two countries does not have to be equal to the national productivity gap. 
 
(d) Next, the international movement of productive capital can be investigated by 
reference to the third volume of Capital. The main discussion here is focused upon 
how competition amongst sectoral (average) capitals produces an average rate of 
profit over the whole economy; thereby, each capital, seen at the surface of the 
economy, appears to end up with a profit proportional to its total size, not to the 
amount of living labour it employs. Obviously, this appears to be a violation of the 
fundamental law of the determination of value according to labour time, but what 
Marx does is to lay bare the contradictory modus operandi of the law of value by 
systematically connecting link by link between the fundamental law and its 
appearance on the surface of the economy. 
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It goes without saying that such a mechanism will be even more complicated when 
the fact that those capitals in competition have a variety of different nationalities in 
reality. But this is not simply a quantitative matter. Assume there are two national 
economies in different phases of capitalist development. Which one would capital 
prefer? Where of the two countries would the rate of profit higher? In general, since 
the composition of capital will be higher in the advanced country but, at the same 
time, the higher labour productivity of the advanced country will necessarily mean the 
higher rate of surplus value, it is not possible to determine theoretically which 
national rate of profit will be higher (CW37: 212-4). If so, what about moving the 
productive facilities from the more to the less developed country? The high 
productivity of the more developed country, whatever its sources (cf. CW35: 334-35), 
will be materialised in the form of advanced machinery and other facilities, and the 
effective organisation of labour. If a capital can export these to a developing country, 
and can combine them with cheaper labour power there, then it might realise a profit 
rate which otherwise could not even be dreamt of. In Capital, this possibility is almost 
completely ignored because its analytical field is located at a more general and simple 
level. 
Table 6.2 is a simple numerical example for this. Assume that there are only two 
countries in the world market in different phases of capitalist development, and take a 
field of production which is relatively more internationalised. Capitals X and Y are 
those reflecting the normalities, both nationally and sectorally, of the more advanced 
(A) and less advanced (B) country, respectively. It would be reasonable to suppose 
that X should use more machinery and less labour than Y, and that the normal 
working day be shorter but the rate of surplus value be higher in country A. Also 
assume that the world price of production in the sector is determined according to the 
price of production of X. If the productivity of labour of A is three times higher than 
that of B and, for convenience’ sake, prices in the world market are quoted in B’s 
currency, then all the values and prices coming from A should be tripled in the world 
market. We have the following equations: 
1*wA = 1 hour of simple average labour of country A,  
1*wB = 1 hour of simple average labour of country B, 
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and  
1*wA = 3*wB = 3*w  
(wA, wB and w are the units of value and price in country A, country B and the 
world market, respectively). 
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Now, compare the two rows starting with X and Y in Table 6.2, respectively. Capitals 
X and Y produce 20 units of the same commodity for a working day using the same 
amount of raw material worth 20w, but they use different quantities of both 
machinery and labour. First, X employs a unit of machinery worth 80w, and 5 
labourers working 8 hours a day. They add new value of 40wA to the total product, 
which, with a labourer’s daily wage being socially set to be 3wA, is divided into total 
wages of 15wA and surplus value of 25wA. Converting these monetary amounts into 
the world market unit, we get 45w and 75w, respectively, and the rate of surplus value 
is 166.7%. In the end, 20 units of product worth 220w are produced. Since we assume 
the unit value of this commodity becomes the world price of production of this 
commodity, capital X ends up with a total profit of 220w, and the corresponding rate 
of profit is {220 − (100+45)} / (100+45) = 51.7%. 
On the other hand, capital Y employs a less productive machine worth only half the 
value of what X uses, and twice many labourers. Since twelve hour day is the social 
norm in country B, and this is to be evenly divided up into variable capital and surplus 
value (i.e., the rate of surplus value is 100%), the total daily value added (=120wB 
=120w) is split into total wages of 60w and surplus value of 60w.Thus 20 units of the 
final product worth 180w are produced. While their individual value is 9w, the market 
price in the world market is set 11w, enabling capital Y to get surplus profit of 2w per 
unit sold. At the end of the day, Y gets 220w with a profit rate of {220 − (60+60)} / 
(60+60) = 83.3%. 
Now suppose that the average capital in the same sector of country A builds a factory 
in country B, and call it Xʹ. To maintain the original technical composition of capital, 
Xʹ employs five workers to run the same machine used in its home country. But since 
they work for 12 hours instead of 8, they will consume 1.5 times more raw material, 
which also requires more wear and tear of the machine. As a result, the value of the 
total constant capital consumed will be 90+30=120w, and the value of the total 30 
units of product 180w. Whilst the individual unit value of this commodity is reduced 
to 6w, its world market price is still 11w; the total revenue of Xʹ is 330w, and its rate 
of profit is {330 − (120+30)} / (120+30) = 120%! 
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In conclusion, by internationalising the process of production itself, capital Xʹ can 
enjoy a tremendously high rate of profit. Let us compare X and Xʹ in Table 6.2 to 
understand this situation. It is certain that the huge amount of profit originates from 
the capability of the internationalising capital to lower the individual value of the 
internationally produced commodity vis-à-vis its world market value, by exploiting 
the difference in the social conditions — the value of labour power, the length of the 
working day, the rate of surplus value, etc. — between the nations concerned. This is 
amongst the normal ways in which capital gets profit, but is definitely not considered 
by Marx. How, then, is the extra profit characterised? It appears to be the extra 
surplus value or its equivalent form taken in the sphere of exchange, but is clearly 
different from it in that the enhanced productivity does not come from capital’s effort 
to improve the productive facilities. Or, as far as the lengthening of the working day 
(from 8 to 12 hours) is concerned, it looks like the production of ‘absolute’ surplus 
value, but this is acquired at the huge expense of the rate of surplus value which is 
lowered from 166.7% to 100%. But the total sum of the extra profit for Xʹ is much 
larger than the absolute surplus value generated. 
 
 
[Figure 6.3] The decomposition of the individual commodity value 
 
Obviously the huge extra profit comes from nowhere but the cheaper labour cost 
available in a latecomer country. Figure 6.3 shows how the individual value of the 
commodities produced by X and Xʹ, respectively, is decomposed. It is clear from it 
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that, if the overall prices in country B are tripled to be equal to those of country A, the 
extra profit will almost disappear. Note that the extra profit does not completely 
disappear since there still remains some advantage occasioned by the ‘economies to 
scale’, that is, longer use of labour for a day in country B. 
It is proposed that the concept of ground rent, especially what Marx termed 
differential rent of the first type (DRI) can be helpful in explaining that extra profit. 
Traditionally, both labour and land have been recognised as the creators of wealth, as 
Marx once said: ‘As William Petty puts it, labour is its father and the earth its mother’ 
(CW35: 53. Also see CW24: 81). Of course, what he meant by wealth is use value, 
not exchange value. As for the latter, only human labour is established as the 
substance of value, and its measure under the capitalist mode of production. This does 
not mean that nature plays no role; it, generally speaking, acts as an element which 
makes up labour productivity. That capitalist who succeeds in lowering the individual 
value of his commodity vis-à-vis its social value by utilizing the mixture of the variety 
of circumstances around the labour process — technology, natural conditions, 
knowledge, and the social character of labour — can temporarily enjoy extra surplus 
value until his competitors can achieve the same degree of productivity. Generally, 
then, the fertility of land should be one such element of productivity, especially in 
agriculture. But, historically, varying forms of landed property have long been in 
place and, thanks to this, the landowner has the power to appropriate the contribution 
thought to have been made by his land to the productivity of the agricultural business 
performed on his land. That is, he takes as rent the part of the value of the agricultural 
product which exceeds the price of production (= cost price + average profit) 
established in the other fields of production as a result of competition. Especially, 
DRI represents the way for the landowner to appropriate the part of productivity 
increase which originates from the superior fertility of his land compared to the worst 
land used. The more fertile a land is, the lower the individual value of the corn 
produced from there would become, and the larger the difference between its 
individual value and the social value would result. 
Interestingly, to the productive capital which moves internationally over the world 
market, labour appears as if it were a natural power of creating value in general. The 
significance of the social determinations which distinguish labour from nature as 
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creators of wealth become feeble in the world market. The employment of labour in a 
national society generally entails a set of social conventions for capital to comply 
with, but capital can bypass them in the world market. It is just like there in the world 
market is a lack of the social foundations needed to distinguish the productivity of 
labour and its intensity. Firstly, as mentioned earlier, in the sphere of production 
which is well internationalised over the world market, labour — but of which country? 
— cannot act as the measure of (world) value but, instead, once the world market 
price for a given commodity is formed through whatever process, the productivity of 
labour of a nation is evaluated back according to the amount of the commodity 
produced by that labour (the transformation of productivity into intensity).144 In the 
end, the problem for a capital considering the internationalisation of its productive 
facilities is the (more or less limited) choice of the destination amongst the national 
labours with such differing productivities and, here, productivity should be inversely 
proportional to the labour cost, given any other factors which determine productivity 
remain unaffected by this choice. 
In other words, that capital makes a choice amongst the national labours with 
differing productive capacities — equivalent to differing wage levels — just as the 
industrial farmer does amongst the lands with differing degrees of fertility. However, 
in the latter case, the existence of landed property is of prime importance. As Ben 
Fine emphatically argued, ‘differential rents exist, not because surplus profits exist, 
but because these are appropriated by the landlord rather than by the capitalist’ (Fine 
1986: 123. See also Fine and Saad-Filho 2004: 153-65). Given this, we can say at 
least that the surplus profit originating from the utilisation of more ‘fertile’ labour in 
the world market simply assumes the form of differential rent. But, more positively, 
in the case of the international movement of productive capital, the state of the host 
country can and does act as the landowner. For it can appropriate the value 
differential by setting a special minimum wage for foreign capitals to be a lot higher 
than normal in its country. We just assumed in Table 6.2 that the internationalising 
capital, Xʹ, gets all the rent. In the end, reality should lie somewhere between the two 
extremes. Lastly, the normal wage may rise and the working day may shorten as a 
                                                
144	In	this	sense,	we	may	even	say	that	labour	submerges	as	one	element	of	productivity	in	
the	world	market.	
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result of both the intensification of international competition over the labour market 
of country B, and the labour movement there. Then, the incentive for a foreign capital 
(Xʹ) to build productive bases in B will become weaker. 
 
 
[Figure 6.4] The international movement of productive capital 
 
(e) Lastly, let us turn our attention to the international movement of money capital, 
that is, international loans. This is the simplest to deal with of the three forms of 
internationalisation of capital. Since money is the general form of value, its 
international movement is in itself a movement of value in abstract. The national 
currency as the form of national value can be converted through the table of 
international exchange rates into any other currency, or into world money (CW28: 96-
8). 
As far as such conversion is concerned, any extra benefit could be expected from 
international lending. In this sense, the crucial reason for any international movement 
of money is the existence of the difference in interest rates amongst nations. 
Theoretically, though, any international difference in interest rates should disappear 
as the movement of money capital gets bigger and more frequent, and be offset by the 
exchange rates (cf. interest parity theorem). Even Marx, whilst recognising the role 
played by nationally peculiar factors in determining interest rates in a given society, 
approves the possibility of the equalisation of interest rates in the world market 
(CW37: Ch. 22). However, reality is still far from such a homogenous world. The 
more people and companies get access to credit instruments as capitalism develops, 
the more diversified interest rates become even within a given national society 
corresponding to the variety of properties of those who need money; indeed, credit 
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rating agencies are amongst the most powerful and promising business entities in the 
contemporary economy! In the world market, national differences amongst national 
interest rates persist reflecting the specificities of national societies and, more 
generally, there are opposite forces of convergence and divergence in interest rates in 
the capitalist development, especially at the level of the world market. As a result, in 
times of zero interest rate in the advanced economies these days, the base rates in 
many developing countries are still near or even above 10%. 
 
 
[Figure 6.5] The international movement of money capital 
 
(f) So far an attempt has been made to incorporate the varying forms of the 
international movement of capital in the framework of value theory by developing 
Marx’s formula for the circuit of capital. A most fundamental aspect of the Marxist 
critique of the Ricardian framework concerns the role of the world market in forming 
the concept of value. We touched upon this issue by emphasising the significance of 
the world market as ‘presupposition’ (see § 4.2.3). Capitalism is, in essence, a system 
of producing the commodity by mobilising the means of production and labour power 
on a world scale, and for satisfying demand from around the world. In other words, 
the formation of the world market was necessary in establishing labour time as value. 
The value of a commodity has been determined by the forces of world capitalism 
from its origins. So was the value of the linen as considered by Marx in the first 
chapter of Capital. Although Marx intentionally ignored the function of these forces 
in the production of the linen, their presence could not be eliminated completely. 
Generally speaking, it is impossible to tell to what extent an introduction of a new 
machine is a result of world competition rather than domestic competition and, so, it 
is absurd to try to do so in abstract. Bearing this in mind, however, we have been 
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interested in the more evident and more identifiable aspects of the global forces in this 
section. The more complex determinations of value developed here make the concept 
of value more concrete. 
So far, emphasis has been laid upon the enduring difference between ‘national’ values. 
But there is also a tendency for convergence: as international competition between 
capitals unfolds, the productivity differentials in individual fields of production 
converge towards the national differential and, as a result, the national differential 
itself gets smaller. Also, that differential necessarily reduces when individual capitals 
seek to realise bigger extra profits by continually changing their trade partners, and 
the international movement of means of production and labour power becomes more 
frequent and active. Then, the productive powers of different national labours, 
together with the conditions for production, will become more equal. However, this 
process can never be completed and will be interrupted by counter-tendencies, as in a 
national or other geographical context, not least in the absence of the institutional 
bodies such as the ‘world’ state that guarantee and enforce the equalisation movement 
on a world scale on a par within national boundaries. At the more concrete levels, 
further, there is the possibility for capital’s strategic behaviour to maintain the 
existing differences.145 
 
6.2.3. The Negative Dimension of Critical Extension 
(a) What makes Capital outstanding is that, based upon the insight that the capitalist 
economic mechanism itself engenders the inconsistencies of the essence and the 
appearance of the economy, it seeks to explain these inconsistencies systematically. 
Those theories which cannot even raise this question only produce misleading 
conceptions about the sources of profit (see Table 6.1). Therefore, the main task for 
Marx is to demonstrate how the exploitative essence of capitalism in the sphere of the 
immediate process of production disguises itself at other more superficial levels. In 
                                                
145	This	cannot	be	pursued	any	further	here.	See,	instead,	Heide	(1993)	and	Picciotto	(1991),	
for	instance.	
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extending this theory, it is of crucial importance to maintain such a critical 
perspective. 
From the simple analysis laid out in the last subsection, we could see that, as soon as 
the international dimension of capital movement is taken into consideration, the real 
source of profit becomes more obscured, and the appearance of capital’s circuits more 
distanced from its exploitative foundation. Firstly, think about the ‘modification’ 
proposition of the law of value in the world market which is the starting point of our 
previous discussion. What this proposition points to is not simply that value 
experiences a quantitative modification in the world market; the essential 
determination of value itself is changed. In a sense, this is a process in which value is 
stripped of its social character. In the world market it is impossible to relate different 
labour times with each other directly, for there is no such social ground that enables it 
as within a national society. It is all the more so when there are many, instead of two 
as in our example, countries. In the world market, it is not that the total value is 
determined by the amount of labour expended; conversely, labour’s capacity of 
creating value is evaluated by the quantity of the commodities produced. Now, the 
national labour which produces more use values within a given duration of time is 
regarded as producing more (exchange) value. Higher ‘national productivity’ appears 
to be the more powerful value creating capacity. Productivity appears to be the source 
of value! In this sense, it is not ungrounded that the capitalist governments are 
obsessed with the necessity of enhancing national productivity, but it does not mean 
such an appearance has to be accepted. 
‘Bourgeois’ political economists tend to count the deceptive appearance in the world 
market as an excuse for rejecting the law of value. For Mill the son, especially, it was 
the main ground upon which he discarded the labour theory of value which Ricardo 
had established but failed to clarify enough, and accepted the ‘utility’ theory of value. 
Consequently, central roles in economic theory were given to use value, instead of 
value, and utility from its consumption. On the other hand, once the conception that 
value is created out of ‘(national) productivity’, then all the factors which make up 
national productivity, not just techniques of production and labour organisation but 
also population, climate, geopolitics, etc., are hailed as the ultimate sources of value. 
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(b) The fetishisation of national productivity, and also of the sources of value and 
profit, advances and reinforces itself through a variety of modalities of the 
international movement of capital. However, economic theories on IERs have largely 
failed to take issue with it. More than anything else, it should be noted that while the 
existing IERs theories — especially those from the Marxist tradition — have had the 
tendency to view IERs at the level of national averages.146 However, the real agent 
that establishes IERs is the individual capital involved in the production of a 
particular commodity. The level of national averages is a suitable level of abstraction 
to deal with the overall quantitative modification of the national value system in the 
world market, as suggested by the ‘modification’ proposition; however, as we 
ascertained from the investigation of the international movement of commodity 
(capital), a sort of qualitative distortion of value beyond the quantitative modification 
does also take place in the world market. The modification of value, which the 
‘modification’ proposition signifies, is in a sense nothing special, for similar 
modification or conversion is also being made incessantly within a given national 
society, which is what Saad-Filho (2002) calls the ‘equalisation’ of value.147 The most 
important difference is this: in a national economy the social averages, or the social 
constants, are substantially formed and determined all the way from the deepest root 
of economic processes — the most intimate interaction between capitals and between 
capital and labour. And, as such, those averages regulate the behaviour of the 
individual capitals and labourers. On the other hand, in the world market, the averages 
are only nominally calculated and, so, do not entail a tendency to sublate the national 
differences within the world market. Therefore, even if the national value systems are 
made commensurable at the aggregate level through ‘modification’, individual sectors 
of production may remain highly incommensurable, which manifest itself when a 
commodity is exported from one country to another. 
                                                
146	Those	discussions	took	place	 in	 the	 late-1960s	and	the	mid-1970s	under	the	heading	of	
‘unequal	exchange’:	Samir	Amin,	Arghiri	Emmanuel,	Ernest	Mandel	and	Christian	Palloix,	to	
name	a	few.	
147	‘The	different	proportions	in	which	different	sorts	of	labour	are	reduced	to	simple	labour	
as	 their	unit	of	measurement,	are	established	by	a	 social	process	 that	goes	on	behind	 the	
backs	of	the	producers,	and,	consequently,	appear	to	be	fixed	by	custom’	(CW35:	54).	
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Put differently, the ratio between the productivity of two national average labours is 
not necessarily applied to every single sector of production. The sort of labour that is 
regarded as simpler than average labour in one country can be taken as more complex 
than average in the other. To generalise, every country has its own characteristic 
system of relative prices. This reflects the historical and social specificities of a 
nation, which should be introduced and explained one by one as the theory proceeds 
towards more concrete areas. To a superficial eye, however, any profit acquired by an 
internationalising capital that exploits this difference in the national price systems will 
appear to be originating from that very capacity of capital. 
Secondly, in the international movement of productive capital, it was shown that the 
combination of capital and labour with different social backgrounds eliminates 
‘sociality’ from the relationship they establish. This is not just a theoretical but also a 
real process. The social bondages inflicted upon social capital include, apart from the 
pressure of competition, a set of social obligations and proportionalities to be 
observed and maintained to ensure the smooth reproduction of social total capital and 
society per se. But there is no way to impel a capital from an advanced country to 
take such obligations, not least when this capital operates to produce a commodity for 
foreign markets of the advanced world. Indeed, such a capital is an alien power, and 
the labourers of the host country are regarded only as a ‘factor of production’ and, as 
such, no better than natural resources with a certain amount of productive capacity. 
Consequently, whilst the part of the profit coming from the extra utility of labour is 
transformed into a rent equivalent, an illusion grows that a large sum of profit comes 
from the ability of capital to secure such productive capacities, that is, the ability to 
choose the best and cheapest option amongst the varying combinations that increase 
its rate of profit beyond the national limitations. Of course, in this case, too, all the 
profit capital gets originates from the surplus labour it exploits in the process of 
production. 
Thirdly, in the international movement of money capital, the fetish character taken by 
the movement of money capital in general develops even further. Basically, since in 
this movement the process of valorisation of capital is completely concealed, the 
capital fetishism acquires its most developed form. Its mystified form, M—Mʹ, is in 
fact: 
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M—{M—C(MP, LP)…P…C2—M2}— Mʹ. 
What complication arises when monetary loans are made internationally? The basic 
form is maintained, but since a variety of different interest rates will prevail in the 
world market, the ultimate amount of interest will also vary:148 
M—{M—C(MP, LP)…P…C3—M3}— Mʺ. 
What is crucial here is that the money owner can now compare the two cases. Of 
course, he will ‘invest’ his money wherever he can expect the maximum amount of 
interest and, ceteris paribus, higher interest rate will yield more interest. Thus, we 
have an additional illusion about surplus value — that interest, itself a form taken by 
surplus value, arises from the national difference between national rates of interest. 
 
(c) Now, let us pay more attention to combining our discussion above with that of 
Capital. According to Marx in the last volume of Capital, the revenues of the 
propertied classes who are not directly involved in production are no more than 
distributed parts of the surplus value which the capitalist class exploits in the process 
of production. However, ‘vulgar’ political economy claims that the revenues of the 
social classes including the capitalist and the labourer are the just rewards for their 
participation in and contribution, direct or indirect, to the production of value. This is 
the ultimate illusion reached by ‘bourgeois’ political economy under the ‘one-
national-economy’ assumption, and all the erroneous propositions depend upon this 
illusion.149 
                                                
148	We	disregard	the	variation	of	the	rate	of	exchange	over	time,	and	assume	for	simplicity	it	
remain	constant.	
149	‘Vulgar	 economy	 actually	 does	 no	 more	 than	 interpret,	 systematise	 and	 defend	 in	
doctrinaire	fashion	the	conception	of	the	agents	of	bourgeois	production	who	are	entrapped	
in	bourgeois	production	relations.	It	should	not	astonish	us,	then,	that	vulgar	economy	feels	
particularly	at	home	in	the	estranged	outward	appearances	of	economic	relations	in	which	
these	prima	 facie	 absurd	and	perfect	 contradictions	appear	and	 that	 these	 relations	 seem	
the	more	self-evident	the	more	their	 internal	relationships	are	concealed	from	it,	although	
they	are	understandable	to	the	popular	mind’	(CW37:	804).	
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In	capital	—	profit,	or	still	better	capital	—	interest,	land	—	rent,	labour	—	wage,	in	
this	economic	trinity	represented	as	the	connection	between	the	component	parts	
of	value	and	wealth	in	general	and	its	sources,	we	have	the	complete	mystification	
of	 the	capitalist	mode	of	production,	 the	conversion	of	social	 relations	 into	 things,	
the	direct	coalescence	of	the	material	production	relations	with	their	historical	and	
social	 determination.	 It	 is	 an	 enchanted,	 perverted,	 topsy-turvy	world	 .	 .	 .	 (CW37:	
817)	
How, then, does this prime illusion at the level of a national society develop if the 
‘one-national-economy’ assumption is loosened? This is our ultimate question, the 
outline of whose answer we have already sketched. In the world market, we have 
already pointed out, the national economy comes to the fore as the basic unit 
constituting the (world) economy, and such an appearance makes the starting point of 
mainstream theories of IERs. This sudden rise of the national economy without the set 
of necessary mediations — itself, an important character of the Ricardian framework 
— in effect nullifies the analysis so far carried out based upon the class as the basic 
analytical unit, and consolidates the bourgeois illusions which are summarised in the 
‘trinity formula’ as firmly established presuppositions. Consequently, the properties 
of the main classes in the capitalist economy, capital, labour and land, are also 
established as ‘factors of production’ with each playing a rather substitutable role. At 
first, this ‘reification of the relations of production’ (CW37: 818) only happens in the 
consciousness of the agents of production, but we have confirmed in the previous 
subsection that it becomes reality at least in the world market. Therefore, 
in	competition	on	the	world-market	 it	 is	solely	a	question	of	whether	commodities	
can	 be	 sold	 advantageously	 with	 existing	 wages,	 interest	 and	 rent	 at,	 or	 below,	
existing	general	market-prices,	 i.e.,	realising	a	corresponding	profit	of	enterprise.	 If	
wages	and	the	price	of	land	are	low	in	one	country,	while	interest	on	capital	is	high,	
because	 the	 capitalist	 mode	 of	 production	 has	 not	 been	 developed	 generally,	
whereas	 in	another	country	wages	and	 the	price	of	 land	are	nominally	high,	while	
interest	on	capital	 is	 low,	 then	 the	capitalist	employs	more	 labour	and	 land	 in	 the	
one	 country,	 and	 in	 the	 other	 relatively	 more	 capital.	 These	 factors	 enter	 into	
calculation	 as	 determining	 elements	 in	 so	 far	 as	 competition	 between	 these	 two	
capitalists	 is	 possible.	 Here,	 then,	 experience	 shows	 theoretically,	 and	 the	 self-
interested	 calculation	 of	 the	 capitalist	 shows	 practically,	 that	 the	 prices	 of	
commodities	 are	 determined	 by	 wages,	 interest	 and	 rent,	 by	 the	 price	 of	 labour,	
capital	 and	 land,	 and	 that	 these	 elements	 of	 price	 are	 indeed	 the	 regulating	
constituent	factors	of	price.	(CW37:	861)	
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In this world market, the national social illusion laid out in Capital is transformed into 
the new illusion, ‘national income according to national productivity’. Any condition 
that affects national productivity is deemed to have value creating power. In any case, 
however, all the incomes and revenues in the capitalist economy can be correctly 
understood based upon the exploitation relation between capital and labour, and our 
analysis in the previous subsection (§ 6.2.2) offers a brief account. 
 
6.2.4. Concluding Remarks 
So far, we have attempted to outline a theory of IERs as an extension of Marx’s value 
theory in his Capital. Extra care has been taken to maintain his critical perspective on 
conventional political economy. Since for Marx the capitalist economic processes do 
not reflect their corresponding real human relations lucidly, it is crucial to track down 
how such relations are distorted in a series of economic processes of production, 
exchange, distribution and consumption. In other words, his main critique in Capital 
is that political economy is composed based upon the distorted appearance of the 
capitalist economy.  
The reason why this is very important in understanding Marx’s value theory is, as 
argued in Chapter 5 (esp. § 5.1.3), because its content, task, and process, that is, its 
analytical aspects, are largely determined by the critical points he wanted to address 
against conventional political economy. Marx was especially interested in developing 
his observation that the various revenues seen on the surface of the capitalist economy 
to be acquired by the main classes of the capitalist, the labourer and the landowner are 
fundamentally rooted in the exploitative relationship between the capitalist and the 
labourer in the sphere of immediate material production.  
It is this character of Marx’s theory that many of the former attempts at composing a 
Marxist theory of IERs, especially those proposed after WWII, have largely failed to 
appreciate in spite of the high analytical precision they have achieved. Indeed, there 
are instances in which Marx’s central instruments such as the reproduction scheme 
and the mechanism of the formation of the price of production are extensively 
employed and developed. But even though these offer a good exercise on those 
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concepts, they do not seem to recognise the theoretical task described above. Rather, 
dividing the national economies in the world into two (or three) groups according to 
their economic and political power, they tend to assume that two representative 
nations from different groups exchange the commodities they (are forced to) 
specialise with each other. In this respect, those theorists as diverse as Andre Gunder 
Frank (1971), Immanuel Wallerstein (1979), Ernest Mandel (1972), Samir Amin 
(1973; 1977) and Arghiri Emmanuel (1969) are not very different. Whilst it was 
criticised earlier in § 6.1.3 that their way of conceptualising the world economy is the 
Ricardian framework, they indeed have been instrumental in illuminating what 
structural outcomes are produced by the development of capitalism as a world 
economy. However, this merit also exposes them to the common criticism that these 
approaches are too rigid or deterministic that they are impotent in addressing the 
recent developments in the world economy such as the rise of the East Asian NICs 
and China. 
On the other hand, there have been other instances that bear more similarity with our 
approach. Christian Palloix (1975) tried to conceptualise the international movement 
of capital by means of developing the general formula of capital circuits. But his 
theoretical focus was different form ours. He primarily used different forms of 
internationalisation to periodise capitalism, emphasising the role of the state in that 
process. Also, there was a set of debate in Germany which came to be called the 
‘German world market debate in the 1970s’ (Nachtwey and ten Brink 2008; Holloway 
and Picciotto 1978). The participants in this debate seemed to be aware that 
developing the category of the world market was an important moment of the 
extension of Marx’s value theory. Especially, Claudia von Braunmühl rightly thought 
‘national economy can only adequately be understood as a particular instance turning 
more or less upon its inner configuration, but which, nevertheless, is an integral 
element of the world market’ (von Braunmühl 1978: 162). But the German scholars 
appear to have been too conscious of the logical derivation of the new concepts from 
the more elementary ones without producing any definitive conclusions. One result is 
that von Braunmühl rejected the idea that the law of value might be modified 
(Nachtwey and ten Brink 2008: 49). 
 
 
188 
In concluding this section, it is worth noting that, as our focus of observation moves 
to the more superficial spheres with the introduction of the world market category, 
that is, as we move farther from the fundamental sphere of exploitation, fetishism 
advances more and more, and the significance of economic categories is often 
obfuscated. In this section, we employed Marx’s argument that the productivity of 
labour and its intensity is not distinguished from each other in the world market. 
While labour productivity and labour intensity are two distinct moments which 
constitute productive power in general, the world market lacks in the historical, social 
and institutional foundations which make such a delicate understanding possible. It is 
in the same vein that we insisted in § 6.2.2 that labour should appear productive 
power in general to an internationalising capital over the world market. 
Consequently, we resorted to the category, rent (DRI), to explain the huge extra profit 
acquired by the capital that transplants its productive bases to where cheaper and, 
therefore, more productive labour is available. This has its own merit, but is also 
flawed, not least because we have not examined the development, or modification, of 
the rent category itself. Indeed, the significance of landed property is much greater in 
he world market, and especially today when access to various natural resources is 
crucial in economic development. This does indicate the direction for future research. 
Lastly, there is an issue of migration. Throughout this chapter, we have assumed 
mobile capital and static labour. But labour also moves, and the role for migration in 
the contemporary world economy is huge, both accelerating and delaying the 
economic development for particular regions. Further, the economic significance of 
the remittances as an immediate outcome of migration cannot be ignored in the 
analysis of the world economy today. Whilst we have limited our analysis with the 
intention of establishing more developed forms of the most fundamental aspects of 
the capitalist economy, there are a lot more to consider to produce a self-contained 
theory of the world market. 
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6.3.	CONCLUSION	OF	PART	II	
Part II (‘The World Market in Value Theory’) of this thesis has been aimed at 
presenting a possible realisation of Marx’s unfinished plan of including in his mature 
value theory the world market as a constituent category of the capitalist economy. In 
this Part, we have endeavoured on three points. First, we tried to explain the meaning 
of Marx’s critique as clearly as possible in Chapter 5. Against some interpretations, 
we emphasised Marx’s critique is a positive as well as negative project. Moreover, his 
critical problematisation against existing political economy directs the way of his 
analytical strategy of composing his own political economy. Second, this is why we 
devoted a section (§ 6.1) to investigating how conventional economics has dealt with 
IERs. In our language, those economists from mercantile to neoclassical, standing in 
the ‘Ricardian framework’, have sought to prove the existence of the ‘gains from 
trade’. 
Lastly, in § 6.2, we introduced the category of the world market positively, and 
outlined a Marxist theory of IERs based upon his value theory. Here, we emphasised 
that this was not an application of what he had already presented in Capital, but an 
extension of his categories over the new, more concrete, theoretical field occasioned 
by the introduction of the new category. Our focus here was to maintain both Marx’s 
analytical and critical bearings, together with their relationship. At least, this has the 
merit of rectifying the general tendency in the existing (quasi-) Marxist theories on 
IERs to lean towards the analytical aspect only; there is the danger of becoming a 
positive ‘explanation’ devoid of the critical essence. 
Admittedly, whilst our discussion may be virtuous, in its own right, in that it develops 
the critical side of a value theoretic approach to IERs, it is far from being a 
comprehensive account of the dynamics of capitalism at the world level. It goes 
without saying that there is a set of categories to be untangled concerning the world 
market itself, and dealing with them also involves some historical considerations. 
There are others, without which our understanding of capitalist IERs is severely 
limited even if they are not immediately related to the world market. Amongst others, 
it is crucial to take into account the economic role played by the state, and credit. 
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As for the state, its economic presence has been strongly recognised only after the 
‘Keynesian Revolution’ in the 20th century. But, in retrospect, it is also possible to 
conceptualise the contemporary ‘active state’ and its functions at the level of the 
capitalist state in general, without assuming any consecutive development of state 
forms. This is what was attempted at (unsuccessfully) in the so-called ‘state derivation’ 
debate in Germany in 1960s and 1970s, and Adam Smith did present a well thought 
out outline of the modern state in his Wealth of Nations as early as 1776 which is far 
from the mythical ‘night-watchman state’. Marx did also have an idea of the state, 
how to deal with it, in his critical project.150 Indeed, whilst we have so far argued to 
the effect that national aggregations tend to distort the fundamental economic 
processes which are played out by classes, the state is indeed an important economic 
mediator in the world market as well as in the national economic formation. 
According to Marx, the state was instrumental in forming the initial conditions for 
capital accumulation, and he listed the ‘bloody legislation’ from the 15th century 
onward, colonial system, public credit and national debts, commercial wars, 
protection, and heavy taxes as main instances of primitive accumulation (CW35: Part 
VIII). Then, the state itself is, like the world market, at once a presupposition for, and 
a result of capitalist development. 
Credit also played an essential role in the establishment of the capitalist system, 
mainly by facilitating large investments in social infrastructure. So, its significance 
should be felt most deeply at the world level; this is why Marx often mentioned the 
world market and credit together when he revealed his intention of writing a sequel to 
Capital. Moreover, today’s ‘financialised’ world economy has seen a variety of 
financial instruments used in all the spheres of economic processes—not just 
production, but also exchange, distribution and consumption, and their function is not 
limited to mediating economic activities any more. In this situation, it is not surprising 
that IERs themselves are financialised, and the state is amongst the biggest actors in 
                                                
150	In	 a	 version	 of	 his	 ‘Plan’,	 he	 says:	 ‘Then	 the	 State.	 (State	 and	 bourgeois	 society.—
Taxation,	or	the	existence	of	the	unproductive	classes.—The	national	debt.—	Population.—
The	 State	 in	 its	 external	 relations:	 Colonies.	 Foreign	 trade.	 Rate	 of	 exchange.	 Money	 as	
international	 coin.—Finally	 the	 world	 market.	 Encroachment	 of	 bourgeois	 society	 on	 the	
State.	Crises’	(CW28:	195).	This	also	presents	some	themes	for	us	to	deal	with,	in	the	future.	
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world financial markets. This, again, indicates the need to take the state and 
credit/finance into consideration to improve what we have outlined in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
The research which has eventually prompted this thesis was first motivated by this 
simple question: what was Karl Marx’s real thought on the ‘world’? Of course, it was 
when the ‘globalisation’ debate was still very hot, and many participants were talking 
about as many Marxes. But, as we have seen in this thesis, his thought on the world 
was never fixed, but changed and evolved as he engaged himself with broader and 
more varied intellectual contexts. Consequently, he did make some original 
achievements as for the way of thinking about the world.  
As he was seeking for the real and the material in social processes, it did not take long 
for him to realise the significance of emerging capitalism as a worldwide system of 
production. Hence, the ‘world market’ instead of the ‘world’. However, it took him a 
lot of time to realise that it was necessary to study political economy to deal with the 
world market properly, and even more time to come up with any original idea 
concerning this theme. In the end, he did not have a chance to express a full account 
of his thought on the world market, or, more generally, the globality of capitalism in 
his life and, consequently left a rather awkward theoretical mission for us. This thesis 
took this task, but what we have produced here is only a partial and tentative 
conclusion. 
At any rate, the outline of Marx’s value theory extended to have the world market as 
its normal category is not merely a conclusion of this thesis; it is also one of the 
potential outcomes of his lifelong intellectual journey. But as emphasised in § 6.2.4 
and § 6.3 repeatedly, that outline is never complete. If only to be a ‘general theory’ of 
capitalist IERs, it should be supplemented with the discussion of the rate of exchange 
between national currencies, finance, the state, migration and remittances, natural 
resources, etc. Thereby, the thus composed theory of the world market — more 
generally, of IERs — should be able to address differing aspects of the world 
economy critically. Indeed, it would be possible to take issue with the common motto 
of the contemporary governments, ‘let’s enhance our national productivity’, with 
what we discussed in Chapter 6. However, our analysis needs to be much more 
comprehensive to be able to occasion any dialectical understanding, for instance, of 
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the international development policies run by the International Monetary Fund, the 
World Bank or the OECD.  
Second, if Chapter 6 is a (tentative) conclusion of Marx’s theory of the world market 
in terms of his mature value theory, it appears strikingly at odds with his early thought 
on the theme as reported in many places of Part I of this thesis. At that time, he used 
to look at the rise of the world market quite positively, and even had a bit of ‘wishful’ 
expectation that it could be a great momentum for human emancipation. On the 
contrary, the world market as conceptualised in Chapter 6 appears to be a field where 
the binding power of the social foundations of economic categories become weaker, 
distinct categories are conflated, and fetishism advances even further. Consequently, 
human beings as wage labourers are degraded as a mere element which constitutes the 
‘alien’ power of productivity for capital. To generalise, it is one of our future task to 
develop the declining power of the social foundations in the world market. The joint-
stock company is one such example. It is well known that Marx hailed this form of 
organisation as ‘the abolition of capital as private property within the framework of 
the capitalist mode of production itself’: 
Formation	of	 stock	 companies.	 Thereby:	 .	 .	 .	 The	 capital,	which	 in	 itself	 rests	on	a	
social	 mode	 of	 production	 and	 presupposes	 a	 social	 concentration	 of	 means	 of	
production	 and	 labour	 power,	 is	 here	 directly	 endowed	 with	 the	 form	 of	 social	
capital	(capital	of	directly	associated	individuals)	as	distinct	from	private	capital,	and	
its	 undertakings	 assume	 the	 form	 of	 social	 undertakings	 as	 distinct	 from	 private	
undertakings.	It	is	the	abolition	of	capital	as	private	property	within	the	framework	
of	the	capitalist	mode	of	production	itself.	(CW37:	434)	
Here, Marx opposes ‘social capital’ to ‘private capital’, and regards them as 
contradicting with each other. Of course, this juxtaposition is meaningful since there 
has been the social and historical background that makes such a contradiction 
working, which is why the joint-stock company was regarded as a special variant 
within West European context. However, as capitalism established itself in new 
territories, such new and contradicting forms were simply transplanted forcibly and, 
consequently, the joint-stock company has been established as the normal form of the 
organisation of capital in South Korea, for example. There is no social foundation 
whatsoever. This is a peculiar way of the reproduction of capitalism as a world 
economy. 
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Third, the social and historical significance of economic categories are not just diluted; 
on the contrary, it sometimes presents itself most strongly at the level of the world 
market. This is why Marx included ‘the modern theory of colonisation’ as the 
concluding chapter in his Capital. Observe that this is not considered as an instance of 
‘primitive accumulation’ even though this chapter is located under the heading of 
‘Part VIII. The So-Called Primitive Accumulation’, which is obvious in the German 
editions.151 Anyway, there can be no doubt over the fact that Marx did consider the 
so-called primitive accumulation as an essential part of his theory of capital 
accumulation. But, unlike exploitation, or the production of absolute/relative surplus 
value, it does not take place in the current process of accumulation, and cannot be 
observed in reality; it belongs to the past, and cannot be experienced again at least in 
those ‘advanced’ countries where capitalism is already firmly rooted. Things are 
different in colonies, though. 
However,	we	are	not	 concerned	here	with	 the	 condition	of	 the	 colonies.	 The	only	
thing	 that	 interests	 us	 is	 the	 secret	 discovered	 in	 the	 new	 world	 by	 the	 political	
economy	 of	 the	 old	 world,	 and	 proclaimed	 on	 the	 house-tops:	 that	 the	 capitalist	
mode	 of	 production	 and	 accumulation,	 and	 therefore	 capitalist	 private	 property,	
have	 for	 their	 fundamental	 condition	 the	 annihilation	 of	 self-earned	 private	
property;	in	other	words,	the	expropriation	of	the	labourer.	(CW35:	760-01)	
In the end, the reproduction of capitalism at the world level is a useful reminder of 
what capitalism is, and has been. This is crucial since Marx’s value theory take the 
historical character of economic categories seriously, but since there is also the 
‘dilution’ tendency at the world level.  
                                                
151	Compare	(i)	the	French	and	the	English	editions	
Part	VII.	The	General	Law	of	Capitalist	Accumulation	
Part	VIII.	The	So-Called	Primitive	Accumulation	
Chapters	26-32.	
Chapter	33.	The	Modern	Theory	of	Colonisation	
with	(ii)	the	German	fourth	edition	
Part	VII.	The	Accumulation	of	Capital	
Chapters	21-23.	
Chapter	24.	The	So-Called	Primitive	Accumulation	
Chapter	25.	The	Modern	Theory	of	Colonisation.	
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On top of that, it is worth reconsidering here the multidimensionality of Marx’s 
critique with which we dealt in Chapter 5. Value theory is, in the end, a logical 
construct of the capitalist world economy and, as such, it does have its own limits. 
Analytically, so, there is emptiness in it which cannot be filled with more logic; on the 
other hand, the early Marx would have tried to fill the emptiness with the class 
struggle and human collective practice. 
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